According to:

http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html

An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
for 25 minutes.

With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
question becomes:

How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
terrorist
organizations start using them against us?

rb wrote:
>
> Highly unlikely that it went undetected for 25 mins.
> More likely it's Iranian sabre rattling again.

Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
smaller versions. Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?

This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
to shoot down a very cheap plane). A radar-directed gun system like
Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target. The best bet at the
moment IMO would be a 35mm gun firing the Oerlikon AHEAD 'shrapnel'
type airburst ammo, using electro-optical guidance.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition
website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion
forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)

wrote:
> rb wrote:
>> Highly unlikely that it went undetected for 25 mins.
>> More likely it's Iranian sabre rattling again.
>
> Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> smaller versions. Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?
>
> This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
> missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> to shoot down a very cheap plane). A radar-directed gun system like
> Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target. The best bet at the
> moment IMO would be a 35mm gun firing the Oerlikon AHEAD 'shrapnel'
> type airburst ammo, using electro-optical guidance.
>
> Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition
> website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion
> forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
>


The US navy in particular seems to have seen the writing on the wall for
some time now, hence (I would assume) part of the reason for their
interest in developing the 'Millenium' gun and expressed interest in the
naval 57mm cannon.
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=13559&rsbci=13158&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400&jsi=false
http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/dec_04_46.php

cheers
rb

rb wrote:
>
> The US navy in particular seems to have seen the writing on the wall for
> some time now, hence (I would assume) part of the reason for their
> interest in developing the 'Millenium' gun and expressed interest in the
> naval 57mm cannon.
> http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=13559&rsbci=13158&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400&jsi=false
> http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/dec_04_46.php

The 35mm Millennium gun would qualify - that's designed to fire the
AHEAD ammo I mentioned - but I'm not so sure about the Bofors 57mm. In
the AA mode that uses radar aiming and proximity fuzes, and I'm not
sure if either would be sensitive enough to respond to a small stealthy
UAV.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:
> Ordinary homing
> missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> to shoot down a very cheap plane).

When choosing whether to expend an expensive missile, it matters not
what the (threat) delivery vehicle cost; what matters is the amount of
damage it is capable of causing.

--
St. John
By doing just a little every day, you can gradually let the task
completely overwhelm you.

wrote:

> Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> smaller versions. Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?

With due respect I don't understand the argument fully in a naval
context. Surely a modern anti-ship missile is much more difficult
target, after all? In general they have small RCS towards target, they
fly very low and very fast. Furthermore their signature can be reduced
even further if design effort is put upon the problem. If we are
talking about small UAV used for anti-ship duties it's either a very
slow and small ASM or it can carry only a very limited payload.

On the other hand, for reconnaissance and target acquisition an UAV is
very good for naval environment as well.

Mvh,
Jon K

wrote:
> According to:
>
> http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
>
> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
> for 25 minutes.
>
> With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
> question becomes:
>
> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
> terrorist
> organizations start using them against us?

Did you notice this is a Russian news agency reporting on what an
Iranian spokesman said?

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> rb wrote:
>>
>> Highly unlikely that it went undetected for 25 mins.
>> More likely it's Iranian sabre rattling again.
>
> Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> smaller versions.

Smaller versions typically have no or little combat capability. Great
survellaince platforms etc but not big enough for any serious work. Make it
big enough to do offensive stuff and it's just as detectable as any other
aircraft.

> Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?

The current crop of UAVs are still heavily dependant on comms and few have
any serious autonomous combat capability. Hence, jamming is the most likely
defense. Jam the comms the UAV goes into autonomous mode. Now you hava a
relatively dumb target to attack.

> This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
> missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> to shoot down a very cheap plane).

The smaller UAVs have limited offensive weapons, if any. Those UAVs that do
are much larger, not overly cheaper than a manned fighter/bomber, and just
as easy to detect (particularly if you can detect all the comms traffic).

> A radar-directed gun system like
> Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target.

The idea is to take them out long before your last line of defense.

> The best bet at the
> moment IMO would be a 35mm gun firing the Oerlikon AHEAD 'shrapnel'
> type airburst ammo, using electro-optical guidance.
>
> Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition
> website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion
> forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
>

The Raven wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...

> > Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> > UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> > smaller versions.
>
> Smaller versions typically have no or little combat capability. Great
> survellaince platforms etc but not big enough for any serious work. Make it
> big enough to do offensive stuff and it's just as detectable as any other
> aircraft.
There are useful offensive things that even small aircraft can do -
like damaging radars. A small uav capable of delivering (slowly) 200kg
of payload is much less detectable then your normal fighter. Although
it might be easier to detect/respond to then an antiship missile, it
might also be orders of magnitude cheaper - and therefore employed in
swarm attacks.

> > Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> > and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> > manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?
>
> The current crop of UAVs are still heavily dependant on comms and few have
> any serious autonomous combat capability.
How long is that going to last? The rest of the world is not dumb, and
India/China have enough good & cheap programmers and scientists...

> Hence, jamming is the most likely defense. Jam the comms the UAV goes into
> autonomous mode. Now you hava a relatively dumb target to attack.
Relatively dumb might still be too smart. Especially if it is in
daylight and in good weather - sea is mostly empty and image
recognition is making a lot of progress.

> > This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
> > missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> > if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> > to shoot down a very cheap plane).
>
> The smaller UAVs have limited offensive weapons, if any. Those UAVs that do
> are much larger, not overly cheaper than a manned fighter/bomber, and just
> as easy to detect (particularly if you can detect all the comms traffic).
You think USA style super-duper all-weather fail proof UAVs.

> > A radar-directed gun system like
> > Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target.
>
> The idea is to take them out long before your last line of defense.
Taking them out early means missiles and/or aircraft. Both will have
problems locking on low signature slow flying targets. And both can be
overwhelmed/depleted by swarm attacks..

I kept specifying "small, stealthy UAVs" - which by definition would
be used for recce, not attack - as these are the hardest targets to
detect and destroy. Now it may be that powerful navies will not be too
troubled by what they can do (you can't hide a ship too easily anyway,
so their enemy will know they are there) but armies certainly are
worried, because UAVs can be used to detect the movements of troops and
vehicles and identify targets for attack - even to lase them to guide
in homing munitions. And some of the recce UAVs being developed at the
moment are really small and quiet and will be very difficult to spot.

Even if SAMs could deal with these small UAVs, the problem would be
that the enemy could then just send over hordes of very cheap UAVs
(without the expensive sensor kit) to soak up the SAMs - a very
cost-effective way of degrading your enemy's capabilities. Unless and
until a small and cheap "anti-UAV" homing missile can be developed, I
think appropriate guns (and ammo) provide the best answer.

It is of course correct that a big, weapon-carrying UAV will be much
easier to detect than a small one (although a stealthy design may still
cause problems, just as stealth strike planes do). In contrast, fast
anti-ship missiles may be difficult to intercept but they have hot
engines and leading-edge surfaces which are easy to detect with IR
sensors: stealth and high speed do not go together very well.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:
> The Raven wrote:
> > > wrote in message
> > ups.com...
>
> > > Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> > > UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> > > smaller versions.
> >
> > Smaller versions typically have no or little combat capability. Great
> > survellaince platforms etc but not big enough for any serious work. Make it
> > big enough to do offensive stuff and it's just as detectable as any other
> > aircraft.
> There are useful offensive things that even small aircraft can do -
> like damaging radars. A small uav capable of delivering (slowly) 200kg
> of payload is much less detectable then your normal fighter. Although
> it might be easier to detect/respond to then an antiship missile, it
> might also be orders of magnitude cheaper - and therefore employed in
> swarm attacks.
>
> > > Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> > > and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> > > manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?
> >
> > The current crop of UAVs are still heavily dependant on comms and few have
> > any serious autonomous combat capability.
> How long is that going to last? The rest of the world is not dumb, and
> India/China have enough good & cheap programmers and scientists...
>
> > Hence, jamming is the most likely defense. Jam the comms the UAV goes into
> > autonomous mode. Now you hava a relatively dumb target to attack.
> Relatively dumb might still be too smart. Especially if it is in
> daylight and in good weather - sea is mostly empty and image
> recognition is making a lot of progress.
>
> > > This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
> > > missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> > > if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> > > to shoot down a very cheap plane).
> >
> > The smaller UAVs have limited offensive weapons, if any. Those UAVs that do
> > are much larger, not overly cheaper than a manned fighter/bomber, and just
> > as easy to detect (particularly if you can detect all the comms traffic).
> You think USA style super-duper all-weather fail proof UAVs.
>
> > > A radar-directed gun system like
> > > Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target.
> >
> > The idea is to take them out long before your last line of defense.
> Taking them out early means missiles and/or aircraft. Both will have
> problems locking on low signature slow flying targets. And both can be
> overwhelmed/depleted by swarm attacks..

Both of these UAVs seem to be on the small side and not capable of much
more than the proported 25 minute flight over an aircraft carrier. The
speed and time indicates a 100 kilometer flight.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/ababil.htm

Ababil is equipped with shahid noroozi guidance and control system
designed and manufactured in Iran.It is composed of two aerial and
ground section. The aircraft control is provided with an autopilot
system that transfers flight information data to the ground station via
a datalink system . The system is able to launch the aircraft ,perform
different maneuvers, fly to30 km range, loiter and simulate air attacks
and finally recover the aircraft at a given point. The range will be
increased up to 120 Km simply by increasing the output power of the
communication system.
wing span 325 cm
wing area 1.76m²
Length overall 288 cm
Max. launching weight 83 kg
Max. payload weight 40 kg

Cruise speed 165 Knots
For longer than 5 km range a tracking system is essential.
Endurance is 1.5 h (Can be increased)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/mohajer.htm

Mohajer (UAV)

Iran's UAV program was launched in the wake of the 1980-88 war with
Iraq. Iran has also been investing in several families of attack and
multirole UAV. Over the years, Iranian officials have reported the
deployment of target drones and such UAVs as the Mohajer-3 [also called
Hodhod-"a hooded bird") and the Mohajer-4. The Mohajer 4 underwent a
test flight on 16 February 2002. The Saeqeh UAV was tested at the same
time. Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Ali Shamkhani,
said that Iran is one of the few countries to have the knowledge for
designing and building UAVs, state radio reported.

Country of Origin Iran
Builder Qods Aviation Industries
Length
Wingspan 3 meters
Weight, Empty
Weight, Maximum 85 kilograms
Engine
Maximum speed 200 kmh
Cruising speed
Ceiling 11,000 feet
Surveillance radius 50 kilometers
Endurance 90 minutes
Launch Pneumatic or jet-assisted
Recovery By Parachute
Armament/Payload
Video and infrared cameras providing 1-meter resolution from altitudes
up to 5,000 feet
User Countries/Groups Hizbollah

wrote:
> I kept specifying "small, stealthy UAVs" - which by definition would
> be used for recce, not attack - as these are the hardest targets to
> detect and destroy. Now it may be that powerful navies will not be too
> troubled by what they can do (you can't hide a ship too easily anyway,
> so their enemy will know they are there)...

On reflection I was wrong there - even small UAVs could pose a serious
threat to ships coming within artillery range of a hostile shore, since
they could lase the ship to guide in laser-homing artillery rounds like
the Russian Krasnopol.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Jack Linthicum wrote:

<snip>
> Both of these UAVs seem to be on the small side and not capable of much
> more than the proported 25 minute flight over an aircraft carrier. The
> speed and time indicates a 100 kilometer flight.
I am not that much worried about the UAVs Iran currently has. More
interesting question is how to defend agains what India/China can
field or sell in 7-10 years.

Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
much easier. Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
(just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
and jam.

It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).

wrote:
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
>
> <snip>
> > Both of these UAVs seem to be on the small side and not capable of much
> > more than the proported 25 minute flight over an aircraft carrier. The
> > speed and time indicates a 100 kilometer flight.
> I am not that much worried about the UAVs Iran currently has. More
> interesting question is how to defend agains what India/China can
> field or sell in 7-10 years.
>
> Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
> are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
> sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
> ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
> mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
> much easier. Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
> (just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
> and jam.
>
> It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
> slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
> attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
> with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
> tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).

A swarm of UAVs requires a swarm of controllers and a swarm of secure
frequencies to accomplish that control. I wonder if a follow-on to a
Shrike or ALARM would bother to hit the transmitting antennas and
instead have a large enough warhead to take out the whole controlling
facility.

wrote:

> On reflection I was wrong there - even small UAVs could pose a serious
> threat to ships coming within artillery range of a hostile shore, since
> they could lase the ship to guide in laser-homing artillery rounds like
> the Russian Krasnopol.

This line of thought might lead into interesting possible conclusion:
return of coastal artillery. If target acquisition works, why not use
advanced SPH's for anti-ship use? If ERGM type rounds can be used they
have more range than most ASM's. SPH's should be also quite flexible as
they could be used to attack land targets as well, a capability which
land-fired ASM's are mostly not suitable for.

A four gun battery firing ERGM-type rounds within MRSI range: maybe
12-20 inbound very small, very fast targets, repeated for perhaps four
times within four minutes, with total of 48-80 inbound rounds. Perhaps
not possible for Iran-type state for a long time, but maybe for China
(and Taiwan as well...).

Mvh,
Jon K

kirjoitti:

> This line of thought might lead into interesting possible conclusion:
> return of coastal artillery. If target acquisition works, why not use
> advanced SPH's for anti-ship use? If ERGM type rounds can be used they

And, obviously I don't mean in sense of ERGM rounds or copies of them,
but in sense of rocket assisted guided rounds, with whatever guidance
method suitable for a/s use.

> Mvh,
> Jon K

Jack Linthicum wrote:

<snip>
> Both of these UAVs seem to be on the small side and not capable of much
> more than the proported 25 minute flight over an aircraft carrier. The
> speed and time indicates a 100 kilometer flight.
I am not that much worried about the UAVs Iran currently has. More
interesting question is how to defend agains what India/China can
field or sell in 7-10 years.

Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
much easier. Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
(just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
and jam.

It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).

> wrote in message
ps.com...
>
> wrote:
> > I kept specifying "small, stealthy UAVs" - which by definition would
> > be used for recce, not attack - as these are the hardest targets to
> > detect and destroy. Now it may be that powerful navies will not be too
> > troubled by what they can do (you can't hide a ship too easily anyway,
> > so their enemy will know they are there)...
>
> On reflection I was wrong there - even small UAVs could pose a serious
> threat to ships coming within artillery range of a hostile shore, since
> they could lase the ship to guide in laser-homing artillery rounds like
> the Russian Krasnopol.

laser guided weapons gave a tendency to attack the sun. you only see the
good ones on tv, not all the misses.
rocks eated by the sun. reflections off of pools of water or streams can
also distract them.

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
>
> <snip>
>> Both of these UAVs seem to be on the small side and not capable of much
>> more than the proported 25 minute flight over an aircraft carrier. The
>> speed and time indicates a 100 kilometer flight.
> I am not that much worried about the UAVs Iran currently has. More
> interesting question is how to defend agains what India/China can
> field or sell in 7-10 years.
>
> Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
> are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
> sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
> ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
> mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
> much easier.

That of course also makes spoofing and the use of decoys much easier
and makes the user rather unpopular with any other seafarers. It'd
be something of a pity if your UAV's decided to attack the local
fishing fleet instead of the USN battle group. Given the number of offshore
rigs and support ships as well as tankers in the Persian Gulf such
indiscriminate weapons would seem rather unattractive to the Iranians
as an example.

> Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
> (just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
> and jam.
>

> It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
> slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
> attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
> with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
> tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).
>

200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
and to CIWS.

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

"ray o'hara" > wrote in message
...
>

>
> laser guided weapons gave a tendency to attack the sun. you only see the
> good ones on tv, not all the misses.

Utter ********, the laser sensors look for reflected light at
specific frequencies

> rocks eated by the sun. reflections off of pools of water or streams can
> also distract them.
>
>

You seem not to understand the difference between IR and laser sensors

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

wrote in
ups.com:

> According to:
>
> http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
>
> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
> for 25 minutes.
>
> With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
> question becomes:
>
> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
> terrorist
> organizations start using them against us?
>

Was the Iranian "UAV" a small drone like ours,or was it a FULL-SIZE
aircraft that was remote controlled?

--
Jim Yanik
jyanik
at
kua.net

wrote in
ups.com:

> I kept specifying "small, stealthy UAVs" - which by definition would
> be used for recce, not attack - as these are the hardest targets to
> detect and destroy. Now it may be that powerful navies will not be too
> troubled by what they can do (you can't hide a ship too easily anyway,
> so their enemy will know they are there) but armies certainly are
> worried, because UAVs can be used to detect the movements of troops and
> vehicles and identify targets for attack - even to lase them to guide
> in homing munitions. And some of the recce UAVs being developed at the
> moment are really small and quiet and will be very difficult to spot.
>
> Even if SAMs could deal with these small UAVs, the problem would be
> that the enemy could then just send over hordes of very cheap UAVs
> (without the expensive sensor kit) to soak up the SAMs - a very
> cost-effective way of degrading your enemy's capabilities. Unless and
> until a small and cheap "anti-UAV" homing missile can be developed, I
> think appropriate guns (and ammo) provide the best answer.
>
> It is of course correct that a big, weapon-carrying UAV will be much
> easier to detect than a small one (although a stealthy design may still
> cause problems, just as stealth strike planes do). In contrast, fast
> anti-ship missiles may be difficult to intercept but they have hot
> engines and leading-edge surfaces which are easy to detect with IR
> sensors: stealth and high speed do not go together very well.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>
>

There's a lot of ASSUMPTION that this "UAV" was a small drone and not a
full-size RC military aircraft. Does anyone know for certain what it was?

--
Jim Yanik
jyanik
at
kua.net

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> wrote:
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> >
<snip>
> > It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
> > slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
> > attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
> > with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
> > tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).
>
> A swarm of UAVs requires a swarm of controllers and a swarm of secure
> frequencies to accomplish that control. I wonder if a follow-on to a
> Shrike or ALARM would bother to hit the transmitting antennas and
> instead have a large enough warhead to take out the whole controlling
> facility.
A swarm of current generation UAVs requires a swarm of controllers.

A swarm of highly autonomous UAVs (perhaps better viewed as a swarm of
ultra cheap cruise missiles accompanied by some stealthy UAVs with good
sensor suites) launched on a 'kill everything that floats and
resembles a warship'' need not. The swarm flies silently (no
communication) to the designated target area, contacts the controllers
when it sees the target (or does not find it), the controller just
tells them "move to X,Y" or "20% attack this ship, 20% attack that ship
and the rest presses on to X,Y". One/few controllers, intermittent, low
bandwidth, frequency agile, tough to intercept/jam communication. Of
course, the tough part is the autonomous acting - but as I said, it you
need it to work only in fair weather, out of ground clutter, in "kill
all that is floating" mode, your task is much easier then what the US
requires from its UAVs. The assymetric warfare thing...

wrote:
>
> No solution is perfect. No UAV is perfect. No weapon is perfect.

....and no defence is perfect.

The concern for navies should be that a very cheap piece of kit (a
small UAV with a laser designator) could guide in very cheap guided
munitions which could take out a very expensive warship.

If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Jim Yanik wrote:
> There's a lot of ASSUMPTION that this "UAV" was a small drone and not a
> full-size RC military aircraft. Does anyone know for certain what it was?

Well the USN hasn't said anything yet, so all we have to go on are what
the Iranians are known to have.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/ababil.htm
wing area 1.76m²
Max. launching weight 83 kg
Cruise speed 165 Knots
Endurance is 1.5 h

Minus 25 minutes on station leaves 30 minutes there and 30 minutes back
or a range of 80 nm.

-HJC

wrote:
> wrote:
> >
> > No solution is perfect. No UAV is perfect. No weapon is perfect.
>
> ...and no defence is perfect.
>
> The concern for navies should be that a very cheap piece of kit (a
> small UAV with a laser designator) could guide in very cheap guided
> munitions which could take out a very expensive warship.
>
> If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
> top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Like anti-radiation missiles. Against the launch sites and control
points.

Keith W wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:

> > Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
> > are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
> > sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
> > ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
> > mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
> > much easier.
>
> That of course also makes spoofing and the use of decoys much easier
> and makes the user rather unpopular with any other seafarers. It'd
> be something of a pity if your UAV's decided to attack the local
> fishing fleet instead of the USN battle group. Given the number of offshore
> rigs and support ships as well as tankers in the Persian Gulf such
> indiscriminate weapons would seem rather unattractive to the Iranians
> as an example.
If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
IR/passive EM sensors),
I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
Chaff and flares might foil simple radar/IR seekers, but I can't see
how would they defeat video imaging sensor (+good software behind it).

> > Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
> > (just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
> > and jam.
> >
>
> > It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
> > slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
> > attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
> > with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
> > tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).
> >
>
> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
> and to CIWS.
Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming. On
the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
engine of the current antiship missiles.

Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
signature and very different characteristics.

The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.

Another possiblity is to actually fly high (say 5-8km) so that the UAV
will have to be attacked by missiles and/or aircraft, not CIWS guns,
and drop (homing) submunition from there, gravity doing the delivery
work. You will want to make these UAVs stealthy, to make the locking of
the missile seeker real difficulty (and postpone finding the UAVs as
much as possible).

There is a tradeoff between sophistication and cost (and reliability,
simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
reliability and long service life'. They need to be good enough to
present a non-negligible threat of crippling the attacker's warships,
not an almost 100% guarantee of destruction.

Stefan

> Keith
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> wrote:
> >
> > If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
> > top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.
>
> Like anti-radiation missiles. Against the launch sites and control
> points.

Since only a simple radio signal is needed to control the UAVs (and
then not all of the time - only when they want to instruct them to do
something) that would be very much harder than hitting a high-powered
radar which has to keep transmitting a distinctive signal all of the
time to do its job. And AR missiles could easily be decoyed by lots of
cheap radio transmitters scattered about.

The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
costly than those of the attackers.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
> > > top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.
> >
> > Like anti-radiation missiles. Against the launch sites and control
> > points.
>
> Since only a simple radio signal is needed to control the UAVs (and
> then not all of the time - only when they want to instruct them to do
> something) that would be very much harder than hitting a high-powered
> radar which has to keep transmitting a distinctive signal all of the
> time to do its job. And AR missiles could easily be decoyed by lots of
> cheap radio transmitters scattered about.
>
> The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> costly than those of the attackers.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals which then
implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
second time but not the first or third. The control point will be that,
singular, one command directing all of the UAVs from one spot. How many
generals would you trust if you were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?

Didn't the Serbs shoot down a U.S. UAV with a helicopter door gun over
Bosnia a few years back?

Helicopter guns might be a cheap way to deal with low performance
UAV's,
assuming you have a sensor that can detect the UAV and direct the Helo
to the target.

wrote:
[snip]

>
> The 35mm Millennium gun would qualify - that's designed to fire the
> AHEAD ammo I mentioned - but I'm not so sure about the Bofors 57mm. In
> the AA mode that uses radar aiming and proximity fuzes, and I'm not
> sure if either would be sensitive enough to respond to a small stealthy
> UAV.

If naval guns can hit incoming artillery shells then they can hit a
slower moving plane. Shrapnel shells can overcome problems with
accuracy. Unlike machine guns, shells can also be used to protect other
ships.

Many UAVs are flown under remote control. Radio direction finding may
permit the location of its headquarters to be found.

Andrew Swallow

wrote:
> Didn't the Serbs shoot down a U.S. UAV with a helicopter door gun over
> Bosnia a few years back?
>
> Helicopter guns might be a cheap way to deal with low performance
> UAV's,
> assuming you have a sensor that can detect the UAV and direct the Helo
> to the target.
If we are talking about a swarm of UAVs, shooting them down with Helos
is way too slow.
And you better pray the UAVs don't carry Stingers or something similar,
helos are sitting ducks...

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> wrote:
> > According to:
> >
> > http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
> >
> > An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
> > for 25 minutes.
> >
> > With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
> > question becomes:
> >
> > How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
> > terrorist
> > organizations start using them against us?
>
> Did you notice this is a Russian news agency reporting on what an
> Iranian spokesman said?

Thanks for pointing that out. It was wondering how it was known to
have been circling for 25 minutes, if it was undetected.

--

FF

wrote:
>
> ...
> >
> > The idea is to take them out long before your last line of defense.
> Taking them out early means missiles and/or aircraft. Both will have
> problems locking on low signature slow flying targets. And both can be
> overwhelmed/depleted by swarm attacks..

So maybe the solution is to suround the fleet with a swarm of
cheap friendly semi-autonomous UAVs to detect and shoot
down approaching hostile UAVs with a cheap weapon like
a light machine gun.

--

FF

wrote:
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> ...
> > The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals
> not necessarily, if mostly autonomous UAVs are used
>
> > which then implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
> > direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
> > second time but not the first or third.
> ??
>
> > The control point will be that, singular, one command directing all of the UAVs
> > from one spot.
> Ever heard of fiber optics communications? Set-up multiple cheap
> antennas for communication, and link them with fiber optics to your
> safe hidden command centre. Why you guys always assume that the bad
> boys are dumb beyond recognition alludes me...

What the hell is an autonomous UAV? and to what purpose? You need a
unique signal for each aircraft otherwise they will all turn left at
the same time. On the first shot you may hit a bunch of decoys but also
the target or targets. Especially if the decoys must be deployed under
the control of the central command. Second time the decoys may stay on
and the command freqs shut down. Third time no one cares and fires
enough weapons to take care of the site and the decoys.

I have heard of fiber optic communications, those antennas will still
radiate and believe it or not the U.S. military can figure out where
the command point is physically. The bad guys do not have to be smart
or dumb, they will be overwhelmed by the amount of crap the U.S. can
throw at tem. It's the occupation afterwards that is the sticking point.

wrote:

> The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> costly than those of the attackers.

It would seem to me to be likely that a simple software code
modification would allow an Aegis system to detect smaller, slower
returns (I would expect that right now, those get filtered out so that
seabirds don't cause spurious readings on the radar scopes). If you
pick up a weak signal that doesn't belong there, just have AEGIS dump
all of its radiating power down a relatively tight beam and zorch a
little lightweight unshielded UAV right out of its electronic mind.

On 31 May 2006 01:51:29 -0700, wrote:

>
>rb wrote:
>>
>> The US navy in particular seems to have seen the writing on the wall for
>> some time now, hence (I would assume) part of the reason for their
>> interest in developing the 'Millenium' gun and expressed interest in the
>> naval 57mm cannon.
>> http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=13559&rsbci=13158&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400&jsi=false
>> http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/dec_04_46.php
>
>The 35mm Millennium gun would qualify - that's designed to fire the
>AHEAD ammo I mentioned - but I'm not so sure about the Bofors 57mm. In
>the AA mode that uses radar aiming and proximity fuzes, and I'm not
>sure if either would be sensitive enough to respond to a small stealthy
>UAV.

I would have thought that the 3Ps range gate fusing would be ideal for that
?

A UAV with a spinning propellor is not going to be overly stealthy, hard to
see yes, invisible to radar ?



greg
--
If you want venality, if you want ignorance, if you want drunkenness,
and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other hand, you
want impulsive, unreflecting, and violent people, where do you look
Do you go to the top or to the bottom?

> wrote in message
ps.com...
>
> Keith W wrote:
>> > wrote in message
>> ups.com...
>> >
>> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
>
>> > Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
>> > are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
>> > sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
>> > ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
>> > mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
>> > much easier.
>>
>> That of course also makes spoofing and the use of decoys much easier
>> and makes the user rather unpopular with any other seafarers. It'd
>> be something of a pity if your UAV's decided to attack the local
>> fishing fleet instead of the USN battle group. Given the number of
>> offshore
>> rigs and support ships as well as tankers in the Persian Gulf such
>> indiscriminate weapons would seem rather unattractive to the Iranians
>> as an example.


> If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
> IR/passive EM sensors),
> I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
> distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
> rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.

As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?

A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
to be especially cheap

> Chaff and flares might foil simple radar/IR seekers, but I can't see
> how would they defeat video imaging sensor (+good software behind it).
>


>> > Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
>> > (just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
>> > and jam.
>> >
>>
>> > It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
>> > slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
>> > attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
>> > with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
>> > tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).
>> >
>>
>> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
>> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
>> and to CIWS.
> Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming.

With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.

> On
> the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
> engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
> engine of the current antiship missiles.
>

But not small enough to be invisible

> Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
> short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
> swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
> signature and very different characteristics.
>

Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC

> The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
> targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
> put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
> can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
> CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.
>

Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.


> Another possiblity is to actually fly high (say 5-8km) so that the UAV
> will have to be attacked by missiles and/or aircraft, not CIWS guns,
> and drop (homing) submunition from there, gravity doing the delivery
> work. You will want to make these UAVs stealthy, to make the locking of
> the missile seeker real difficulty (and postpone finding the UAVs as
> much as possible).
>
> There is a tradeoff between sophistication and cost (and reliability,

And you are now propsing sophisticated, costly and probably unreliable.


> simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
> country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
> good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
> The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
> reliability and long service life'.

But with real time image recognition, organic SEAD and large warheads

DUH !

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> wrote:
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > ...
> > > The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals
> > not necessarily, if mostly autonomous UAVs are used
> >
> > > which then implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
> > > direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
> > > second time but not the first or third.
> > ??
> >
> > > The control point will be that, singular, one command directing all of the UAVs
> > > from one spot.
> > Ever heard of fiber optics communications? Set-up multiple cheap
> > antennas for communication, and link them with fiber optics to your
> > safe hidden command centre. Why you guys always assume that the bad
> > boys are dumb beyond recognition alludes me...
>
> What the hell is an autonomous UAV?
An UAV that can fly itself using an autopilot (see cruise missiles) to
predefined destination, look around and try to see and identify ships
and perhaps asks the controller for help in making crucial decisions
(attack/ignore/move elsewehere).

> and to what purpose?
Increase survivablilty/success of the system. Little, low bandwidth
communication = difficult to detect & jam.

> You need a unique signal for each aircraft otherwise they will all turn left at
> the same time.
You are still thinking 'remote controlled airplane'. Think 'remote
command'. The UAVs are capable of flying themselves, they just might
need advice from time to time. You don't tell each single aircraft what
to do exactly, you just send a message to the whole swarm: "20% of you
attack the ship, priorities ar A,B,C, the rest go to box [X,Y] and
search for targets there" Each UAV rolls a dice, if it is in the 20%,
it rolls a dice to choose among the identifiable targets on the ship
(phased arrays, CIWS radars, bridge, aircraft on deck, catapult). They
actual flying and execution of the commands is done autonomously. (It
will be a bit more complicated, but this is the basic idea.)

> On the first shot you may hit a bunch of decoys but also
> the target or targets. Especially if the decoys must be deployed under
> the control of the central command. Second time the decoys may stay on
> and the command freqs shut down. Third time no one cares and fires
> enough weapons to take care of the site and the decoys.
No decoys needed. The UAVs themselves are cheap enough so that would be
waste. Perhpas you can have a hi/lo mix of UAVs with high end
sensors/UAVs with cheapo sensors (as the sensors are likely the
costliest part of the UAV), the cheapo UAVs acting as a sort of decoys
(but still being able to inflict damage, just with a bit lower
probability.)

> I have heard of fiber optic communications, those antennas will still
> radiate
With autonomous UAVs, the radiation will be intermittent and low
bandwidth. Using spread spectrum/frequency agility or whatever, it
will be difficult to pick up out of the noise. And antennas are cheap
and you can have plenty of them....

> and believe it or not the U.S. military can figure out where
> the command point is physically.
:-) Like they had sooo much intelligence on WMD in Iraq. Or their
capability to take out Serbian tanks/guns/command centers. ;-) Somehow
I don't think Iran is a country in which USA has a lot of good
humint....

And tt's not like you need an air conditioned bunker holding 100s of
people and computers, anywhere in the vicinity where you can connect to
your fiber network is good enough. The squad doing the control might
decide themselves in the morning of the attack where they want to be,
not even their superiors need to know...

> The bad guys do not have to be smart
> or dumb, they will be overwhelmed by the amount of crap the U.S. can
> throw at tem.
You know, never underestimate your adversary...
Somehow, the Serbian military was not particularly overwhelmed, the
civilian infrastructure was....

> It's the occupation afterwards that is the sticking point.
Well, I don't think US will be dumb enough to try to occupy Iran. But
with Dubya you never know....

wrote:
[snip]

>
> Even if SAMs could deal with these small UAVs, the problem would be
> that the enemy could then just send over hordes of very cheap UAVs
> (without the expensive sensor kit) to soak up the SAMs - a very
> cost-effective way of degrading your enemy's capabilities. Unless and
> until a small and cheap "anti-UAV" homing missile can be developed, I
> think appropriate guns (and ammo) provide the best answer.

NATOs weapons are expensive because:
a. they are made in tiny quantities.
b. are built to work at the north pole, in a snow storm during a nuclear
war.

If you relax the specifications a little something much cheaper can be
made. For instance in the middle east the sensor kit for a UAV could be
a mobile phone with built in camera. Reprogram the phone to take a
picture every minute and radio it back. Such a UAV and camera could be
mass produced for less than £1,000.

Longer range at night would require a civilian infra-red surveillance
camera and a bigger plane but still very low cost.

Andrew Swallow

Andrew Swallow wrote:

> Many UAVs are flown under remote control. Radio direction finding may
> permit the location of its headquarters to be found.

Good point, few countries have enough satellite bandwidth to manage
UAVs the way the US does, so unless Iran is buying bandwidth from
someone else, they'd have to be RC controlled UAVs.

That would make the controller VERY vulnerable to counter fire and
would severly limit range. It would also make the control of the UAV
somewhat easy to jam, or even commandeer.

wrote:
[snip]

>
> A swarm of highly autonomous UAVs (perhaps better viewed as a swarm of
> ultra cheap cruise missiles accompanied by some stealthy UAVs with good
> sensor suites) launched on a 'kill everything that floats and
> resembles a warship'' need not. The swarm flies silently (no

Try launch at night and attack anything that is between 2 and 150
degrees warmer than the sea. The Iranians would destroy the odd Iraqi
or Saudi car but that may not worry them. The upper limit stops the
second wave from attacking the same targets are the first wave.

Andrew Swallow

wrote:
> With due respect I don't understand the argument fully in a naval
> context. Surely a modern anti-ship missile is much more difficult
> target, after all? In general they have small RCS towards target, they
> fly very low and very fast. Furthermore their signature can be reduced
> even further if design effort is put upon the problem. If we are
> talking about small UAV used for anti-ship duties it's either a very
> slow and small ASM or it can carry only a very limited payload.

The speed is the key. Most radars are programmed to filter out small
returns that aren't moving very fast, because its probably a bird.

If you get a small return, but its moving at Mach 2, that's a pretty
good indicator that you are not tracking a bird. Also, any inbound ASM
is going to have a visible heat signature as well, especailly the newer
supersonic ones.

Therein lies the problem with a UAV, the radar system ignores it
because its too slow.

Henry J Cobb wrote:
> Jim Yanik wrote:
>> There's a lot of ASSUMPTION that this "UAV" was a small drone and not
>> a full-size RC military aircraft. Does anyone know for certain what it
>> was?
>
> Well the USN hasn't said anything yet, so all we have to go on are what
> the Iranians are known to have.
>
> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/ababil.htm
> wing area 1.76m²
> Max. launching weight 83 kg
> Cruise speed 165 Knots
> Endurance is 1.5 h
>
> Minus 25 minutes on station leaves 30 minutes there and 30 minutes back
> or a range of 80 nm.
>
> -HJC

If it is cheap it does not have to make a return journey giving a range
of 160 nm.

Andrew Swallow

wrote:

> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
> for 25 minutes.

> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
> terrorist
> organizations start using them against us?

Carrier launches it's own swarm of 1/6 scale Hellcats to cut the
intruders' crepe-paper streamers with their props...

Hezbollah also flew a UAV over Israel in 2004:

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20041107-1114-lebanon-israel.html

So this isn't a new problem.

Come to think of it, didn't an Israeli UAV photograph a U. S.
Helicopter carrier
off Lebanon while the Marines were in Beirut in the 1980's?

Keith W wrote:
> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
> > IR/passive EM sensors),
> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
>
> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?
Scared ****less of being shot down?
Wishful thinking?
Orgasmic about being able to release their weapons and claim kills?
Darkness/lousy weather/bad visibility?
Flying fast and having only few short seconds to make decision?
Releasing their weapons from way too far range for positive
identification (perhaps because being scared ****less)?

Can be any of these or their combination.

> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
> to be especially cheap
Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
magnification for examining the suspicios contacts), a decent CPU to do
the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free. Perhaps the
costliest part of the development would be sea trials (to see how is
the real-time identification working and debug it), but then who knows
what they use their small UAVs for now (see the first message of this
thread).

<snip>
> >> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
> >> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
> >> and to CIWS.
> > Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming.
>
> With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.
The cost might be high for initial development, but there is not reason
the cost should be high on per-unit base. Cameras/CPUs and copying
software is cheap. Cooled IR sensors and other fancy sensor stuff might
rise the cost - the question is how much of it is needed, especially
if you don't ask for all-weather capability.

> > On
> > the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
> > engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
> > engine of the current antiship missiles.
> But not small enough to be invisible
Nothing is invisible. But if its signature is there with seagulls and
sun reflections off waves, the locking/homing task is so much harder.

> > Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
> > short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
> > swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
> > signature and very different characteristics.
>
> Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
> that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC
An attacking UAV can make its decision to attack close enough - when it
can actually see the island/aircrafts on deck of the carrier. And has a
lots of frames to base its decision on. It might even send some info to
the controller and ask whether to attack or not (again, tradeoff
between how much you send and how reliable you want your communication
channel to be).

> > The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
> > targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
> > put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
> > can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
> > CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.
> >
>
> Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
> 8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.
Such an UAV will not be small: it will be Predator size, powered by a
Rotax, Jabiru or more likely cheap copy of them. But it can be cheap,
especially if mass produced and intended for one-way cruise-missile
type missions. Ultralight aircraft kits are essentially hand-made and
sell for 10-20k. Replace the cabin with the warhead(s), give it faster
wing (no need for low stall speed, this is on one way mission) and the
sensors/brains/communication kit and mass produce it. Be smart
designing it (ease of mass production) and try to reduce the IR/radar
signature, but don't go overboard with that - keep the costs down. The
only potentially expensive parts on the aircraft are sensors and
warheads. The 200kg is the total useful load, some UAVs will have it
divided as sub missiles for massed attack on air defense radars, other
UAVs will simply have a big explosive load (hoping that the radars have
already been damaged, so they can get in close to do BAM).

....
> > simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
> > country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
> > good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
> > The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
> > reliability and long service life'.
>
> But with real time image recognition, organic SEAD and large warheads
Yeah, you need real time image recognition. That is the enabling
technology. I think we can agree to disagree whether that is possible
in the next 5-10 years, for operation in good visibility.

The quoted 200kg was just quoted as an example - about what an
ultralight aircraft can carry. You need your aircraft big enough to
have enough range to engage the carrier group operating off your
shores, so a 200kg payload will not significantly increase it anyway.
A modified ultralight can't fly that fast, leaving it rather
vulnerable. That's why you are better of launching submunitions from
out of range of the gun CIWS. Those subminitions need to be reasonably
smart (once qued by the sensors of the main craft, they need to be able
to lock on their target and hit it), but not necessarily pack a lot of
punch (hitting radars, aircraft on deck and so on). Once the radars
have been damaged, the second wave can then just press on with large
warhead bringing general destruction. (Or, to keep it simple, they all
go together. If the radars are switched off, the large warheads will
arrive and do the damage, if the radars are on (likely), the
submunitions will home on them.)


> DUH !
>
> Keith

Airyx wrote:
> Therein lies the problem with a UAV, the radar system ignores it
> because its too slow.

That lasts only as long as it takes to recognize the potential threat
that little, slow UAVs could pose. I can't imagine that developing a
new algorithm to pick out non-avian flight patterns would be that
tricky. I doubt that there are many birds that follow as linear and
consistent a flight pattern as your average UAV, and a cheap
lightweight UAV won't be able to spoof the behavior of a seabird.

Jeb wrote:
> wrote:
>
> > The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> > that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> > costly than those of the attackers.
>
> It would seem to me to be likely that a simple software code
> modification would allow an Aegis system to detect smaller, slower
> returns (I would expect that right now, those get filtered out so that
> seabirds don't cause spurious readings on the radar scopes). If you
> pick up a weak signal that doesn't belong there, just have AEGIS dump
> all of its radiating power down a relatively tight beam and zorch a
> little lightweight unshielded UAV right out of its electronic mind.
Shielding agains nuclear EMP might be tough (especially because it is
so non-trivial to check whether it works).

Shielding against a radar with known properties should not be a
problem. If you go to the pains of designing and building the UAVs, you
don't leave them vulnerable against such an obvious way to deal with
them.

Jeb wrote:
> Airyx wrote:
>> Therein lies the problem with a UAV, the radar system ignores it
>> because its too slow.
>
> That lasts only as long as it takes to recognize the potential threat
> that little, slow UAVs could pose. I can't imagine that developing a
> new algorithm to pick out non-avian flight patterns would be that
> tricky. I doubt that there are many birds that follow as linear and
> consistent a flight pattern as your average UAV, and a cheap
> lightweight UAV won't be able to spoof the behavior of a seabird.
>

There is an upper limit on the number of targets a radar can track. A
thousand aircraft would be a large force but a thousand birds is a small
flock.

Andrew Swallow

wrote:
> Jeb wrote:
> > wrote:
> >
> > > The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> > > that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> > > costly than those of the attackers.
> >
> > It would seem to me to be likely that a simple software code
> > modification would allow an Aegis system to detect smaller, slower
> > returns (I would expect that right now, those get filtered out so that
> > seabirds don't cause spurious readings on the radar scopes). If you
> > pick up a weak signal that doesn't belong there, just have AEGIS dump
> > all of its radiating power down a relatively tight beam and zorch a
> > little lightweight unshielded UAV right out of its electronic mind.

> Shielding agains nuclear EMP might be tough (especially because it is
> so non-trivial to check whether it works).
>
> Shielding against a radar with known properties should not be a
> problem. If you go to the pains of designing and building the UAVs, you
> don't leave them vulnerable against such an obvious way to deal with
> them.

:) If you say so. But how much weight do you think you'll have to add
to that "cheap and simple" UAV to keep a CG or DDG's AN/SPY-1 from
burning out the electronics from sheer power output alone? Suddenly
the cost and complexity aspect of those UAVs is going to go way up and
result in either a smaller unit buy or the buyers spending a lot more
on those UAVs than they'd planned.

For that matter, if you can locate the UAV by radar, then just direct a
blinding laser against the system so that either it can't target or
can't feed useful info back to its controller. Takes it out of the
mission and still doesn't require expenditure of any ordnance, if the
targeted ship doesn't want to kill it.

> wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> Keith W wrote:
>> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
>> > IR/passive EM sensors),
>> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
>> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
>> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
>>
>> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
>> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
>> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?


> Scared ****less of being shot down?

The Argentine air crews displayed almost suicidal bravery

> Wishful thinking?
> Orgasmic about being able to release their weapons and claim kills?
> Darkness/lousy weather/bad visibility?

Daylight

> Flying fast and having only few short seconds to make decision?

In a C-130 ?

> Releasing their weapons from way too far range for positive
> identification (perhaps because being scared ****less)?

They rolled them off the exit ramp at mast top height

>
> Can be any of these or their combination.
>

Or just maybe its harder than you think.

>> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
>> to be especially cheap
> Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
> wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
> magnification for examining the suspicios contacts),

Problem 1 ) You have to process them to decide if they are suspicious


> a decent CPU to do
> the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
> items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
> pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free.

Understatement of the year

> Perhaps the
> costliest part of the development would be sea trials (to see how is
> the real-time identification working and debug it), but then who knows
> what they use their small UAVs for now (see the first message of this
> thread).
>

Who knows if the incident even happened.

> <snip>
>> >> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
>> >> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
>> >> and to CIWS.
>> > Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming.
>>
>> With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.
> The cost might be high for initial development, but there is not reason
> the cost should be high on per-unit base. Cameras/CPUs and copying
> software is cheap. Cooled IR sensors and other fancy sensor stuff might
> rise the cost - the question is how much of it is needed, especially
> if you don't ask for all-weather capability.

All of it or it wont work



>
>> > On
>> > the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
>> > engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
>> > engine of the current antiship missiles.
>> But not small enough to be invisible
> Nothing is invisible. But if its signature is there with seagulls and
> sun reflections off waves, the locking/homing task is so much harder.
>

Seagulls dont have 100 hp engines. Even cheap IR sensors
have no problem with people let alone IC engines

>> > Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
>> > short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
>> > swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
>> > signature and very different characteristics.
>>
>> Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
>> that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC
> An attacking UAV can make its decision to attack close enough - when it
> can actually see the island/aircrafts on deck of the carrier.

First it has to decide to get close enough, then it has to survive
the transit

> And has a
> lots of frames to base its decision on. It might even send some info to
> the controller and ask whether to attack or not (again, tradeoff
> between how much you send and how reliable you want your communication
> channel to be).
>

Comms are BAD things for an autonomous UAV , they can be jammed



>> > The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
>> > targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
>> > put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
>> > can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
>> > CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.
>> >
>>
>> Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
>> 8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.
> Such an UAV will not be small: it will be Predator size, powered by a
> Rotax, Jabiru or more likely cheap copy of them.


None of which carry 8-12 sub missiles. Note that controlling
Predator involves 3 operators in a 30ft trailer packed with electronics

> But it can be cheap,
> especially if mass produced and intended for one-way cruise-missile
> type missions.

Not with the abilities you are demanding.

> Ultralight aircraft kits are essentially hand-made and
> sell for 10-20k.

Indeed but of course they fly a around 70 knots
with a max gross weight of around 300 kg, not
much room there for 200kg warheads

> Replace the cabin with the warhead(s), give it faster
> wing (no need for low stall speed, this is on one way mission) and the
> sensors/brains/communication kit and mass produce it.

Real easy huh , when do you plan to start production ?

> Be smart
> designing it (ease of mass production) and try to reduce the IR/radar
> signature, but don't go overboard with that - keep the costs down. The
> only potentially expensive parts on the aircraft are sensors and
> warheads. The 200kg is the total useful load, some UAVs will have it
> divided as sub missiles for massed attack on air defense radars, other
> UAVs will simply have a big explosive load (hoping that the radars have
> already been damaged, so they can get in close to do BAM).
>
> ...
>> > simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
>> > country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
>> > good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
>> > The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
>> > reliability and long service life'.
>>
>> But with real time image recognition, organic SEAD and large warheads
> Yeah, you need real time image recognition. That is the enabling
> technology. I think we can agree to disagree whether that is possible
> in the next 5-10 years, for operation in good visibility.
>
> The quoted 200kg was just quoted as an example - about what an
> ultralight aircraft can carry. You need your aircraft big enough to
> have enough range to engage the carrier group operating off your
> shores, so a 200kg payload will not significantly increase it anyway.
> A modified ultralight can't fly that fast, leaving it rather
> vulnerable.


I think I already said that

> That's why you are better of launching submunitions from
> out of range of the gun CIWS. Those subminitions need to be reasonably
> smart (once qued by the sensors of the main craft, they need to be able
> to lock on their target and hit it), but not necessarily pack a lot of
> punch (hitting radars, aircraft on deck and so on).

Hint CIWS reach a long way , the sort of missile you'd need would
be stinger sized at a minimum and you need a control system
smart enough to know WHEN to fire, sensor fuzion is harder than
you seem to think

> Once the radars
> have been damaged, the second wave can then just press on with large
> warhead bringing general destruction. (Or, to keep it simple, they all
> go together. If the radars are switched off, the large warheads will
> arrive and do the damage, if the radars are on (likely), the
> submunitions will home on them.)
>

So you now rely on a new development of small fast radar
homing sub munitions as well, and all this a grad student
technology , yeah right !

Keith

"Keith W" > wrote in message
...
>
> > wrote in message
> oups.com...
>>
>> Keith W wrote:
>>> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
>>> > IR/passive EM sensors),
>>> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
>>> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
>>> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
>>>
>>> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
>>> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
>>> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?
>
>
>> Scared ****less of being shot down?
>
> The Argentine air crews displayed almost suicidal bravery
>
Are these exclusive?

Glenn D.

"Glenn Dowdy" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith W" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> > wrote in message
>> oups.com...
>>>
>>> Keith W wrote:
>>>> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
>>>> > IR/passive EM sensors),
>>>> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
>>>> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
>>>> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
>>>>
>>>> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
>>>> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
>>>> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?
>>
>>
>>> Scared ****less of being shot down?
>>
>> The Argentine air crews displayed almost suicidal bravery
>>
> Are these exclusive?
>

Not at all

Keith

In article . com>,
says...
>
> Andrew Swallow wrote:
>
> > Many UAVs are flown under remote control. Radio direction finding may
> > permit the location of its headquarters to be found.
>
> Good point, few countries have enough satellite bandwidth to manage
> UAVs the way the US does, so unless Iran is buying bandwidth from
> someone else, they'd have to be RC controlled UAVs.
>
Fully autonomous UAVs are not common today---but they probably will
be in another few years. They would be particularly good
for surveillance of large targets like a CVBG. The UAV could
send out data and wait for very generic microburst commands
like "circle left, 20mile radius". That would make it hard
to attack the controller. While it may be possible get a DF
location on a randomly-timed, 10millisecond, spread spectrum signal
from a mobile command post, it might also be very expensive.


> That would make the controller VERY vulnerable to counter fire and
> would severly limit range. It would also make the control of the UAV
> somewhat easy to jam, or even commandeer.
>
>I would expect that military UAVs would have fairly good encryption
on the links. Heck, even the low-cost ($179) 900 MHz modems we use
on some projects feature frequency hopping and 256-bit AES encryption.

http://www.maxstream.net/products/xtend/rf-modem-rs232.php

Mark Borgerson

> wrote in message
oups.com...
> wrote:
>
>> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
>> for 25 minutes.
>
>> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
>> terrorist
>> organizations start using them against us?
>
> Carrier launches it's own swarm of 1/6 scale Hellcats to cut the
> intruders' crepe-paper streamers with their props...

Finally someone's thinking straight. Personally I'd forget all the high-tech
stuff and go for an old WWII carrier with Seafires on it. No swarm of UAVs
can match that, plus all the WWII pilot wanabees get to fly. If a flight is
sent to intercept a flock of birds, oh well, at least they've flown. If they
come across hostile UAVs its time to check the lightbulb in that good old
reflector gunsight and go weapons hot.

In article om>,
says...
>
> wrote:
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
> > > > top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.
> > >
> > > Like anti-radiation missiles. Against the launch sites and control
> > > points.
> >
> > Since only a simple radio signal is needed to control the UAVs (and
> > then not all of the time - only when they want to instruct them to do
> > something) that would be very much harder than hitting a high-powered
> > radar which has to keep transmitting a distinctive signal all of the
> > time to do its job. And AR missiles could easily be decoyed by lots of
> > cheap radio transmitters scattered about.
> >
> > The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> > that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> > costly than those of the attackers.
> >
> > Tony Williams
> > Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>
> The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals which then
> implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
> direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
> second time but not the first or third. The control point will be that,
> singular, one command directing all of the UAVs from one spot. How many
> generals would you trust if you were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?
>
One control point for a swarm of semi-intelligent UAVs does not imply
either continuous transmission or a single transmitter.

Mark Borgerson

In article . com>,
says...
>
> wrote:
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > ...
> > > The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals
> > not necessarily, if mostly autonomous UAVs are used
> >
> > > which then implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
> > > direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
> > > second time but not the first or third.
> > ??
> >
> > > The control point will be that, singular, one command directing all of the UAVs
> > > from one spot.
> > Ever heard of fiber optics communications? Set-up multiple cheap
> > antennas for communication, and link them with fiber optics to your
> > safe hidden command centre. Why you guys always assume that the bad
> > boys are dumb beyond recognition alludes me...
>
> What the hell is an autonomous UAV?

Well, a semi-autonomous UAV is one that doesn't require continuous
flight-control command. It simply requires comms more on the order
of those with a fighter pilot: "Target in sight" "cleared to fire",
etc.

> and to what purpose? You need a
> unique signal for each aircraft otherwise they will all turn left at
> the same time.

Nope. You just need a different packet address for each UAV.


> On the first shot you may hit a bunch of decoys but also
> the target or targets. Especially if the decoys must be deployed under
> the control of the central command. Second time the decoys may stay on
> and the command freqs shut down. Third time no one cares and fires
> enough weapons to take care of the site and the decoys.

How many rounds does the defense need to destroy all those decoys
and targets?
>
> I have heard of fiber optic communications, those antennas will still
> radiate and believe it or not the U.S. military can figure out where
> the command point is physically. The bad guys do not have to be smart
> or dumb, they will be overwhelmed by the amount of crap the U.S. can
> throw at tem. It's the occupation afterwards that is the sticking point.
>
Yup. Then the US military will be overwhelmed by the amount of
crap the insurgents throw at them! ;-( The guys on land are having
problems countering modest numbers of low-cost, command detonated
munitions. The Navy has the advantage of greater standoff range--
but loses a lot of that advantage as soon as it comes time to
put boots on the beach.


Mark Borgerson

Keith W wrote:

> > Can be any of these or their combination.
> Or just maybe its harder than you think.
Somehow I doubt when they were overflying the tanker in daylight, they
still thought they are attacking an aircraft carrier. :-)

> >> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
> >> to be especially cheap
> > Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
> > wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
> > magnification for examining the suspicios contacts),
>
> Problem 1 ) You have to process them to decide if they are suspicious
There are not so many big things floating in the ocean, just examine
them all.
While the waves move and provide clutter, in half-decent weather a
100m+ ship tends to stick out as a sore thumb from quite afar. And it
is quite unlikely there will be third party merchants sticking around a
US carrier group in time of armed conflict....

> > a decent CPU to do
> > the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
> > items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
> > pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free.
> Understatement of the year
Yes, if you want to be able to do it in all weather, from 50km+ afar,
your target hidden among the merchants, in few moments of ultrasonic
flight.

In fair weather, from less then 15km, with closing speed of 200km/h, I
am not so sure. Warships do look quite differently then merchants/oil
rigs, and they also tend to radiate differently.

> >> With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.
> > The cost might be high for initial development, but there is not reason
> > the cost should be high on per-unit base. Cameras/CPUs and copying
> > software is cheap. Cooled IR sensors and other fancy sensor stuff might
> > rise the cost - the question is how much of it is needed, especially
> > if you don't ask for all-weather capability.
>
> All of it or it wont work
See above. Fair weather, no clutter. You want sensors from different
spectra to work together, but they can be the cheap stuff...

> >> > On
> >> > the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
> >> > engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
> >> > engine of the current antiship missiles.
> >> But not small enough to be invisible
> > Nothing is invisible. But if its signature is there with seagulls and
> > sun reflections off waves, the locking/homing task is so much harder.
> >
> Seagulls dont have 100 hp engines. Even cheap IR sensors
> have no problem with people let alone IC engines
With the engine tucked at the back (like Predator) and with good mixing
of the exhaust gas, you are mostly looking at cold front face.
Seagulls/people tend to present warm bodies.

Moreover, those cheap sensors are not mounted on supersonic missiles
screaming to intercept you (the heat of the supersonic air alone might
wash out your meager IR signature).

> >> > Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
> >> > short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
> >> > swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
> >> > signature and very different characteristics.
> >>
> >> Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
> >> that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC
> > An attacking UAV can make its decision to attack close enough - when it
> > can actually see the island/aircrafts on deck of the carrier.
>
> First it has to decide to get close enough, then it has to survive
> the transit
First is not that tough - with enough endurance reserve. Second is the
matter of identification distance. And if the suspected target is
illuminating me with targetting radar, I don't really have problem to
identify it as a target, even if I am relatively far.

> > And has a
> > lots of frames to base its decision on. It might even send some info to
> > the controller and ask whether to attack or not (again, tradeoff
> > between how much you send and how reliable you want your communication
> > channel to be).
> Comms are BAD things for an autonomous UAV , they can be jammed
Yes - but low bandwith intelligently designed comms are tough to jam.

> >> Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
> >> 8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.
> > Such an UAV will not be small: it will be Predator size, powered by a
> > Rotax, Jabiru or more likely cheap copy of them.
> None of which carry 8-12 sub missiles.
Useful load of Predator is about thousand pounds. A hellfire is more
useful for predator then 8-12 short range anti-radar missiles.

> Note that controlling
> Predator involves 3 operators in a 30ft trailer packed with electronics
Predator does a lot more, and the operators/electronics are there to
analyze/evaluate what it sees, in a much harder to analyze environment,
and with much higher expectations.

> > Ultralight aircraft kits are essentially hand-made and
> > sell for 10-20k.
>
> Indeed but of course they fly a around 70 knots
> with a max gross weight of around 300 kg, not
> much room there for 200kg warheads
Ultralights with 100hp engines are limited to cca 500kg and 100knots by
law, not by physics. Predator uses the same 100hp Rotax and has 220km/h
max speed, around 1000kg takeoff weight of which cca 500kg is dry
weight (200payload, 300 fuel).
That 500kg of dry weight also includes lots of sensors you will do
without.

> > Replace the cabin with the warhead(s), give it faster
> > wing (no need for low stall speed, this is on one way mission) and the
> > sensors/brains/communication kit and mass produce it.
>
> Real easy huh , when do you plan to start production ?
The tough part is really the sensors/data analysis, not the
airframe....


> > That's why you are better of launching submunitions from
> > out of range of the gun CIWS. Those subminitions need to be reasonably
> > smart (once qued by the sensors of the main craft, they need to be able
> > to lock on their target and hit it), but not necessarily pack a lot of
> > punch (hitting radars, aircraft on deck and so on).
>
> Hint CIWS reach a long way , the sort of missile you'd need would
> be stinger sized at a minimum and you need a control system
> smart enough to know WHEN to fire, sensor fuzion is harder than
> you seem to think
Stinger missile proper weights 10kg, plenty of room in my 200kg
allowance for 8 of them.

Somehow identifying the range to the target (when you are within line
of sight and less then 10km away) does not seem too hard to me.

Knowing that I am being illuminated by targeting radars also helps in
making my decision.

> > Once the radars
> > have been damaged, the second wave can then just press on with large
> > warhead bringing general destruction. (Or, to keep it simple, they all
> > go together. If the radars are switched off, the large warheads will
> > arrive and do the damage, if the radars are on (likely), the
> > submunitions will home on them.)
> So you now rely on a new development of small fast radar
> homing sub munitions as well, and all this a grad student
> technology , yeah right !
No, being India/China/Iran, I already have those - maybe a bit larger,
but no significant new development needed.

> Keith

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> Mark Borgerson wrote:
> > In article om>,
> > says...
> > >
> > > wrote:
> > > > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
> > > > > > top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.
> > > > >
> > > > > Like anti-radiation missiles. Against the launch sites and control
> > > > > points.
> > > >
> > > > Since only a simple radio signal is needed to control the UAVs (and
> > > > then not all of the time - only when they want to instruct them to do
> > > > something) that would be very much harder than hitting a high-powered
> > > > radar which has to keep transmitting a distinctive signal all of the
> > > > time to do its job. And AR missiles could easily be decoyed by lots of
> > > > cheap radio transmitters scattered about.
> > > >
> > > > The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> > > > that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> > > > costly than those of the attackers.
> > > >
> > > > Tony Williams
> > > > Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> > >
> > > The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals which then
> > > implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
> > > direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
> > > second time but not the first or third. The control point will be that,
> > > singular, one command directing all of the UAVs from one spot. How many
> > > generals would you trust if you were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?
> > >
> > One control point for a swarm of semi-intelligent UAVs does not imply
> > either continuous transmission or a single transmitter.
> >
> > Mark Borgerson
>
> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> grenades.
Hm, I don't know. Especially if they employ hundreds/thousands of
battery/solar powered decoy transmitters. You will need to listen on
the whole spectrum, all time, and be able to sort out what is real and
what is noise.

> Still have to transmit to the aircraft, whether it is a high
> sophisticated address or not the transmission has to be made to each
> aircraft.
No, a broadcast to the whole group is enough.

> Home on radiation.
The radiation is almost never there (short bursts from different
locations). You will need to remember the bearing/location of the
burst, then examine that neighbourhood for anything suspicious and then
perhaps attack it. With decoy transmitters .... good luck!

> Again the idea that the position in which
> a large scale use of UAVs is analogous to the IED situation is not
> defensible. Multiple targets are multiple targets to an airborne
> system. So far I see this whole discussion as one of a possible but not
> probable situation.
Tough to say what is probable. What is certain is that the potential
adversaries are not stupid, and they are searching assymetric ways how
to neutralise the US military advantages....

Jack Linthicum wrote:
[snip]

>
> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> grenades.

The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.

Andrew Swallow

Andrew Swallow wrote:
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> [snip]
>
> >
> > I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> > intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> > miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> > grenades.
>
> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
?? You transmit only when you want to issue new command to the swarm,
not to control every little thing. You can have minutes without
transmission, then 10ms transmission, followed by another long silence.

And you can also have plenty of cheap decoy trasmitters, just to make
it easier to intercept ... something. ;-)



> Andrew Swallow

wrote:
> Andrew Swallow wrote:
>> Jack Linthicum wrote:
>> [snip]
>>
>>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
>>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
>>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
>>> grenades.
>> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
>> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
>> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
> ?? You transmit only when you want to issue new command to the swarm,
> not to control every little thing. You can have minutes without
> transmission, then 10ms transmission, followed by another long silence.
>

A machine can get a fairly accurate bearing in 10ms. Machines can be
made to be very patient so the several minutes is only a minor problem.
Several minutes allows wide angle receivers to be replaced by narrow
angle receivers sufficiently accurate to allow the targeting of weapons.

> And you can also have plenty of cheap decoy trasmitters, just to make
> it easier to intercept ... something. ;-)
>
Try brute force and ignorance - destroy the lot.

Andrew Swallow

In article >,
says...
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> [snip]
>
> >
> > I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> > intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> > miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> > grenades.
>
> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
>

Why are you assuming that the command post does not move? I see no
reason that a mobile command post and multiple mobile transmitters
could not be used.

Spread spectrum and frequency hopping systems do use a finite number
of frequencies---but the sequence of freqencies used may not repeat for
many hours. That leaves you with a broadband collection problem
and having to sort out multiple emitters on the same bandwidth with
different hopping schedules. I suspect that is a problem handled
offline and after-the-fact, and not in real time. However, the
technology has probably advanced a bit in the 30 years I've been
out of the sigint world. ;-)


Mark Borgerson

Mark Borgerson wrote:
> In article >,
> says...
>> Jack Linthicum wrote:
>> [snip]
>>
>>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
>>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
>>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
>>> grenades.
>> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
>> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
>> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
>>
>
> Why are you assuming that the command post does not move? I see no
> reason that a mobile command post and multiple mobile transmitters
> could not be used.
>

This comes down to the definition of mobile. If the command post stays
in the same place for half an hour it is static. A constantly moving
command post would need a vehicle the size of a bus to hold the
operators and long range transmitters, possible but hard to camouflage.

> Spread spectrum and frequency hopping systems do use a finite number
> of frequencies---but the sequence of freqencies used may not repeat for
> many hours. That leaves you with a broadband collection problem
> and having to sort out multiple emitters on the same bandwidth with
> different hopping schedules. I suspect that is a problem handled
> offline and after-the-fact, and not in real time. However, the
> technology has probably advanced a bit in the 30 years I've been
> out of the sigint world. ;-)

If we are trying to destroy the command post we do not need to receive
the entire message we can simply wait until that frequency is reused by
that transmitter. If the equipment is hopping over 100 frequencies it
should be back within the next 200 transmissions.

The computers will need programming to treat transmissions from two
widely separated locations as two targets. Home in on them one at a time.

Andrew Swallow

"Keith W" > wrote in message
...
>
> > wrote in message
> oups.com...
[ SNIP ]
>>> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
>>> to be especially cheap
>> Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
>> wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
>> magnification for examining the suspicios contacts),
>
> Problem 1 ) You have to process them to decide if they are suspicious
>
>> a decent CPU to do
>> the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
>> items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
>> pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free.
>
> Understatement of the year
[ SNIP ]

If he can show the image processing and recognition problem to be easy, his
soon-to-be net worth will be more than that of Bill Gates. In fact, he'll
hire Billy just to supervise the programming staff to write the queuing
software for his executive bathroom.

Despite humongous amounts of research being done over many decades, general
computer vision remains an intractable problem. To illustrate, it may be
impossible for a vertical photograph (satellite) to differentiate between a
parking lot surrounded by a board fence and with a few cars parked on it,
and a large building with a flat roof and large roof vents, both with roads
nearby and under conditions of shadowing.

Now, in this case we'd certainly have a rules base codifying the knowledge.
But even restricting the problem to that of finding ships in the open ocean,
it's still not that simple. At a typical distance and altitude, a lot of
those ship lines are actually curves, so your algorithms need to recognize
smooth curves as part of a ship definition. Hmmmm, what else at sea is often
a fairly smooth curve?

I have a photo (8 1/2 by 11") of most of 4th MEB at sea, either 1990 or
1991. Fourteen vessels (LSTs, LPDs, LSDs, LPHs, one LHA, and a hospital
ship - no UNREP ships) are depicted. Going off the length of the LHA (shown
at a significant oblique), my estimate (very rough) is that the formation is
5-6 km across and perhaps 3 km deep. Even compressed like this - it's a
formation in time of hostilities that surely makes captains nervous - it's
still a collection with lots and lots of empty space. The colour contrast
and the wakes, the very calm conditions and excellent vizibility (light
haze) will at least allow a decent software to identify the ships as ships.
Leaving aside the hospital ship, I don't see that classifying most of the
vessels in the photograph would be anything other than a [very] difficult
recognition problem. A human can do it quickly, especially if cued with the
knowledge that everything is a USN gator, but it would be a pretty expensive
program that reliably typed each target.

One wonders too if the supposedly small and cheap UAV with the purportedly
inexpensive but sophisticated image recognition system is also fixing the
precise 3-D attitude of the airframe and hence the camera in order to allow
for estimating sizes of the objects in the picture, and _their_ attitude.
Forget relying on the horizon - in my picture you can barely make it out
because of haze. And it would have to be really precise data in order to get
good dimensional info.

What if you can't even see the wake, for one of several reasons? I'll give
the program three stars if it even correctly figures out what end of the
ship is which.

Now let's suppose that I am somewhat harsh in my analysis. Let's say that a
relatively coarse resolution picture and a basic analysis alerts the
software to "blobs of interest", and then the vehicle + camera is commanded
to do what it needs to do to get high-res images, and a better routine
analyzes these. Given some near optimal pictures - nearly side-on to the
vessel - you'd have something to work with. But in order to gauge size,
you'd need to be at some moderate altitude to have good geometry, under
which conditions superstructure begins to blend into the rest of the mass,
not be outlined against sky. In any case, with a large, detailed image of
the target, you now encounter other recognition problems e.g what details do
I ignore?

It is not a simple problem.

AHS

wrote:

> rb wrote:
>
>>Highly unlikely that it went undetected for 25 mins.
>>More likely it's Iranian sabre rattling again.
>
>
> Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> smaller versions. Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?
>
> This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
> missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> to shoot down a very cheap plane). A radar-directed gun system like
> Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target. The best bet at the
> moment IMO would be a 35mm gun firing the Oerlikon AHEAD 'shrapnel'
> type airburst ammo, using electro-optical guidance.

Block 1B CIWS has an infrared and optical tracker that would do nicely
against any UAV within it's range...the question is finding the UAV in
the first place. An Infrared search system with the ability to designate
to a B1B Phalanx would work quite well I think...

....Ken

wrote:

:Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
:are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
:sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
:ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
:mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
:much easier. Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
:(just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
:and jam.

I just had this conversation at work today. Your application requires
ATR on the part of the UAV. ATR is a hard problem (to the point of
being largely impossible in the general case).

:It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
:slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
:attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
:with a small warhead

Ok, now you're talking about radar homers, which are easier (in other
words, they're possible). But they're either easily decoyed or they
start getting expensive.

:(spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
:tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).

Pretty much what it could before, only slightly degraded.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

In article >,
says...
> wrote:
> > Andrew Swallow wrote:
> >> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> >> [snip]
> >>
> >>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> >>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> >>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> >>> grenades.
> >> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
> >> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
> >> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
> > ?? You transmit only when you want to issue new command to the swarm,
> > not to control every little thing. You can have minutes without
> > transmission, then 10ms transmission, followed by another long silence.
> >
>
> A machine can get a fairly accurate bearing in 10ms. Machines can be
> made to be very patient so the several minutes is only a minor problem.
> Several minutes allows wide angle receivers to be replaced by narrow
> angle receivers sufficiently accurate to allow the targeting of weapons.
>

Narrow angle receivers require larger antennas or arrays of antennas.
Granted, that is easier at 900 Mhz than at 9Mhz.

Several minutes between hits on a narrowband frequency is different than
several hours---particularly if your platform is moving. Then you
get into problems with how accurately you know the position and
heading of the platform. Much more difficult than DF from a fixed
land base.
> > And you can also have plenty of cheap decoy trasmitters, just to make
> > it easier to intercept ... something. ;-)
> >
> Try brute force and ignorance - destroy the lot.
How many missiles will that take?


Mark Borgerson

"Keith W" > wrote:

:"ray o'hara" > wrote in message
...
:>
:> laser guided weapons gave a tendency to attack the sun. you only see the
:> good ones on tv, not all the misses.
:
:Utter ********, the laser sensors look for reflected light at
:specific frequencies

Ray is, as usual, being an idiot. Not only reflected light at
specific frequencies, but with a specific code.

:> rocks eated by the sun. reflections off of pools of water or streams can
:> also distract them.
:
:You seem not to understand the difference between IR and laser sensors

He's also the better part of a century behind when it comes to IR,
since IIR weapons (what he seems to be referring to) have very little
problem with practically everything he mentions.

He apparently thinks laser weapons home on heat. Hell, even IR strike
weapons don't do that!

--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson

wrote:

:Jack Linthicum wrote:
:>
:> A swarm of UAVs requires a swarm of controllers and a swarm of secure
:> frequencies to accomplish that control. I wonder if a follow-on to a
:> Shrike or ALARM would bother to hit the transmitting antennas and
:> instead have a large enough warhead to take out the whole controlling
:> facility.
:A swarm of current generation UAVs requires a swarm of controllers.
:
:A swarm of highly autonomous UAVs (perhaps better viewed as a swarm of
:ultra cheap cruise missiles accompanied by some stealthy UAVs with good
:sensor suites) launched on a 'kill everything that floats and
:resembles a warship'' need not.

You've eliminated controllers by assuming impossible software.

Things don't work like they show them in movies.

--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson

In article >,
says...
> Mark Borgerson wrote:
> > In article >,
> > says...
> >> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> >> [snip]
> >>
> >>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> >>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> >>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> >>> grenades.
> >> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
> >> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
> >> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
> >>
> >
> > Why are you assuming that the command post does not move? I see no
> > reason that a mobile command post and multiple mobile transmitters
> > could not be used.
> >
>
> This comes down to the definition of mobile. If the command post stays
> in the same place for half an hour it is static. A constantly moving
> command post would need a vehicle the size of a bus to hold the
> operators and long range transmitters, possible but hard to camouflage.

So you don't think the Iranians have buses or semi-trailers? Suppose
there are 100 semis on the coastal road. Which one do you target?
>
> > Spread spectrum and frequency hopping systems do use a finite number
> > of frequencies---but the sequence of freqencies used may not repeat for
> > many hours. That leaves you with a broadband collection problem
> > and having to sort out multiple emitters on the same bandwidth with
> > different hopping schedules. I suspect that is a problem handled
> > offline and after-the-fact, and not in real time. However, the
> > technology has probably advanced a bit in the 30 years I've been
> > out of the sigint world. ;-)
>
> If we are trying to destroy the command post we do not need to receive
> the entire message we can simply wait until that frequency is reused by
> that transmitter. If the equipment is hopping over 100 frequencies it
> should be back within the next 200 transmissions.

With spread-spectrum transmitters, the time spent at one particular
frequency may be only a millisecond or two. If you can provide a link
to a system that can accurately track a moving spread-spectrum
transmitter, I'd be interested in reviewing its specifications.

The problem with intercepting spread-spectrum signals is that the
receiver KNOWS where the next signal will arrive. It can tune it's
receiver software for that frequency. The intercept receive has to be
able to recieve ALL frequencies---and thus cannot use the same signal
processing techniques as a receiver that knows the sequence.
>
> The computers will need programming to treat transmissions from two
> widely separated locations as two targets. Home in on them one at a time.

How do you work with one continuously moving target transmitting on
256 different frequencies? I suppose it could be done with large
enough antennas and enough processing power on a number of different
ships. It's not going to be easy, cheap, or widely available, though.

Mark Borgerson

wrote:

:On 30 May 2006 21:54:32 -0700, wrote:
:
:>According to:
:>
:>http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
:>
:>An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
:>for 25 minutes.
:
:Maybe so and maybe not.

I'd bet against. Just because they didn't kill it doesn't mean they
didn't see it.

:>With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
:>question becomes:
:>
:>How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or terrorist
:>organizations start using them against us?
:
:UAVs radiate. Their controlling facility radiates. If you radiate
:you are detectable. If you can be detected you can be localized. If
:you can be localized you can be targeted.

I learned it the simple way: If you can see it, you can kill it.

--
"When you enter a room full of armed men, shoot the first
person who makes a move, hostile or otherwise. He has
started to think and is therefore dangerous..."
-- Colonel Paddy Mayne, co-founder of the SAS

wrote:

:If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate,

And how likely do you think THAT is?

Have you ever heard of HELICOPTERS being scrambled off an aircraft
carrier to intercept inbounds?

I think the Iranians were being watched the whole time and just
weren't smart enough to realize it.

In other words, it's the usual baseless chest thumping that typically
occurs in that region of the world.

--
"If you grab them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow."
-- Chuck Colson

wrote:

:I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
:distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
:rig/tanker/finshing ship.

Please send me that graduate student's name, address, and phone
number. I know some folks that would like to give him a job.

Hint: The real world isn't a Hollywood movie.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

In article <V%qfg.6218$JX1.2803@edtnps82>,
says...
> "Keith W" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > > wrote in message
> > oups.com...
> [ SNIP ]
> >>> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
> >>> to be especially cheap
> >> Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
> >> wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
> >> magnification for examining the suspicios contacts),
> >
> > Problem 1 ) You have to process them to decide if they are suspicious
> >
> >> a decent CPU to do
> >> the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
> >> items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
> >> pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free.
> >
> > Understatement of the year
> [ SNIP ]
>
> If he can show the image processing and recognition problem to be easy, his
> soon-to-be net worth will be more than that of Bill Gates. In fact, he'll
> hire Billy just to supervise the programming staff to write the queuing
> software for his executive bathroom.
>
> Despite humongous amounts of research being done over many decades, general
> computer vision remains an intractable problem. To illustrate, it may be
> impossible for a vertical photograph (satellite) to differentiate between a
> parking lot surrounded by a board fence and with a few cars parked on it,
> and a large building with a flat roof and large roof vents, both with roads
> nearby and under conditions of shadowing.
>
> Now, in this case we'd certainly have a rules base codifying the knowledge.
> But even restricting the problem to that of finding ships in the open ocean,
> it's still not that simple. At a typical distance and altitude, a lot of
> those ship lines are actually curves, so your algorithms need to recognize
> smooth curves as part of a ship definition. Hmmmm, what else at sea is often
> a fairly smooth curve?
>
> I have a photo (8 1/2 by 11") of most of 4th MEB at sea, either 1990 or
> 1991. Fourteen vessels (LSTs, LPDs, LSDs, LPHs, one LHA, and a hospital
> ship - no UNREP ships) are depicted. Going off the length of the LHA (shown
> at a significant oblique), my estimate (very rough) is that the formation is
> 5-6 km across and perhaps 3 km deep. Even compressed like this - it's a
> formation in time of hostilities that surely makes captains nervous - it's
> still a collection with lots and lots of empty space. The colour contrast
> and the wakes, the very calm conditions and excellent vizibility (light
> haze) will at least allow a decent software to identify the ships as ships.
> Leaving aside the hospital ship, I don't see that classifying most of the
> vessels in the photograph would be anything other than a [very] difficult
> recognition problem. A human can do it quickly, especially if cued with the
> knowledge that everything is a USN gator, but it would be a pretty expensive
> program that reliably typed each target.
>
> One wonders too if the supposedly small and cheap UAV with the purportedly
> inexpensive but sophisticated image recognition system is also fixing the
> precise 3-D attitude of the airframe and hence the camera in order to allow
> for estimating sizes of the objects in the picture, and _their_ attitude.
> Forget relying on the horizon - in my picture you can barely make it out
> because of haze. And it would have to be really precise data in order to get
> good dimensional info.

what's wrong with just sorting the targets in order of image size and
and allocating the UAVs on that basis. Do you think they will be
too worried if they get the hospital ship or an oiler instead of
the LPD?
>
> What if you can't even see the wake, for one of several reasons? I'll give
> the program three stars if it even correctly figures out what end of the
> ship is which.

Does it need to know which end is which? I would just aim
for the center of mass. >
> Now let's suppose that I am somewhat harsh in my analysis. Let's say that a
> relatively coarse resolution picture and a basic analysis alerts the
> software to "blobs of interest", and then the vehicle + camera is commanded
> to do what it needs to do to get high-res images, and a better routine
> analyzes these. Given some near optimal pictures - nearly side-on to the
> vessel - you'd have something to work with. But in order to gauge size,
> you'd need to be at some moderate altitude to have good geometry, under
> which conditions superstructure begins to blend into the rest of the mass,
> not be outlined against sky. In any case, with a large, detailed image of
> the target, you now encounter other recognition problems e.g what details do
> I ignore?
>
> It is not a simple problem.

You seem to be assuming that the enemy wants more information than
"3 big ships at coordinates x,y, speed X, on course B" For recon
information where you know the position of friendlies, that's probably
enougb to issue the targeting order.

Given traffic patterns in the Gulf, it ought to be pretty easy
to test whether your software can distinguish between 1000-foot
vessels and 100-foot vessels.

Mark Borgerson

Ken Chaddock wrote:

>
> Block 1B CIWS has an infrared and optical tracker that would do nicely
> against any UAV within it's range...the question is finding the UAV in
> the first place. An Infrared search system with the ability to designate
> to a B1B Phalanx would work quite well I think...

But a prop-driven UAV with a small engine and some attention to exhaust
masking would not be an easy IR target.

If all you want to do is locate and identify a ship, and beam an
illuminating laser at it to guide the incoming ordnance, then the UAV
can be very small and very hard to detect.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:

:
:Jack Linthicum wrote:
:> wrote:
:> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
:> > ...
:> > > The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals
:> > not necessarily, if mostly autonomous UAVs are used
:> >
:> > > which then implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
:> > > direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
:> > > second time but not the first or third.
:> > ??
:> >
:> > > The control point will be that, singular, one command directing all of the UAVs
:> > > from one spot.
:> > Ever heard of fiber optics communications? Set-up multiple cheap
:> > antennas for communication, and link them with fiber optics to your
:> > safe hidden command centre. Why you guys always assume that the bad
:> > boys are dumb beyond recognition alludes me...
:>
:> What the hell is an autonomous UAV?
:An UAV that can fly itself using an autopilot (see cruise missiles) to
:predefined destination,

This much is doable.

:look around and try to see and identify ships

You just departed our current reality.

:and perhaps asks the controller for help in making crucial decisions
:(attack/ignore/move elsewehere).
:
:> and to what purpose?
:Increase survivablilty/success of the system. Little, low bandwidth
:communication = difficult to detect & jam.
:
:> You need a unique signal for each aircraft otherwise they will all turn left at
:> the same time.
:You are still thinking 'remote controlled airplane'. Think 'remote
:command'. The UAVs are capable of flying themselves, they just might
:need advice from time to time. You don't tell each single aircraft what
:to do exactly, you just send a message to the whole swarm: "20% of you
:attack the ship, priorities ar A,B,C, the rest go to box [X,Y] and
:search for targets there" Each UAV rolls a dice, if it is in the 20%,

And what do you do if they all roll '1'? How do you even know?

:it rolls a dice to choose among the identifiable targets on the ship
:(phased arrays, CIWS radars, bridge, aircraft on deck, catapult).

Back into another universe.

:They
:actual flying and execution of the commands is done autonomously. (It
:will be a bit more complicated, but this is the basic idea.)

A 'bit more complicated' indeed - to the point of requiring sensors
and software that don't exist in our universe running on hardware we
can't build.

:> On the first shot you may hit a bunch of decoys but also
:> the target or targets. Especially if the decoys must be deployed under
:> the control of the central command. Second time the decoys may stay on
:> and the command freqs shut down. Third time no one cares and fires
:> enough weapons to take care of the site and the decoys.
:No decoys needed. The UAVs themselves are cheap enough so that would be
:waste. Perhpas you can have a hi/lo mix of UAVs with high end
:sensors/UAVs with cheapo sensors (as the sensors are likely the
:costliest part of the UAV), the cheapo UAVs acting as a sort of decoys
:(but still being able to inflict damage, just with a bit lower
:probability.)

You REALLY need to get out more and stop watching so many movies.

:> I have heard of fiber optic communications, those antennas will still
:> radiate
:With autonomous UAVs, the radiation will be intermittent and low
:bandwidth. Using spread spectrum/frequency agility or whatever, it
:will be difficult to pick up out of the noise. And antennas are cheap
:and you can have plenty of them....

Yes, "or whatever" seems to paper over a massive quantity of
technological unlikelihoods and impossibilities.

:> It's the occupation afterwards that is the sticking point.
:Well, I don't think US will be dumb enough to try to occupy Iran. But
:with Dubya you never know....

As if you hadn't said enough dumb**** things....

--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson

Fred J. McCall wrote:
> wrote:
>
> :If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate,
>
> And how likely do you think THAT is?
>
> Have you ever heard of HELICOPTERS being scrambled off an aircraft
> carrier to intercept inbounds?
>
> I think the Iranians were being watched the whole time and just
> weren't smart enough to realize it.
>
> In other words, it's the usual baseless chest thumping that typically
> occurs in that region of the world.

And do have any evidence that it was being watched, or that helicopters
were scrambled to deal with it, or is that just "baseless chest
thumping"? Presumably the USN would have said something by now if they
had known about it all along?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:

:
:Fred J. McCall wrote:
:> wrote:
:>
:> :If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate,
:>
:> And how likely do you think THAT is?
:>
:> Have you ever heard of HELICOPTERS being scrambled off an aircraft
:> carrier to intercept inbounds?
:>
:> I think the Iranians were being watched the whole time and just
:> weren't smart enough to realize it.
:>
:> In other words, it's the usual baseless chest thumping that typically
:> occurs in that region of the world.
:
:And do have any evidence that it was being watched, or that helicopters
:were scrambled to deal with it, or is that just "baseless chest
:thumping"? Presumably the USN would have said something by now if they
:had known about it all along?

Really? Why? I don't recall a press release every time we caught the
Russians.

The IRANIANS claim the helicopters were scrambled to intercept it.
This is part of my reasoning for putting it down to baseless chest
thumping.

Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors.

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

Fred J. McCall wrote:
>
> The IRANIANS claim the helicopters were scrambled to intercept it.
> This is part of my reasoning for putting it down to baseless chest
> thumping.
>
> Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors.

That's because ships haven't had to deal with UAVs before. As someone
else on this board has suggested, a helo with a machine gun may
actually be the best way of dealing with small, slow UAVs until
something more sophisticated can be developed.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Jeb wrote:
>
> It would seem to me to be likely that a simple software code
> modification would allow an Aegis system to detect smaller, slower
> returns (I would expect that right now, those get filtered out so that
> seabirds don't cause spurious readings on the radar scopes).

I doubt that very much. If radar systems have great difficulty in
detecting and tracking stealthy aircraft like the F-117, B-2 and so on
- big objects with lots of metal in them - they are going to find it
vastly more difficult to pick up a very small, mostly plastic object
which has also been designed to be as stealthy as possible. If that
could be remedied by tweaking the software, then all of the money spent
on stealth aircraft has been wasted.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:

:
:Fred J. McCall wrote:
:>
:> The IRANIANS claim the helicopters were scrambled to intercept it.
:> This is part of my reasoning for putting it down to baseless chest
:> thumping.
:>
:> Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors.
:
:That's because ships haven't had to deal with UAVs before.

Air targets are air targets. Helicopters are neither trained nor
equipped to do air intercepts.

:As someone
:else on this board has suggested, a helo with a machine gun may
:actually be the best way of dealing with small, slow UAVs

"Someone on this board" will inevitably suggest all sorts of stupid
things.

Hint #1: It's not a 'board'. Its called a newsgroup.

Hint #2: Helos are too slow to deal with even a slow UAV. The
leading edge of the rotor goes transonic at relatively slow forward
speeds.

Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
helicopter has.

:until
:something more sophisticated can be developed.

It doesn't take anything "sophisticated" to deal with this threat. If
it's really small and really slow, just blow past it in the mach and
let the shockwave trash it. If it's bigger and tougher, that's why
they still put Vulcan cannon on airplanes.

--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson

Fred J. McCall wrote:
>
> Hint #2: Helos are too slow to deal with even a slow UAV. The
> leading edge of the rotor goes transonic at relatively slow forward
> speeds.

UAVs vary a lot in speed - this article
http://www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/mirsad1.htm concerning a UAV flight over
Israel, has some data which shows that some of them fly as slow as 75
mph. The Swiss Ranger, which seems typical, is quoted as flying at
between 55 and 130 knots. These would certainly be within the
capabilities of a helo to catch.

> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
> helicopter has.

Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.

> :until
> :something more sophisticated can be developed.
>
> It doesn't take anything "sophisticated" to deal with this threat. If
> it's really small and really slow, just blow past it in the mach and
> let the shockwave trash it.

That might do the trick, as long as you've got air support handy (not
all warhips are aircraft carriers, or have one on call).

The basic problem is that naval self-defence systems are designed to
deal with large, fast objects which produce a nice big radar echo. We
know that they have problems picking up stealth planes - that's the
whole point of stealth planes, after all - so it is obvious that
they're going to have a hell of a lot more problems dealing with a very
much smaller and inherently stealthy object. I don't doubt they will
eventually find a means of coping with them, but that's probably years
away - and the threat exists now.

Note that according to the website above concerning the half-hour
terrorist flight over Israel "the Israeli army could also do nothing to
shut down the plane though they observed the entire flight over their
territory."

The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 - then the USN woke up to
the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
answer.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

"Mark Borgerson" <mborgerson.at.comcast.net> wrote in message
.net...
> In article <V%qfg.6218$JX1.2803@edtnps82>,
> says...

>
> Given traffic patterns in the Gulf, it ought to be pretty easy
> to test whether your software can distinguish between 1000-foot
> vessels and 100-foot vessels.
>
> Mark Borgerson
>
>

There are LOTS of 1000 ft vessels in the gulf, most are VLCC's

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

> wrote in message
ups.com...

> The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
> missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
> until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 - then the USN woke up to
> the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
> answer.

The Israeli navy was dealing with Styx quite well without Phalanx in 1973.

--
William Black

I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.

William Black wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
>
> > The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
> > missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
> > until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 - then the USN woke up to
> > the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
> > answer.
>
> The Israeli navy was dealing with Styx quite well without Phalanx in 1973.

Yes, because they learned the hard way that they had to do something
about it (and losing a destroyer is a very hard way...). Phalanx was
simply the last-ditch element of a layered defence system which the USN
thought it prudent to add as a result of the Israeli experience.

The point of my analogy was simply that new threats tend not to be
taken very seriously until somebody gets hurt by them - then there is a
reaction.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:
> Fred J. McCall wrote:
> >
> > It doesn't take anything "sophisticated" to deal with this threat. If
> > it's really small and really slow, just blow past it in the mach and
> > let the shockwave trash it.
>
> That might do the trick, as long as you've got air support handy (not
> all warhips are aircraft carriers, or have one on call).

Actually, on reflection I can see problems. Trying to fly very close to
a UAV when you're closing at a speed of at least 340 metres per second
and the UAV might make unpredictable moves at any time could be a
recipe for disaster....a collision would certainly deal with the UAV
but not in a very cost-effective manner.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Keith W wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ps.com...
> >
> > Keith W wrote:
> >> > wrote in message
> >> ups.com...
> >> >
> >> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> >
> >> > Almost all the arguments one sees here are based on the fact that UAVs
> >> > are dumb and if you can take the comms out, you are fine. I am not
> >> > sure that will hold for long, especially if the UAVs are used against
> >> > ships on open sea, in fair weather, in 'kill every warship you see'
> >> > mode - which all makes the autonomous decision making of the UAV so
> >> > much easier.
> >>
> >> That of course also makes spoofing and the use of decoys much easier
> >> and makes the user rather unpopular with any other seafarers. It'd
> >> be something of a pity if your UAV's decided to attack the local
> >> fishing fleet instead of the USN battle group. Given the number of
> >> offshore
> >> rigs and support ships as well as tankers in the Persian Gulf such
> >> indiscriminate weapons would seem rather unattractive to the Iranians
> >> as an example.
>
>
> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
> > IR/passive EM sensors),
> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
>
> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?
>
> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
> to be especially cheap
>
> > Chaff and flares might foil simple radar/IR seekers, but I can't see
> > how would they defeat video imaging sensor (+good software behind it).
> >
>
>
> >> > Design for minimal communication and bandwidth needs
> >> > (just for higher level commands/coordination) - much tougher to detect
> >> > and jam.
> >> >
> >>
> >> > It is easy to imagine a swarm of UAVs used as very sheap relatively
> >> > slow (200km/h) flying cruise missiles with small warheads, designed to
> >> > attack radars and similar on-ship targets that can be seriously damaged
> >> > with a small warhead (spray a shotgun of darts with wavy aluminium
> >> > tails into that phased array and see what it can do afterwards).
> >> >
> >>
> >> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
> >> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
> >> and to CIWS.
> > Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming.
>
> With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.
>
> > On
> > the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
> > engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
> > engine of the current antiship missiles.
> >
>
> But not small enough to be invisible
>
> > Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
> > short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
> > swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
> > signature and very different characteristics.
> >
>
> Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
> that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC
>
> > The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
> > targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
> > put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
> > can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
> > CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.
> >
>
> Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
> 8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.
>
>
> > Another possiblity is to actually fly high (say 5-8km) so that the UAV
> > will have to be attacked by missiles and/or aircraft, not CIWS guns,
> > and drop (homing) submunition from there, gravity doing the delivery
> > work. You will want to make these UAVs stealthy, to make the locking of
> > the missile seeker real difficulty (and postpone finding the UAVs as
> > much as possible).
> >
> > There is a tradeoff between sophistication and cost (and reliability,
>
> And you are now propsing sophisticated, costly and probably unreliable.
>
>
> > simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
> > country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
> > good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
> > The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
> > reliability and long service life'.
>
> But with real time image recognition, organic SEAD and large warheads
>
> DUH !
>
> Keith
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

I think you have misssed one vital point. The Iranians may not aim to
sink a US battlegroup, they may simply want to close the straights of
Hormuz. For this purpose the motto would be, if it floats and moves
sink it.

One of the main characteristics of asymmetric warfare is that military
forces are rarely attacked. "The services are the safest place to be!".
No, suicide bombers go into restaurants and target civilians, not the
Israeli military. One can argue here about the "Geneva Convention".
Lets face it, in modern conditions the GC is a dead duck

BTW - The Iraqis are taking most of the casualties NOT US or British
forces.

> wrote in message
oups.com...
>

>
> I think you have misssed one vital point. The Iranians may not aim to
> sink a US battlegroup, they may simply want to close the straights of
> Hormuz. For this purpose the motto would be, if it floats and moves
> sink it.
>

In which case they would use mines, ships are more easily sunk by
letting water in the bottom than by letting air in to the top. Mines
really are cheap and effective weapons.

> One of the main characteristics of asymmetric warfare is that military
> forces are rarely attacked. "The services are the safest place to be!".


Note that the Iranians are as dependent on free traffic movement through
the straits as everyone else.

> No, suicide bombers go into restaurants and target civilians, not the
> Israeli military. One can argue here about the "Geneva Convention".
> Lets face it, in modern conditions the GC is a dead duck
>
> BTW - The Iraqis are taking most of the casualties NOT US or British
> forces.
>
>

All of which while true is irrelevant to the question at hand.

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> wrote:
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > If the report on the Iran UAV is accurate, the USN is evidently not on
> > > > top of this at present. I hope they are working on it, very hard.
> > >
> > > Like anti-radiation missiles. Against the launch sites and control
> > > points.
> >
> > Since only a simple radio signal is needed to control the UAVs (and
> > then not all of the time - only when they want to instruct them to do
> > something) that would be very much harder than hitting a high-powered
> > radar which has to keep transmitting a distinctive signal all of the
> > time to do its job. And AR missiles could easily be decoyed by lots of
> > cheap radio transmitters scattered about.
> >
> > The problem here is that it could be a kind of 'asymmetric warfare', in
> > that the costs and problems of the defence are potentially far more
> > costly than those of the attackers.
> >
> > Tony Williams
> > Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>
> The mention was of swarms which implies swarms of signals which then
> implies if I have an ECM craft up and I get lots of radiation from one
> direction I will send a message to that source. The decoys may work the
> second time but not the first or third. The control point will be that,
> singular, one command directing all of the UAVs from one spot. How many
> generals would you trust if you were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?

One thing about swarms. They are capable of communicating with each
other. This is more relevant in fact to what the US can do than what
the Iranians are capable of now. It is also relevant to what China
might do in 7-10 years. In fact a swarm would (like the Internet) have
one communication link. Let us suppose tou were trying to defend
yourself and you decided to fly UAVs in a formation where each plane
was in formation about 500m from its colleagues. 2,000 (hopefully)
cheap aircraft would thereby guard 1,000km of front. If you were to arm
them with LMGs we would have the basis of a system.

The important thing to realize from the software viewpoint is that they
form a network and one controller could control all of them. They need
not in fact take up an inordinate amount of satellite banbwidth.
Remember of course that 2 sides fight every war. The US (and Britain)
is probable capable of developing this within the 7-10 years mentioned
by other contributors.

Such a concept is a direct development of what is going on in civvy
street and the COTS situation. Question - should this be a secret
project or should it be done openly with the perveyors of COTS. It is
very much along the lines of what is hapenning with mobile phones, and
corresponds to a view of what the Internet will become.

Secret projects:-

1) Cost 25% more simply from being secret.
2) Deny themseves Peer Group Review.
3) Frequently deny themselves COTS.

Often the best security may simply be rapid advance not secrecy.

This system will also be a trmendous force multiplier when it comes to
policing a piece of territory. On secrecy cicero a WW2 spy said that if
you were going to hand tomorrow knowing the precise weight and breaking
strain of the rope was not going to help you. I think we whould tell Al
Qaeda the weight and breaking strain. It won't help them.

Andrew Swallow wrote:
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> [snip]
>
> >
> > I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> > intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> > miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> > grenades.
>
> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
>
> Andrew Swallow

Spread is fairly compact when compared with Ultra wideband. Where
spread can occupy megahertz ultra covers gigs, but at the lower power
level, at least under FCC rules. http://www.sss-mag.com/ss.html

Site has an nice simple tutorial on SS, with one exception, the "German
lady scientist" was the actress Hedy Lamarr and she worked it out at a
Hollywood party.

> This implies 1000 km of constant wind and cloud.

Not necessarily. They could be further apart in good weather and closer
toghether in bad. As far as wind is concerned COTS provides cheap (1m
or less) GPS. They could stay in formation unless the wind speed
exceeded forward speed. Unlikely.

> In which case they would use mines, ships are more easily sunk by
> letting water in the bottom than by letting air in to the top. Mines
> really are cheap and effective weapons.

Not necesarily. You have to lay mines. The US could blow the ship out
of the water. UAVs are mobile. You can launch them from deep inside
Iran. Also mines being static can be swept. A mobile mine (a USB) would
be quite a threat.

>Note that the Iranians are as dependent on free traffic movement through
>the straits as everyone else.

True, but

1) They might be prepared to hurt themselves to hurt us. In a full
scale war they wont care.

2) They will time the passage and routes of their own vessels so that
they don't get attacked.

If deterrence really did work defense policy would be a lot simpler.

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>
>> In which case they would use mines, ships are more easily sunk by
>> letting water in the bottom than by letting air in to the top. Mines
>> really are cheap and effective weapons.
>
> Not necesarily. You have to lay mines.

Easily done by anything from a traditional dhow to a helicopter

> The US could blow the ship out
> of the water.

They'd have to know you were laying mines. The straits of Hormuz are passed
by dozens of Iranian vessels every day (and night). Covert mine laying
is old hat.


> UAVs are mobile. You can launch them from deep inside
> Iran. Also mines being static can be swept.

Not a simple task, especially if the minesweepers are subject to attack

> A mobile mine (a USB) would
> be quite a threat.
>

Floating mines have existed for many decades


>>Note that the Iranians are as dependent on free traffic movement through
>>the straits as everyone else.
>
> True, but
>
> 1) They might be prepared to hurt themselves to hurt us. In a full
> scale war they wont care.
>

I suspect they will when they run out of money and food

> 2) They will time the passage and routes of their own vessels so that
> they don't get attacked.
>

And you dont think the USN would interict their ships huh ?


> If deterrence really did work defense policy would be a lot simpler.
>

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

wrote:
> > This implies 1000 km of constant wind and cloud.
>
> Not necessarily. They could be further apart in good weather and closer
> toghether in bad. As far as wind is concerned COTS provides cheap (1m
> or less) GPS. They could stay in formation unless the wind speed
> exceeded forward speed. Unlikely.

Wind is never homogenous and never from the same direction, especially
over 1000klicks, all the 100 or 500 or whatever comms checks on
position would certainly excite someone on the Elint watch. Those
people are good, by the way, and have a real ear for the rare and
unusual.

Do you have a range (distance) for communications in this manner by the
way?

"Keith W" > wrote in message
...
>
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> > 1) They might be prepared to hurt themselves to hurt us. In a full
> > scale war they wont care.
> >
>
> I suspect they will when they run out of money and food

No evidence of that in the "Iran Iraq" war.

The Iranian form of government (an Islamic theocratic republic) has shown it
has considerable fortitude and public support in times of hardship.

--
William Black

I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.

wrote:

:
:Fred J. McCall wrote:
:>
:> Hint #2: Helos are too slow to deal with even a slow UAV. The
:> leading edge of the rotor goes transonic at relatively slow forward
:> speeds.
:
:UAVs vary a lot in speed - this article
:http://www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/mirsad1.htm concerning a UAV flight over
:Israel, has some data which shows that some of them fly as slow as 75
:mph. The Swiss Ranger, which seems typical, is quoted as flying at
:between 55 and 130 knots. These would certainly be within the
:capabilities of a helo to catch.

Only if he starts from fairly close to begin with.

:> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
:> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
:> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
:> helicopter has.
:
:Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.

No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.

:If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
:is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.

Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?

Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.

Hint #3: If 'speed differential' was such a huge problem, all air
forces would be operating Piper Cubs as penetrating bombers. They
aren't.

:> :until
:> :something more sophisticated can be developed.
:>
:> It doesn't take anything "sophisticated" to deal with this threat. If
:> it's really small and really slow, just blow past it in the mach and
:> let the shockwave trash it.
:
:That might do the trick, as long as you've got air support handy (not
:all warhips are aircraft carriers, or have one on call).
:
:The basic problem is that naval self-defence systems are designed to
:deal with large, fast objects which produce a nice big radar echo. We
:know that they have problems picking up stealth planes - that's the
:whole point of stealth planes, after all - so it is obvious that
:they're going to have a hell of a lot more problems dealing with a very
:much smaller and inherently stealthy object. I don't doubt they will
:eventually find a means of coping with them, but that's probably years
:away - and the threat exists now.

Hint #4: The sky is NOT falling, Chicken Little....

:Note that according to the website above concerning the half-hour
:terrorist flight over Israel "the Israeli army could also do nothing to
:shut down the plane though they observed the entire flight over their
:territory."

And just why was that? It's a preposterous claim. If you can see it
you can kill it.

:The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
:missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
:until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 -

And was totally ineffective only 5 years later, although dozens were
fired, with one even being downed by a 75mm gun.

:then the USN woke up to
:the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
:answer.

You have an interesting view of history is all I can say.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

wrote:

:Not necessarily. They could be further apart in good weather and closer
:toghether in bad. As far as wind is concerned COTS provides cheap (1m
:or less) GPS.

Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.

--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson

"William Black" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith W" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> > wrote in message
>> ups.com...
>> > 1) They might be prepared to hurt themselves to hurt us. In a full
>> > scale war they wont care.
>> >
>>
>> I suspect they will when they run out of money and food
>
> No evidence of that in the "Iran Iraq" war.
>

Actually there was. Depletion of Iranian foreign currency reserves
in the latter stages of the war caused major problems to the
Iranians and was one of the reasons they agreed to a ceasefire.
They were reduced to barter style swops of food for oil by 1987.

You also have to recall that they were able to export oil .
Oil exports ran at around 1.1 million bpd throughout the war with
a brief drop in 1986 following the bombing of Kharg Island.
By early 1987, oil exports were around the level set in by its
OPEC agreements.

> The Iranian form of government (an Islamic theocratic republic) has shown
> it
> has considerable fortitude and public support in times of hardship.
>

Indeed but the Iran Iraq war was defensive, Iraq had invaded Iran.
A war caused by a belligerent Iranian government may be less
well supported.

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Mark Borgerson wrote:
> In article >,
> says...
>> wrote:
>>> Andrew Swallow wrote:
>>>> Jack Linthicum wrote:
>>>> [snip]
>>>>
>>>>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
>>>>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
>>>>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
>>>>> grenades.
>>>> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
>>>> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
>>>> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
>>> ?? You transmit only when you want to issue new command to the swarm,
>>> not to control every little thing. You can have minutes without
>>> transmission, then 10ms transmission, followed by another long silence.
>>>
>> A machine can get a fairly accurate bearing in 10ms. Machines can be
>> made to be very patient so the several minutes is only a minor problem.
>> Several minutes allows wide angle receivers to be replaced by narrow
>> angle receivers sufficiently accurate to allow the targeting of weapons.
>>
>
> Narrow angle receivers require larger antennas or arrays of antennas.
> Granted, that is easier at 900 Mhz than at 9Mhz.
>
> Several minutes between hits on a narrowband frequency is different than
> several hours---particularly if your platform is moving. Then you
> get into problems with how accurately you know the position and
> heading of the platform. Much more difficult than DF from a fixed
> land base.

Mobile targets probably have to be attached by a plane that can chase them.

>>> And you can also have plenty of cheap decoy trasmitters, just to make
>>> it easier to intercept ... something. ;-)
>>>
>> Try brute force and ignorance - destroy the lot.
> How many missiles will that take?

About 3 for every transmitter, depending on the accuracy of the DFing.
You will soon have a civilian population that is suspicious of decoy
transmitters.

Andrew Swallow

Keith W wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> >> In which case they would use mines, ships are more easily sunk by
> >> letting water in the bottom than by letting air in to the top. Mines
> >> really are cheap and effective weapons.
> >
> > Not necesarily. You have to lay mines.
>
> Easily done by anything from a traditional dhow to a helicopter
>
> > The US could blow the ship out
> > of the water.
>
> They'd have to know you were laying mines. The straits of Hormuz are passed
> by dozens of Iranian vessels every day (and night). Covert mine laying
> is old hat.
>
>
> > UAVs are mobile. You can launch them from deep inside
> > Iran. Also mines being static can be swept.
>
> Not a simple task, especially if the minesweepers are subject to attack
>
> > A mobile mine (a USB) would
> > be quite a threat.
> >
>
> Floating mines have existed for many decades
>
>
> >>Note that the Iranians are as dependent on free traffic movement through
> >>the straits as everyone else.
> >
> > True, but
> >
> > 1) They might be prepared to hurt themselves to hurt us. In a full
> > scale war they wont care.
> >
>
> I suspect they will when they run out of money and food
>
> > 2) They will time the passage and routes of their own vessels so that
> > they don't get attacked.
> >
>
> And you dont think the USN would interict their ships huh ?
>
>
> > If deterrence really did work defense policy would be a lot simpler.
> >
>
> Keith
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

I think we have some hisory here. During Iran - Iraq Iran did indeed
lay some mines. The US was in a much more difficult position legally
from what would be the case were the US to be a belligenent. "Blow it
out of the water" assumed US belligerent status. The US while "neural"
did sink some minelayers and very nearly became a belligerent on Iraq's
side.

Te USN would be a lot more aggressive with a defined legal position.
The US sank ships but did not mount strikes on Iranian naval facilities.

> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.

In 7-10 years it will be Galileo. The specifications are a little bit
eklastic as they depend on integration time. If you are talking about
RELATIVE separation this will in fact be only a few centimers, the
accuracy of DGPS.

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>

>
> I think we have some hisory here. During Iran - Iraq Iran did indeed
> lay some mines. The US was in a much more difficult position legally
> from what would be the case were the US to be a belligenent. "Blow it
> out of the water" assumed US belligerent status. The US while "neural"
> did sink some minelayers and very nearly became a belligerent on Iraq's
> side.
>
> Te USN would be a lot more aggressive with a defined legal position.
> The US sank ships but did not mount strikes on Iranian naval facilities.
>
>

Covertly laying mines is less likely to attract strikes than overt
attack using drones.

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

In article >,
says...
>
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> >> In which case they would use mines, ships are more easily sunk by
> >> letting water in the bottom than by letting air in to the top. Mines
> >> really are cheap and effective weapons.
> >
> > Not necesarily. You have to lay mines.
>
> Easily done by anything from a traditional dhow to a helicopter
>
> > The US could blow the ship out
> > of the water.
>
> They'd have to know you were laying mines. The straits of Hormuz are passed
> by dozens of Iranian vessels every day (and night). Covert mine laying
> is old hat.
>
>
> > UAVs are mobile. You can launch them from deep inside
> > Iran. Also mines being static can be swept.
>
> Not a simple task, especially if the minesweepers are subject to attack
>
> > A mobile mine (a USB) would
> > be quite a threat.
> >
>
> Floating mines have existed for many decades
>
>
> >>Note that the Iranians are as dependent on free traffic movement through
> >>the straits as everyone else.
> >
> > True, but
> >
> > 1) They might be prepared to hurt themselves to hurt us. In a full
> > scale war they wont care.
> >
>
> I suspect they will when they run out of money and food

I wouldn't hold my breath if I were you. High oil prices have
allowed Iran to build up about $40Billion in foreign capital
reserves. As for the hunger factor--according to the FAO,
Iran is a net exporter of food.

http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index.asp?lang=en&iso3=IRN&subj=4
>
> > 2) They will time the passage and routes of their own vessels so that
> > they don't get attacked.
> >
>
> And you dont think the USN would interict their ships huh ?
>

Probably---but would they stop Japanese and Chinese ships loaded
with Iranian oil that has already been purchased?
>
> > If deterrence really did work defense policy would be a lot simpler.
> >
>
> Keith
>

Mark Borgerson

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>
>
>> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.
>
> In 7-10 years it will be Galileo. The specifications are a little bit
> eklastic as they depend on integration time. If you are talking about
> RELATIVE separation this will in fact be only a few centimers, the
> accuracy of DGPS.
>

The accuracy of the GPS systems isnt the issue anyway. Its
handling the problem of separattion of large numbers of drones.

If they have to communicate with each other that introduces
extra weight, a considerable processing issue and a vulnerability
to jamming and/or spoofing.

Frankly you'd probably be better off accepting a certain percentage
of losses due to mid air collisions

Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Mark Borgerson wrote:
> In article >,
> says...
>> Mark Borgerson wrote:
>>> In article >,
>>> says...
>>>> Jack Linthicum wrote:
>>>> [snip]
>>>>
>>>>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
>>>>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
>>>>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
>>>>> grenades.
>>>> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
>>>> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
>>>> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
>>>>
>>> Why are you assuming that the command post does not move? I see no
>>> reason that a mobile command post and multiple mobile transmitters
>>> could not be used.
>>>
>> This comes down to the definition of mobile. If the command post stays
>> in the same place for half an hour it is static. A constantly moving
>> command post would need a vehicle the size of a bus to hold the
>> operators and long range transmitters, possible but hard to camouflage.
>
> So you don't think the Iranians have buses or semi-trailers? Suppose
> there are 100 semis on the coastal road. Which one do you target?

The one with the big aerial.

Small aerial to small aerial on moving objects gives a short range.

>>> Spread spectrum and frequency hopping systems do use a finite number
>>> of frequencies---but the sequence of freqencies used may not repeat for
>>> many hours. That leaves you with a broadband collection problem
>>> and having to sort out multiple emitters on the same bandwidth with
>>> different hopping schedules. I suspect that is a problem handled
>>> offline and after-the-fact, and not in real time. However, the
>>> technology has probably advanced a bit in the 30 years I've been
>>> out of the sigint world. ;-)
>> If we are trying to destroy the command post we do not need to receive
>> the entire message we can simply wait until that frequency is reused by
>> that transmitter. If the equipment is hopping over 100 frequencies it
>> should be back within the next 200 transmissions.
>
> With spread-spectrum transmitters, the time spent at one particular
> frequency may be only a millisecond or two. If you can provide a link
> to a system that can accurately track a moving spread-spectrum
> transmitter, I'd be interested in reviewing its specifications.
>

Try
<http://klabs.org/richcontent/MAPLDCon98/Papers/d3_haji.pdf>


For DFing you do not need to accurately track a spread-spectrum
transmitter's hops. You only need to guess one of the frequencies.
To intercept and decode a signal you need (almost) all the frequencies,
providing it can tell the difference between static and modulated signal
the above machine may be able to reconstruct the signal by listening
on hundreds of frequencies simultaneously.

> The problem with intercepting spread-spectrum signals is that the
> receiver KNOWS where the next signal will arrive. It can tune it's
> receiver software for that frequency. The intercept receive has to be
> able to recieve ALL frequencies---and thus cannot use the same signal
> processing techniques as a receiver that knows the sequence.
>> The computers will need programming to treat transmissions from two
>> widely separated locations as two targets. Home in on them one at a time.
>
> How do you work with one continuously moving target transmitting on
> 256 different frequencies? I suppose it could be done with large
> enough antennas and enough processing power on a number of different
> ships. It's not going to be easy, cheap, or widely available, though.

You can deal with frequency hopping by listening on hundreds of
frequencies simultaneously. When one of the frequencies is known very
accurate direction finding equipment can tune to that frequency and wait
for the transmitter.

Where the target is physically moving whilst transmitting something like
a radar display is needed. PCs can be programmed to act in this
fashion. Five years ago the army was working on things like this.

Andrew Swallow

In article . com>,
says...
>
> wrote:
> > > This implies 1000 km of constant wind and cloud.
> >
> > Not necessarily. They could be further apart in good weather and closer
> > toghether in bad. As far as wind is concerned COTS provides cheap (1m
> > or less) GPS. They could stay in formation unless the wind speed
> > exceeded forward speed. Unlikely.
>
> Wind is never homogenous and never from the same direction, especially
> over 1000klicks, all the 100 or 500 or whatever comms checks on
> position would certainly excite someone on the Elint watch. Those
> people are good, by the way, and have a real ear for the rare and
> unusual.
>
> Do you have a range (distance) for communications in this manner by the
> way?
>
>
The $179, spread-spectrum, 1W, 900Mhz radios we use for telemetry
have line-of sight ranges up to 40 miles.

You can check out the state of the art in commercial products at

http://www.maxstream.net/products/


That would be fine for covering the Straits of Hormuz. For that
you don't need a 1000km swarm in any case.

Mark Borgerson

In article >,
says...
> wrote:
>
> :Not necessarily. They could be further apart in good weather and closer
> :toghether in bad. As far as wind is concerned COTS provides cheap (1m
> :or less) GPS.
>
> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.
>
>
Hint #2; consider that the improvements due to WAAS are not
available outside North America.

Hit #3: Consider the difference between accuracy and relative
precision. The accuracy needed to transmit a target location
is different from the relative precision you need to keep
from colliding with other UAVs in the swarm.


Mark Borgerson

Keith W wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> >
> >> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.
> >
> > In 7-10 years it will be Galileo. The specifications are a little bit
> > eklastic as they depend on integration time. If you are talking about
> > RELATIVE separation this will in fact be only a few centimers, the
> > accuracy of DGPS.
> >
>
> The accuracy of the GPS systems isnt the issue anyway. Its
> handling the problem of separattion of large numbers of drones.
>
> If they have to communicate with each other that introduces
> extra weight, a considerable processing issue and a vulnerability
> to jamming and/or spoofing.
>
> Frankly you'd probably be better off accepting a certain percentage
> of losses due to mid air collisions
>
> Keith
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

The issue of transmission is the ability of a controller to take
action. Also you need some degree of defense in depth. If an enemy
swarm approached you, you would need the ability to direct resources to
that are. One UAV with a LMG is not going to stop a swarm. If however
it had communication technoilogy it might.

Acceptance of losses due to mid air collisions - OK there will be heavy
losses from a variety of causes. This is, of course, acceptable in a
cheap unmanned system.

To me the amazing thing is the sophistication of COTS. You talk about
weight and cost, but I can put a mobile in my shirt pocket which can do
the most amazing things. Spoofing - all converstaions are routinely
encrypted. Jamming - yes OK but if you are the US you simply put the
jammers out of action.

In point of fact use of an error correcting code, such as Reed Soloman,
will go a long way to soving the problem of jamming. You transmit in
bursts, the jammers have be on all the time.

If you were to have a swarm of UAVs with slightly modified mobile
phones with some aircraft being base stations and commumicating via
satellite you would have gone a fair way to building your system
without too much reaearch.

To do peer-peer communication is something which has been considered, a
lot of development would be needed.

What I think is amazing is the pace of COTS development. It provides a
very good arument against secret projects. What in fact I had in mind
was the provisions of contracts to the perveyors of COTS to advance
their act in military directions. The military could make the new
generation of Internet appear faster. The experts talk about

1) Specificicity. This will involve linguistic research. If you put in
"lock" it will know whether you mean "eclusia" or "cerradura".

2) This is relevant here. The ability of a mobile phone to read a
nearby screen. This is the whole concept of connectivity.

Why not provide funds to get this done? No secrecy required. Tell Al
Qaeda about the strength and breaking strain of the rope.

wrote:
> The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
> missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
> until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 - then the USN woke up to
> the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
> answer.

Is that installed on the ship in question?

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/cvn-76.htm
USS RONALD REAGAN is equipped with Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM),
which replaces the Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) used on other
carriers. RAM Systems pack 21 fire and forget missiles capable of
destroying any high-speed incoming targets.

But how about low-speed incoming targets? Send in the Stringbags?

Better yet, assign each Carrier Strike Group an ESG for protection
against slow flying targets.

Why?

For the fighter aircraft that can hover in midair. VIFF 'em dead.

-HJC

schrieb:

> The responses so far all point to several things:
>
<snip>
> 3. It is always likely to prove difficult to spot a small, stealthy UAV
> by any means - visual, IR or radar. Furthermore, existing gun/missile
> systems are not designed to engage such targets and may have great
> difficulty in doing so.
>
What about using lidar?
In bad weather the drone/UAV might be degraded as well as your lidar-system.

And for defence/shooting them down maybe something like THEL could be
used, and I believe the range of THEL being superior to that of most gun
systems.

> 4. The UAV controlling station can be mobile and will only need to send
> occasional very brief signals - they will require a lot of effort to
> locate and kill.
>
> Basically it comes down to difficulties and probabilities. UAVs exist,
> now, which are extremely difficult to detect and can carry the
> necessary targeting equipment. They are very cheap by military
> standards. Laser-homing munitions exist, now, which are cheap and can
> home in on such signals. The means of dealing with such a threat does
> not appear to exist at present. I have no doubt that people are working
> on it, and that solutions will be found (perhaps along the lines that
> some have suggested here), but they are likely to require a lot of cost
> to implement and will always face the basic problem - the UAV
> controllers only need to succeed once, the warship has to succeed every
> time.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>

> wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> Keith W wrote:
>> > wrote in message
>> ups.com...
>> >
>> >
>> >> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.
>> >
>> > In 7-10 years it will be Galileo. The specifications are a little bit
>> > eklastic as they depend on integration time. If you are talking about
>> > RELATIVE separation this will in fact be only a few centimers, the
>> > accuracy of DGPS.
>> >
>>
>> The accuracy of the GPS systems isnt the issue anyway. Its
>> handling the problem of separattion of large numbers of drones.
>>
>> If they have to communicate with each other that introduces
>> extra weight, a considerable processing issue and a vulnerability
>> to jamming and/or spoofing.
>>
>> Frankly you'd probably be better off accepting a certain percentage
>> of losses due to mid air collisions
>>
>> Keith
>>
>>
>>
>> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet
>> News==----
>> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+
>> Newsgroups
>> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption
>> =----
>
> The issue of transmission is the ability of a controller to take
> action.

You dont get it. To maintain separation each drone needs to know
where its neighbours are not just its own position

> Also you need some degree of defense in depth. If an enemy
> swarm approached you, you would need the ability to direct resources to
> that are. One UAV with a LMG is not going to stop a swarm. If however
> it had communication technoilogy it might.
>

The USN isnt going to rely on one LMG for defence

> Acceptance of losses due to mid air collisions - OK there will be heavy
> losses from a variety of causes. This is, of course, acceptable in a
> cheap unmanned system.
>
> To me the amazing thing is the sophistication of COTS. You talk about
> weight and cost, but I can put a mobile in my shirt pocket which can do
> the most amazing things. Spoofing - all converstaions are routinely
> encrypted. Jamming - yes OK but if you are the US you simply put the
> jammers out of action.
>

The US is doing the jamming in this scenarion and dont kid
yourself that encryption cant be broken.


> In point of fact use of an error correcting code, such as Reed Soloman,
> will go a long way to soving the problem of jamming. You transmit in
> bursts, the jammers have be on all the time.
>

And this is a problem because ?

> If you were to have a swarm of UAVs with slightly modified mobile
> phones with some aircraft being base stations and commumicating via
> satellite you would have gone a fair way to building your system
> without too much reaearch.
>

Psst mobile phones require repeaters in line of sight, there arent
too many in the middle of the Gulf


Keith



----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Fred J. McCall wrote:
> wrote:
>
> :> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
> :> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
> :> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
> :> helicopter has.
> :
> :Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
>
> No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.

What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
UAV? The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
foolish complacency.

> :If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
> :is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.
>
> Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?
>
> Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.

And exactly how will the pilot aim his guns, if the radar gunsight
won't lock on and the sights he's got are no better than WW2 standards?


Hint #1: in WW2 the Luftwaffe found that only between 2% and 5% of the
shots they fired hit the target - and they were shooting at B-17s! Now
scale down the target size to a UAV with a wingspan of a couple of
metres, and work out how much ammo would have to be fired to nail one.

Hint #2: unlike the Luftwaffe's ammo, the current standard US 20mm
aircraft SAPHEI shell, the PGU-28/B, does not have a tracer - so the
pilot will have no idea where his shots are going.

> :The basic problem is that naval self-defence systems are designed to
> :deal with large, fast objects which produce a nice big radar echo. We
> :know that they have problems picking up stealth planes - that's the
> :whole point of stealth planes, after all - so it is obvious that
> :they're going to have a hell of a lot more problems dealing with a very
> :much smaller and inherently stealthy object. I don't doubt they will
> :eventually find a means of coping with them, but that's probably years
> :away - and the threat exists now.
>
> Hint #4: The sky is NOT falling, Chicken Little....

I sincerely hope that you have absolutely no connection with the
planning of USN defence systems, because that sort of sneering
complacency gets the wrong people killed.

> :Note that according to the website above concerning the half-hour
> :terrorist flight over Israel "the Israeli army could also do nothing to
> :shut down the plane though they observed the entire flight over their
> :territory."
>
> And just why was that? It's a preposterous claim. If you can see it
> you can kill it.

How, exactly? Ordinary MGs with eyeball sights stand hardly any chance
of connecting with a small plane at an unknown distance and travelling
at an unknown speed, unless it comes very low and close. Radar FCS
would probably not even pick it up.

The report I referenced has this to say: "According to a statement of
Hezbollah leader, the flight over Israel to Nahariya lasted 14 minutes.
Israeli side confirms this claim."

The report also says: "Currently no country has an efficient defense
against small low-flying UAVs, because existing air defense systems are
not designed to counter threats of this type. Air defenses are mainly
aimed at relatively large and fast planes. Thus, it is not surprising
that Israeli air defense turned out to be weak against "Mirsad 1" UAV.
Israeli army could also do nothing to shut down the plane though they
observed the entire flight over their territory."

Unless you have evidence that the report is a fabrication - in which
case please post it here - what are your grounds for dismissing it,
except of course that you don't want to believe it?

> :The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
> :missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
> :until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 -
>
> And was totally ineffective only 5 years later, although dozens were
> fired, with one even being downed by a 75mm gun.

That's right: the Styx was a very big and quite slow missile which made
a nice big target. Modern anti-ship missiles are in a completely
different league. Please note that the Israelis now fit Phalanx to just
about all of their warships.

> :then the USN woke up to
> :the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
> :answer.
>
> You have an interesting view of history is all I can say.

So please explain - why in your opinion was Phalanx developed?

Just to help you, I have a copy of an article by the US technical naval
historian Norman Friedman, which describes the Phalanx as "specifically
designed to destroy incoming missiles which have survived other fleet
defences."

Your basic attitude seems to be that the USN defences will work
perfectly as they do "in the movies", while their attackers will be
easily defeated. Try asking the crew of USS Stark about that. NO weapon
system, offensive or defensive, can be relied upon to work all of the
time, for a variety of technical and human failure reasons.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

In message m>,
writes
>Jeb wrote:
>> It would seem to me to be likely that a simple software code
>> modification would allow an Aegis system to detect smaller, slower
>> returns (I would expect that right now, those get filtered out so that
>> seabirds don't cause spurious readings on the radar scopes).
>
>I doubt that very much. If radar systems have great difficulty in
>detecting and tracking stealthy aircraft like the F-117, B-2 and so on
>- big objects with lots of metal in them - they are going to find it
>vastly more difficult to pick up a very small, mostly plastic object
>which has also been designed to be as stealthy as possible.

It depends on the values of "great difficulty" you're working to. Being
able to knock the range of a D-band search radar down to a fraction of
its expected value, can open great gaps in a land-based radar network
through which a stealth aircraft can fly: but overflying a ship with
such a radar will still get you detected and tracked at quite usable
distances, even in a "Stealth" aircraft.

To simplify grossly, a radar can detect a target at a distance
proportional to the inverse fourth power of its radar cross section -
so, for example, a radar that can pick up a one-square-metre target at
100 miles, can spot something half that size at 85 miles, or a target
with a radar echoing area of 0.01 square metres at about 32 miles.

Big differences there between "get through the radar fence along their
border" and "fly over the top of the radar undetected".

>If that
>could be remedied by tweaking the software, then all of the money spent
>on stealth aircraft has been wasted.

Stealth aircraft aren't generally trying to play Kamikaze into warships
at sea.

--
Paul J. Adam

In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
wrote:
>:That's because ships haven't had to deal with UAVs before.
>
>Air targets are air targets. Helicopters are neither trained nor
>equipped to do air intercepts.

Perhaps not in the USN, but there *are* other navies...

>:As someone
>:else on this board has suggested, a helo with a machine gun may
>:actually be the best way of dealing with small, slow UAVs
>
>"Someone on this board" will inevitably suggest all sorts of stupid
>things.
>
>Hint #1: It's not a 'board'. Its called a newsgroup.
>
>Hint #2: Helos are too slow to deal with even a slow UAV. The
>leading edge of the rotor goes transonic at relatively slow forward
>speeds.

Smaller UAVs, light civilian aircraft et cetera fly rather slower than
some helicopters - the Lynx has a higher cruise speed than many light
aircraft's "pass this red line and the wings fall off" Vne - and can
leave most of the smaller UAVs standing (top speed ~170kt compared to
ScanEagle's 60kt, for example). Or, more appropriately, intercept, hold
formation, and allow the employment of an M3M .50" machine gun from the
most appropriate range and angle.

After all, when conducting trials to work out what useful things a UAV
could do for your forces at sea, it makes sense to also check out what
unhelpful things an adversary might try to do with his own UAVs and how
they might be detected and if necessary dissuaded...

--
Paul J. Adam

In article >,
(Andrew Swallow) wrote:

> A machine can get a fairly accurate bearing in 10ms. Machines
> can be made to be very patient so the several minutes is only
> a minor problem.

The point you are missing that has been made is that there is no
need for the transmitter to be at the same place as the command
post or the only one. If I was doing this I would have a command
post, fibre optic links to several transmitters and possibly the
transmitters using remote aerials. Combine that with random
transmitter selection for each transmission and it will make life
difficult. Oh eventually you will run out of usable transmitters
but the swarm is likely to be extinct by that point anyway.

The so called computer intelligence required by each UAV is a
much bigger problem.

Ken Young

On Wed, 31 May 2006 16:44:09 -0700, Mark Borgerson <> wrote:
>
> Why are you assuming that the command post does not move? I see no
> reason that a mobile command post and multiple mobile transmitters
> could not be used.

"I see no reason why all of the problems with my idea can't
be addressed by making my system even more complex."

You already have a large number of Predator-sized UAVs (the
Predator has a wingspan of almost 50 feet and is about 28 feet
long, by the way, for a payload of about 450 pounds), which
are apparently equipped with a sensor suite that can image
ships in visible light and IR (it would kind of suck to not
be able to see your target several miles away in haze, or if
it was dark out, so I'm assuming you've already thrown in
multispectral imaging capability, or hey, why not synthetic
aperture radar) plus a laser rangefinder and sophisticated
ESM receivers that can classify and locate enemy radar emissions,
plus a Mk 1 Electronic Brain that can fuse all the sensor data,
analyze images to reliably identify specific ship types from any
angle and in any lighting conditions, and decide all by itself
to engage targets with the weapons that also somehow have to
fit in that 450 lb payload.

Oops, I almost forgot the swarm of decoy aircraft that match
the radar, IR, visual, and ESM signature of your real attack
UAVs (so the enemy can't easily classify them as decoys and
ignore them), but are just there to make things more confusing.

Now you want to add a mobile command infrastructure, presumably
with a horde of mobile decoy transmitters to make the actual
transmitters harder to target (if the decoys aren't mobile,
after all, they won't be very effective decoys.)

What happens if the ships you're trying to attack are below
the horizon from your coast? Better add a satellite
communication system so you can still order your UAVs
around when they're more than 20 miles offshore.

Or hey, wait a minute, the UAVs are autonomous, so why not make
them submersible too? If they're attacked, they can just dive
into the water and continue the rest of the way to the target
safely. At one stroke, you've just rendered all of the enemy's
sophisticated air defense systems useless!

I think there might be a point somewhere in there when the
leaders of Ashcanistan will tell you and your Asymmetrical
Warefare-O-Matic system to get lost, and go back to their
original idea of using WWI-era naval mines and suicide
speedboats to inconvenience the naval forces of the
Great Satan.


ljd

"rb" > wrote in message
...
> wrote:
>> According to:
>>
>> http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
>>
>> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
>> for 25 minutes.
>>
>> With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
>> question becomes:
>>
>> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
>> terrorist organizations start using them against us?
>>
>
> Highly unlikely that it went undetected for 25 mins.
> More likely it's Iranian sabre rattling again.
>
> rb

Indeed. How would they have known it wasn't detected for 25 minutes after
detecting it after all :)

"Jim Yanik" > wrote in message
.. .
> wrote in
> ups.com:
>
>> According to:
>>
>> http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
>>
>> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
>> for 25 minutes.
>>
>> With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
>> question becomes:
>>
>> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
>> terrorist
>> organizations start using them against us?
>>
>
> Was the Iranian "UAV" a small drone like ours,or was it a FULL-SIZE
> aircraft that was remote controlled?
>
most likely it was a genie out of some Persian story, and dreamed up by some
Russian journalist.

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
[ SNIP ]
> I learned it the simple way: If you can see it, you can kill it.

Well, not if "it" is capering about merrily in a No Fire Area.

AHS

In article >,
says...
>
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> >
> >> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.
> >
> > In 7-10 years it will be Galileo. The specifications are a little bit
> > eklastic as they depend on integration time. If you are talking about
> > RELATIVE separation this will in fact be only a few centimers, the
> > accuracy of DGPS.
> >
>
> The accuracy of the GPS systems isnt the issue anyway. Its
> handling the problem of separattion of large numbers of drones.
>
> If they have to communicate with each other that introduces
> extra weight, a considerable processing issue and a vulnerability
> to jamming and/or spoofing.
>
> Frankly you'd probably be better off accepting a certain percentage
> of losses due to mid air collisions
>

That's my position also. One of these days I'll have to set up a
Monte-Carlo simulation to try to judge the collision probability.
As it is, one of my customers still wants to have their autonomous
flying machines exhibit 'flocking and anti-collision' behavior.
Keeping track of where 49 other systems are and where they are
going IS a considerable processing issue---but you can simplify
by ignoring those that are more than 10 seconds flight away
from the system of interest.

Jamming and spoofing can be an issue---but it is somewhat difficult
to jam a spread-spectrum system that only has to communicate
a few hundred meters (from one drone to another).

Mark Borgerson

Keith W wrote:
> > wrote in message
> oups.com...
> >
> > Keith W wrote:
> >> > wrote in message
> >> ups.com...
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> Hint: Look up the accuracy specifications of GPS.
> >> >
> >> > In 7-10 years it will be Galileo. The specifications are a little bit
> >> > eklastic as they depend on integration time. If you are talking about
> >> > RELATIVE separation this will in fact be only a few centimers, the
> >> > accuracy of DGPS.
> >> >
> >>
> >> The accuracy of the GPS systems isnt the issue anyway. Its
> >> handling the problem of separattion of large numbers of drones.
> >>
> >> If they have to communicate with each other that introduces
> >> extra weight, a considerable processing issue and a vulnerability
> >> to jamming and/or spoofing.
> >>
> >> Frankly you'd probably be better off accepting a certain percentage
> >> of losses due to mid air collisions
> >>
> >> Keith
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet
> >> News==----
> >> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+
> >> Newsgroups
> >> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption
> >> =----
> >
> > The issue of transmission is the ability of a controller to take
> > action.
>
> You dont get it. To maintain separation each drone needs to know
> where its neighbours are not just its own position
>
> > Also you need some degree of defense in depth. If an enemy
> > swarm approached you, you would need the ability to direct resources to
> > that are. One UAV with a LMG is not going to stop a swarm. If however
> > it had communication technoilogy it might.
> >
>
> The USN isnt going to rely on one LMG for defence
>
> > Acceptance of losses due to mid air collisions - OK there will be heavy
> > losses from a variety of causes. This is, of course, acceptable in a
> > cheap unmanned system.
> >
> > To me the amazing thing is the sophistication of COTS. You talk about
> > weight and cost, but I can put a mobile in my shirt pocket which can do
> > the most amazing things. Spoofing - all converstaions are routinely
> > encrypted. Jamming - yes OK but if you are the US you simply put the
> > jammers out of action.
> >
>
> The US is doing the jamming in this scenarion and dont kid
> yourself that encryption cant be broken.
>
>
> > In point of fact use of an error correcting code, such as Reed Soloman,
> > will go a long way to soving the problem of jamming. You transmit in
> > bursts, the jammers have be on all the time.
> >
>
> And this is a problem because ?
>
> > If you were to have a swarm of UAVs with slightly modified mobile
> > phones with some aircraft being base stations and commumicating via
> > satellite you would have gone a fair way to building your system
> > without too much reaearch.
> >
>
> Psst mobile phones require repeaters in line of sight, there arent
> too many in the middle of the Gulf
>
>
> Keith
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

I think you misunderstand the concept. It is one LMG per plane not one
LMG. The whole concept rests on low cost, density and because of
density there will be line of sight communication, although not
necessariyy direct. Communication is of course needed to allow
concentration of forces. You can in fact visualize this as an army of
robots.

Encryption - can it be broken? There have been a number of mathematical
articles on this. If it is breakable you can simply use more bits. A
faster code is noltiplication in a modulus and exlusive OR, but you
need to transmit "die Radstellung" by another method (say RSA).

In article >,
says...
> Mark Borgerson wrote:
> > In article >,
> > says...
> >> Mark Borgerson wrote:
> >>> In article >,
> >>> says...
> >>>> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> >>>> [snip]
> >>>>
> >>>>> I think that a spread spectrum burst type transmission can be
> >>>>> intercepted and given a rough bearing. The money to do this is
> >>>>> miniscule in comparison with making Trident missiles into hand
> >>>>> grenades.
> >>>> The command post does not move between transmissions. Spread
> >>>> spectrum/frequency hopping systems return to previous frequencies every
> >>>> few seconds. Just use several bursts to home in on the transmitter.
> >>>>
> >>> Why are you assuming that the command post does not move? I see no
> >>> reason that a mobile command post and multiple mobile transmitters
> >>> could not be used.
> >>>
> >> This comes down to the definition of mobile. If the command post stays
> >> in the same place for half an hour it is static. A constantly moving
> >> command post would need a vehicle the size of a bus to hold the
> >> operators and long range transmitters, possible but hard to camouflage.
> >
> > So you don't think the Iranians have buses or semi-trailers? Suppose
> > there are 100 semis on the coastal road. Which one do you target?
>
> The one with the big aerial.
>
> Small aerial to small aerial on moving objects gives a short range.

You can put a pretty large antenna (at 900Mhz or higher) inside the
back of a semi trailer. (Probably best to use fiberglass panels
rather than aluminum on the outside, though!)
>
> >>> Spread spectrum and frequency hopping systems do use a finite number
> >>> of frequencies---but the sequence of freqencies used may not repeat for
> >>> many hours. That leaves you with a broadband collection problem
> >>> and having to sort out multiple emitters on the same bandwidth with
> >>> different hopping schedules. I suspect that is a problem handled
> >>> offline and after-the-fact, and not in real time. However, the
> >>> technology has probably advanced a bit in the 30 years I've been
> >>> out of the sigint world. ;-)
> >> If we are trying to destroy the command post we do not need to receive
> >> the entire message we can simply wait until that frequency is reused by
> >> that transmitter. If the equipment is hopping over 100 frequencies it
> >> should be back within the next 200 transmissions.
> >
> > With spread-spectrum transmitters, the time spent at one particular
> > frequency may be only a millisecond or two. If you can provide a link
> > to a system that can accurately track a moving spread-spectrum
> > transmitter, I'd be interested in reviewing its specifications.
> >
>
> Try
> <http://klabs.org/richcontent/MAPLDCon98/Papers/d3_haji.pdf>

Thanks for the link. It looks very interesting. I couldn't find
any data on the angular resolution of the DF, though.
>
>
> For DFing you do not need to accurately track a spread-spectrum
> transmitter's hops. You only need to guess one of the frequencies.
> To intercept and decode a signal you need (almost) all the frequencies,
> providing it can tell the difference between static and modulated signal
> the above machine may be able to reconstruct the signal by listening
> on hundreds of frequencies simultaneously.
>
> > The problem with intercepting spread-spectrum signals is that the
> > receiver KNOWS where the next signal will arrive. It can tune it's
> > receiver software for that frequency. The intercept receive has to be
> > able to recieve ALL frequencies---and thus cannot use the same signal
> > processing techniques as a receiver that knows the sequence.
> >> The computers will need programming to treat transmissions from two
> >> widely separated locations as two targets. Home in on them one at a time.
> >
> > How do you work with one continuously moving target transmitting on
> > 256 different frequencies? I suppose it could be done with large
> > enough antennas and enough processing power on a number of different
> > ships. It's not going to be easy, cheap, or widely available, though.
>
> You can deal with frequency hopping by listening on hundreds of
> frequencies simultaneously. When one of the frequencies is known very
> accurate direction finding equipment can tune to that frequency and wait
> for the transmitter.

How accurate is 'very accurate'? Back when I was working with HFDF,
one or two degrees angular resolution was considered reasonable.
The system I worked with is described here:

http://www.nrl.navy.mil/NewsRoom/images/75awards.pdf
(look at the award citation for high frequency direction finding)
>
> Where the target is physically moving whilst transmitting something like
> a radar display is needed. PCs can be programmed to act in this
> fashion. Five years ago the army was working on things like this.
>

Mark Borgerson

"Jeroen Wenting" <jwenting at hornet dot demon dot nl> wrote in message
...
>
> "Jim Yanik" > wrote in message
> .. .
> > wrote in
> > ups.com:
> >
> >> According to:
> >>
> >> http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20060530/48833304.html
> >>
> >> An Iranian UAV was able to circle a U.S. aircraft carrier undetected
> >> for 25 minutes.
> >>
> >> With U.S. forces making increasing use of UAV's, the inevitable
> >> question becomes:
> >>
> >> How can we protect our forces against UAV's when other countries or
> >> terrorist
> >> organizations start using them against us?
> >>
> >
> > Was the Iranian "UAV" a small drone like ours,or was it a FULL-SIZE
> > aircraft that was remote controlled?
> >
> most likely it was a genie out of some Persian story, and dreamed up by
some
> Russian journalist.

Assumptions like that get people killed.

Underestimating an enemy, or potential enemy, is a very dangerous thing to
do.

--
William Black

I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.

Paul J. Adam wrote:
>
> Stealth aircraft aren't generally trying to play Kamikaze into warships
> at sea.

True, but I have been thinking more in terms of getting no closer than
is required to identify the target and illuminate it with a laser. For
a ship near to the shore, you could that with a very small UAV, I
think: not easy to knock down, even if you're able to detect it.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Moritz Wünsch wrote:
> schrieb:
>
> > The responses so far all point to several things:
> >
> <snip>
> > 3. It is always likely to prove difficult to spot a small, stealthy UAV
> > by any means - visual, IR or radar. Furthermore, existing gun/missile
> > systems are not designed to engage such targets and may have great
> > difficulty in doing so.
> >
> What about using lidar?
> In bad weather the drone/UAV might be degraded as well as your lidar-system.
>
> And for defence/shooting them down maybe something like THEL could be
> used, and I believe the range of THEL being superior to that of most gun
> systems.

That sounds like a promising approach - but I believe it would be quite
a few years before such a system could be in service. Which is, of
course, the crux of the problem: the threat is relatively low-tech,
cheap, proven and available now, the responses to it are high-tech,
costly, unproven and available "sometime in the future".

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

wrote:
> Ken Chaddock wrote:
>
>
>>Block 1B CIWS has an infrared and optical tracker that would do nicely
>>against any UAV within it's range...the question is finding the UAV in
>>the first place. An Infrared search system with the ability to designate
>>to a B1B Phalanx would work quite well I think...
>
>
> But a prop-driven UAV with a small engine and some attention to exhaust
> masking would not be an easy IR target.
>
> If all you want to do is locate and identify a ship, and beam an
> illuminating laser at it to guide the incoming ordnance, then the UAV
> can be very small and very hard to detect.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Have you ever seen the radar return from a prop ? Looks like a bloody
747...a prop-job wouldn't be a particular problem and contrary to
popular misconception, most modern IR trackers don't rely on a hugh heat
gradient but rather on the difference in emissivity between the target
and the background, IOW it's tracking the delta, not the absolute IR
output of the target...

....Ken

wrote:

:
:Fred J. McCall wrote:
:> wrote:
:>
:> :> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
:> :> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
:> :> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
:> :> helicopter has.
:> :
:> :Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
:>
:> No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.
:
:What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
:UAV?

What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?

:The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
:radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
:radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
:proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
:foolish complacency.

Which means nothing, since a fighter attacking with a gun uses
EYEBALLS to get the target and they're way up close.

:> :If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
:> :is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.
:>
:> Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?
:>
:> Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.
:
:And exactly how will the pilot aim his guns, if the radar gunsight
:won't lock on and the sights he's got are no better than WW2 standards?

He'll aim them the same way he aims them against anything else. Times
have changed since WW2 and no 'radar gunsight' is required.

:Hint #1: in WW2 the Luftwaffe found that only between 2% and 5% of the
:shots they fired hit the target - and they were shooting at B-17s! Now
:scale down the target size to a UAV with a wingspan of a couple of
:metres, and work out how much ammo would have to be fired to nail one.

About 5 rounds.

:Hint #2: unlike the Luftwaffe's ammo, the current standard US 20mm
:aircraft SAPHEI shell, the PGU-28/B, does not have a tracer - so the
:pilot will have no idea where his shots are going.

Nor does he need to. It's NICE to have radar, but it's hardly
necessary in order to score a lot of hits with a modern gun and HUD.

:> :The basic problem is that naval self-defence systems are designed to
:> :deal with large, fast objects which produce a nice big radar echo. We
:> :know that they have problems picking up stealth planes - that's the
:> :whole point of stealth planes, after all - so it is obvious that
:> :they're going to have a hell of a lot more problems dealing with a very
:> :much smaller and inherently stealthy object. I don't doubt they will
:> :eventually find a means of coping with them, but that's probably years
:> :away - and the threat exists now.
:>
:> Hint #4: The sky is NOT falling, Chicken Little....
:
:I sincerely hope that you have absolutely no connection with the
:planning of USN defence systems, because that sort of sneering
:complacency gets the wrong people killed.

I sincerely hope that you have absolute no connection with the
planning of ANY systems used by the military, because such abysmal
ignorance leads to unexecutable programs designed to counter
non-existent threats.

:> :Note that according to the website above concerning the half-hour
:> :terrorist flight over Israel "the Israeli army could also do nothing to
:> :shut down the plane though they observed the entire flight over their
:> :territory."
:>
:> And just why was that? It's a preposterous claim. If you can see it
:> you can kill it.
:
:How, exactly? Ordinary MGs with eyeball sights stand hardly any chance
:of connecting with a small plane at an unknown distance and travelling
:at an unknown speed, unless it comes very low and close. Radar FCS
:would probably not even pick it up.

And none of that applies to most modern aircraft, or even most modern
air defense weapons in general.

:The report I referenced has this to say: "According to a statement of
:Hezbollah leader, the flight over Israel to Nahariya lasted 14 minutes.
:Israeli side confirms this claim."
:
:The report also says: "Currently no country has an efficient defense
:against small low-flying UAVs, because existing air defense systems are
:not designed to counter threats of this type. Air defenses are mainly
:aimed at relatively large and fast planes. Thus, it is not surprising
:that Israeli air defense turned out to be weak against "Mirsad 1" UAV.
:Israeli army could also do nothing to shut down the plane though they
:observed the entire flight over their territory."
:
:Unless you have evidence that the report is a fabrication - in which
:case please post it here - what are your grounds for dismissing it,
:except of course that you don't want to believe it?

Because it's from an untrustworthy source and doesn't seem to fit the
facts of our current reality, however much it might accord with yours.

:> :The situation is analogous to that posed by the first Russian anti-ship
:> :missile, the Styx. It was around for years and no-one took much notice
:> :until one sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967 -
:>
:> And was totally ineffective only 5 years later, although dozens were
:> fired, with one even being downed by a 75mm gun.
:
:That's right: the Styx was a very big and quite slow missile which made
:a nice big target. Modern anti-ship missiles are in a completely
:different league. Please note that the Israelis now fit Phalanx to just
:about all of their warships.

So noted. So what? What does this have to do with the current
discussion?

:> :then the USN woke up to
:> :the need for a short-range defence system, and Phalanx was the eventual
:> :answer.
:>
:> You have an interesting view of history is all I can say.
:
:So please explain - why in your opinion was Phalanx developed?

I was referring to your apparently belief that everyone was ignoring
everything up until 1967. This is merely a stupid belief, totally at
odds with the reality most of us live in.

:Just to help you, I have a copy of an article by the US technical naval
:historian Norman Friedman, which describes the Phalanx as "specifically
:designed to destroy incoming missiles which have survived other fleet
:defences."

Just to help you, we build the ****ing thing.

:Your basic attitude seems to be that the USN defences will work
:perfectly as they do "in the movies", while their attackers will be
:easily defeated.

I don't feel particularly responsible for how things seem to you. I'd
attribute that to your meds, not anything to do with me.

:Try asking the crew of USS Stark about that. NO weapon
:system, offensive or defensive, can be relied upon to work all of the
:time, for a variety of technical and human failure reasons.

That's right, but again it's irrelevant to the current discussion.

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
wrote:
:>:That's because ships haven't had to deal with UAVs before.
:>
:>Air targets are air targets. Helicopters are neither trained nor
:>equipped to do air intercepts.
:
:Perhaps not in the USN, but there *are* other navies...

Really? Who? Of course the French come close, but other than them?
:-)

The only reason I can come up with to be training helicopters to do
air intercept work is a total lack of any ship much larger than a
destroyer. That's not a navy....

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
.. .
:[ SNIP ]
:> I learned it the simple way: If you can see it, you can kill it.
:
:Well, not if "it" is capering about merrily in a No Fire Area.

I can't say I believe in No Fire Areas.

--
"You'd see his work everywhere but never see him. A
colonel in Special Ops said he was the ******* son
of Clint Eastwood and Yoda."
-- Colby Granger, "Numb3rs"

"William Black" > wrote:

:Underestimating an enemy, or potential enemy, is a very dangerous thing to
:do.

So is overestimating one and acting on that. Just think how much
money you could spend to counter Potemkin Villages....

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

writes:

> rb wrote:
>>
>> Highly unlikely that it went undetected for 25 mins.
>> More likely it's Iranian sabre rattling again.
>
> Regardless of the accuracy of this particular account, it is true that
> UAVs pose a new problem for navies and armies, especially in the
> smaller versions. Defensive systems are generally designed to detect
> and destroy much bigger and more obvious targets, and even if they
> manage to spot a small UAV, what would be used to shoot it down?
>
> This is the subject of much debate at the moment. Ordinary homing
> missiles may not be able to lock-on to a stealthy little UAV (and even
> if they could, there's not much logic in using a very expensive missile
> to shoot down a very cheap plane). A radar-directed gun system like
> Phalanx might also not lock-on to such a target. The best bet at the
> moment IMO would be a 35mm gun firing the Oerlikon AHEAD 'shrapnel'
> type airburst ammo, using electro-optical guidance.

At the end of the day, a smaller and more mobile target will win the
inevitable arms race: as yet un- or under-developed weapons for such a
small vehicle will be able to compromise (either individually or in
numbers) a much larger surface warship, leading to the realization
that warship-based gun development is just postponing the
inevitable. A rational multi-layered solution would require one's own
similarly-sized (and priced) vehicles capable of taking out the other
sides', methods to reduce the capability to launch (=airfield or
controller suppression) and to control. There is no chance of
preventing countries from producing or deploying such weapons, since
that is normal sovereign behaviour.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug ) Tel: +81 774 38-3866
JSPS Fellow (Rm.403, RISH, Kyoto Uni.) Fax: +81 774 31-8463
www.rish.kyoto-u.ac.jp/radar-group/members/gernot Mob: +81 90 39493924

wrote:
> rb wrote:
>> The US navy in particular seems to have seen the writing on the wall for
>> some time now, hence (I would assume) part of the reason for their
>> interest in developing the 'Millenium' gun and expressed interest in the
>> naval 57mm cannon.
>> http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=13559&rsbci=13158&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400&jsi=false
>> http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/dec_04_46.php
>
> The 35mm Millennium gun would qualify - that's designed to fire the
> AHEAD ammo I mentioned - but I'm not so sure about the Bofors 57mm. In
> the AA mode that uses radar aiming and proximity fuzes, and I'm not
> sure if either would be sensitive enough to respond to a small stealthy
> UAV.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>

3P ammunition should work with time fusing at least, so long as the uav
can be targetted...

http://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/missiles/bofors/
"...
SIX-MODE PROGRAMMABLE ALL-TARGET 3P AMMUNITION
The different function modes of the 3P ammunition gives Bofors Naval Gun
Systems the flexibility to combat a range of targets:

Gated Proximity Function, Gated Proximity Function with Impact Priority
and Conventional Proximity Function for Air Defence
Time Function for combating small, fast, manoeuvring surface targets and
concealed on-shore targets
Impact Function and Armour Piercing Function ..."

http://www.uniteddefense.com/prod/ngun_mk3.htm

"....The 57mm Mk 3 provides unmatched lethality with multiple 57mm
ammunition options available from the weapon's twin compartment magazine
that can shift between round types instantly. Bofors 57mm 3P all-target
programmable ammunition allows three proximity fuzing options as well as
settings for time, impact and armor-piercing functions. With a range of
17 kilometers, Bofors 57mm HCER surface target ammunition provides reach
and explosive effect comparable to larger caliber guns...."


rb

In article <%AMfg.1638$I61.24@clgrps13>,
says...
> wrote:
> > Ken Chaddock wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Block 1B CIWS has an infrared and optical tracker that would do nicely
> >>against any UAV within it's range...the question is finding the UAV in
> >>the first place. An Infrared search system with the ability to designate
> >>to a B1B Phalanx would work quite well I think...
> >
> >
> > But a prop-driven UAV with a small engine and some attention to exhaust
> > masking would not be an easy IR target.
> >
> > If all you want to do is locate and identify a ship, and beam an
> > illuminating laser at it to guide the incoming ordnance, then the UAV
> > can be very small and very hard to detect.
> >
> > Tony Williams
> > Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>
> Have you ever seen the radar return from a prop ? Looks like a bloody
> 747...a prop-job wouldn't be a particular problem and contrary to
> popular misconception, most modern IR trackers don't rely on a hugh heat
> gradient but rather on the difference in emissivity between the target
> and the background, IOW it's tracking the delta, not the absolute IR
> output of the target...

So what IS the radar return from a wooden or fiberglass propellor like?

The UAVs that I've seen and the powered paragliders don't have metal
propellors. I suspect the reason is economics, rather than stealth,
though.



Mark Borgerson

In article >,
says...
> wrote:
>
> :
> :Fred J. McCall wrote:
> :> wrote:
> :>
> :> :> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
> :> :> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
> :> :> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
> :> :> helicopter has.
> :> :
> :> :Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
> :>
> :> No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.
> :
> :What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
> :UAV?
>
> What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?
>
> :The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
> :radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
> :radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
> :proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
> :foolish complacency.
>
> Which means nothing, since a fighter attacking with a gun uses
> EYEBALLS to get the target and they're way up close.
>
> :> :If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
> :> :is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.
> :>
> :> Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?
> :>
> :> Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.
> :
> :And exactly how will the pilot aim his guns, if the radar gunsight
> :won't lock on and the sights he's got are no better than WW2 standards?
>
> He'll aim them the same way he aims them against anything else. Times
> have changed since WW2 and no 'radar gunsight' is required.
>
> :Hint #1: in WW2 the Luftwaffe found that only between 2% and 5% of the
> :shots they fired hit the target - and they were shooting at B-17s! Now
> :scale down the target size to a UAV with a wingspan of a couple of
> :metres, and work out how much ammo would have to be fired to nail one.
>
> About 5 rounds.

Hmmm, coming up behind a UAV with a 6-foot wingspan, the cross-sectional
area of the target might be only 1 or 2 square feet. How close does
the fighter pilot have to be to hit a 2 square foot target with 5
rounds?
>
> :Hint #2: unlike the Luftwaffe's ammo, the current standard US 20mm
> :aircraft SAPHEI shell, the PGU-28/B, does not have a tracer - so the
> :pilot will have no idea where his shots are going.
>
> Nor does he need to. It's NICE to have radar, but it's hardly
> necessary in order to score a lot of hits with a modern gun and HUD.
><<SNIP>>

Mark Borgerson

Fred J. McCall wrote:

A load of BS.

Well done, you've managed the rare achievement of being put on my
IGNORE list as not worth reading or responding to.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Mark Borgerson <mborgerson.at.comcast.net> wrote:

:In article >,
says...
:> wrote:
:>
:> :
:> :Fred J. McCall wrote:
:> :> wrote:
:> :>
:> :> :> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
:> :> :> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
:> :> :> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
:> :> :> helicopter has.
:> :> :
:> :> :Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
:> :>
:> :> No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.
:> :
:> :What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
:> :UAV?
:>
:> What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?
:>
:> :The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
:> :radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
:> :radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
:> :proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
:> :foolish complacency.
:>
:> Which means nothing, since a fighter attacking with a gun uses
:> EYEBALLS to get the target and they're way up close.
:>
:> :> :If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
:> :> :is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.
:> :>
:> :> Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?
:> :>
:> :> Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.
:> :
:> :And exactly how will the pilot aim his guns, if the radar gunsight
:> :won't lock on and the sights he's got are no better than WW2 standards?
:>
:> He'll aim them the same way he aims them against anything else. Times
:> have changed since WW2 and no 'radar gunsight' is required.
:>
:> :Hint #1: in WW2 the Luftwaffe found that only between 2% and 5% of the
:> :shots they fired hit the target - and they were shooting at B-17s! Now
:> :scale down the target size to a UAV with a wingspan of a couple of
:> :metres, and work out how much ammo would have to be fired to nail one.
:>
:> About 5 rounds.
:
:Hmmm, coming up behind a UAV with a 6-foot wingspan, the cross-sectional
:area of the target might be only 1 or 2 square feet. How close does
:the fighter pilot have to be to hit a 2 square foot target with 5
:rounds?

He doesn't have to hit it with 5 rounds. He has to hit it with 1
round out of 5.

This is probably not that difficult from hundreds of yards away. The
HUD shows him what the bullet path is going to be. Initially they'll
probably get FAR too close until they realize how small the targets
are.

--
"Death is my gift." -- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

wrote:

:Fred J. McCall wrote:
:
:A load of BS.
:
:Well done, you've managed the rare achievement of being put on my
:IGNORE list as not worth reading or responding to.

How nice. And so you demonstrate your allergy to the truth.

Which fact was it demolishing your case that put you over the edge?

<snicker>

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

In message . com>,
writes
>Paul J. Adam wrote:
>> Stealth aircraft aren't generally trying to play Kamikaze into warships
>> at sea.
>
>True, but I have been thinking more in terms of getting no closer than
>is required to identify the target and illuminate it with a laser.

That's still "close range" compared to expected radar performance.

>For
>a ship near to the shore, you could that with a very small UAV, I
>think: not easy to knock down, even if you're able to detect it.

Not *that* small - the designator (with enough power to work at a decent
standoff), the optics to know where it's pointed, the transmitter with
enough bandwidth to allow effective search, identification and
engagemenrt, the stabilisation system for all this to make it usable and
the power supply to keep it all running add up to a pretty sizeable
package.

A current system gets you about 11kg for a portable laser designator,
with a range of 5km quoted. That's pretty close quarters...

http://www.dsd.es.northropgrumman.com/DSD-Brochures/laser/LLDR.pdf


Another handy site is www.flir.com - they make some good kit and their
brochures demonstrate how going from simple optical/TI to adding
designation capability, range unspecified, ramps your payload weight
from 13 to 51 kilograms (compare their Microstar II to the BRITE Star)


Perfectly feasible to pack all these systems into a UAV and have them
work very well (see Predator) but it does impose a size penalty, and
also increases the effort needed if as well as working and flying you
have to add "and very low RCS across all the frequencies of interest".

Not that much smaller than some more conventional antiship threats, in
fact :)

--
Paul J. Adam

In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>:>Air targets are air targets. Helicopters are neither trained nor
>:>equipped to do air intercepts.
>:
>:Perhaps not in the USN, but there *are* other navies...
>
>Really? Who? Of course the French come close, but other than them?
>:-)
>
>The only reason I can come up with to be training helicopters to do
>air intercept work is a total lack of any ship much larger than a
>destroyer. That's not a navy....

Sorry you can't think of a reason, but that doesn't mean there isn't
one.

A hint - destroyers max out around thirty knots, a Lynx can wind up to
~170 knots. Which is more suitable to investigate something like a
Cessna or a Robin that cruises at ~70kt and stalls at forty?

--
Paul J. Adam

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
:>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
:>:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
:>:>Air targets are air targets. Helicopters are neither trained nor
:>:>equipped to do air intercepts.
:>:
:>:Perhaps not in the USN, but there *are* other navies...
:>
:>Really? Who? Of course the French come close, but other than them?
:>:-)
:>
:>The only reason I can come up with to be training helicopters to do
:>air intercept work is a total lack of any ship much larger than a
:>destroyer. That's not a navy....
:
:Sorry you can't think of a reason, but that doesn't mean there isn't
:one.
:
:A hint - destroyers max out around thirty knots, a Lynx can wind up to
:~170 knots. Which is more suitable to investigate something like a
:Cessna or a Robin that cruises at ~70kt and stalls at forty?

An F/A-18. But you need a carrier for those.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>:Sorry you can't think of a reason, but that doesn't mean there isn't
>:one.
>:
>:A hint - destroyers max out around thirty knots, a Lynx can wind up to
>:~170 knots. Which is more suitable to investigate something like a
>:Cessna or a Robin that cruises at ~70kt and stalls at forty?
>
>An F/A-18. But you need a carrier for those.

See? There *is* a reason after all!

--
Paul J. Adam

Mark Borgerson wrote:
> In article >,
> says...
> > wrote:
> >
> > :
> > :Fred J. McCall wrote:
> > :> wrote:
> > :>
> > :> :> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
> > :> :> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
> > :> :> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
> > :> :> helicopter has.
> > :> :
> > :> :Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
> > :>
> > :> No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.
> > :
> > :What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
> > :UAV?
> >
> > What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?
> >
> > :The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
> > :radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
> > :radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
> > :proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
> > :foolish complacency.
> >
> > Which means nothing, since a fighter attacking with a gun uses
> > EYEBALLS to get the target and they're way up close.
> >
> > :> :If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
> > :> :is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.
> > :>
> > :> Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?
> > :>
> > :> Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.
> > :
> > :And exactly how will the pilot aim his guns, if the radar gunsight
> > :won't lock on and the sights he's got are no better than WW2 standards?
> >
> > He'll aim them the same way he aims them against anything else. Times
> > have changed since WW2 and no 'radar gunsight' is required.
> >
> > :Hint #1: in WW2 the Luftwaffe found that only between 2% and 5% of the
> > :shots they fired hit the target - and they were shooting at B-17s! Now
> > :scale down the target size to a UAV with a wingspan of a couple of
> > :metres, and work out how much ammo would have to be fired to nail one.
> >
> > About 5 rounds.
>
> Hmmm, coming up behind a UAV with a 6-foot wingspan, the cross-sectional
> area of the target might be only 1 or 2 square feet. How close does
> the fighter pilot have to be to hit a 2 square foot target with 5
> rounds?
> >
> > :Hint #2: unlike the Luftwaffe's ammo, the current standard US 20mm
> > :aircraft SAPHEI shell, the PGU-28/B, does not have a tracer - so the
> > :pilot will have no idea where his shots are going.
> >
> > Nor does he need to. It's NICE to have radar, but it's hardly
> > necessary in order to score a lot of hits with a modern gun and HUD.
> ><<SNIP>>
>
> Mark Borgerson

An idea occurs, why not use the the overpressure from a high speed pass
to upset the UAVs' guidance system? Done with wing tip pressure on V-1s
in WWII, if these things are to small for ammo use air pressure to tip
them over.

It is ok blithely saying image recognition software which is not as cheap or
as easy as you suggest even if it was I would counter your Imgae recognition
with WW1/WW2 technology ie all the ships make smoke and turn into their own
smoke screens lol!

DD


> wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> Keith W wrote:
>> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
>> > IR/passive EM sensors),
>> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
>> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
>> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
>>
>> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
>> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
>> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?
> Scared ****less of being shot down?
> Wishful thinking?
> Orgasmic about being able to release their weapons and claim kills?
> Darkness/lousy weather/bad visibility?
> Flying fast and having only few short seconds to make decision?
> Releasing their weapons from way too far range for positive
> identification (perhaps because being scared ****less)?
>
> Can be any of these or their combination.
>
>> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
>> to be especially cheap
> Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
> wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
> magnification for examining the suspicios contacts), a decent CPU to do
> the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
> items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
> pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free. Perhaps the
> costliest part of the development would be sea trials (to see how is
> the real-time identification working and debug it), but then who knows
> what they use their small UAVs for now (see the first message of this
> thread).
>
> <snip>
>> >> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
>> >> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
>> >> and to CIWS.
>> > Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming.
>>
>> With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.
> The cost might be high for initial development, but there is not reason
> the cost should be high on per-unit base. Cameras/CPUs and copying
> software is cheap. Cooled IR sensors and other fancy sensor stuff might
> rise the cost - the question is how much of it is needed, especially
> if you don't ask for all-weather capability.
>
>> > On
>> > the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
>> > engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
>> > engine of the current antiship missiles.
>> But not small enough to be invisible
> Nothing is invisible. But if its signature is there with seagulls and
> sun reflections off waves, the locking/homing task is so much harder.
>
>> > Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
>> > short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
>> > swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
>> > signature and very different characteristics.
>>
>> Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
>> that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC
> An attacking UAV can make its decision to attack close enough - when it
> can actually see the island/aircrafts on deck of the carrier. And has a
> lots of frames to base its decision on. It might even send some info to
> the controller and ask whether to attack or not (again, tradeoff
> between how much you send and how reliable you want your communication
> channel to be).
>
>> > The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
>> > targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
>> > put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
>> > can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
>> > CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.
>> >
>>
>> Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
>> 8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.
> Such an UAV will not be small: it will be Predator size, powered by a
> Rotax, Jabiru or more likely cheap copy of them. But it can be cheap,
> especially if mass produced and intended for one-way cruise-missile
> type missions. Ultralight aircraft kits are essentially hand-made and
> sell for 10-20k. Replace the cabin with the warhead(s), give it faster
> wing (no need for low stall speed, this is on one way mission) and the
> sensors/brains/communication kit and mass produce it. Be smart
> designing it (ease of mass production) and try to reduce the IR/radar
> signature, but don't go overboard with that - keep the costs down. The
> only potentially expensive parts on the aircraft are sensors and
> warheads. The 200kg is the total useful load, some UAVs will have it
> divided as sub missiles for massed attack on air defense radars, other
> UAVs will simply have a big explosive load (hoping that the radars have
> already been damaged, so they can get in close to do BAM).
>
> ...
>> > simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
>> > country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
>> > good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
>> > The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
>> > reliability and long service life'.
>>
>> But with real time image recognition, organic SEAD and large warheads
> Yeah, you need real time image recognition. That is the enabling
> technology. I think we can agree to disagree whether that is possible
> in the next 5-10 years, for operation in good visibility.
>
> The quoted 200kg was just quoted as an example - about what an
> ultralight aircraft can carry. You need your aircraft big enough to
> have enough range to engage the carrier group operating off your
> shores, so a 200kg payload will not significantly increase it anyway.
> A modified ultralight can't fly that fast, leaving it rather
> vulnerable. That's why you are better of launching submunitions from
> out of range of the gun CIWS. Those subminitions need to be reasonably
> smart (once qued by the sensors of the main craft, they need to be able
> to lock on their target and hit it), but not necessarily pack a lot of
> punch (hitting radars, aircraft on deck and so on). Once the radars
> have been damaged, the second wave can then just press on with large
> warhead bringing general destruction. (Or, to keep it simple, they all
> go together. If the radars are switched off, the large warheads will
> arrive and do the damage, if the radars are on (likely), the
> submunitions will home on them.)
>
>
>> DUH !
>>
>> Keith
>

Dave Deep wrote:
> It is ok blithely saying image recognition software which is not as cheap or
> as easy as you suggest even if it was I would counter your Imgae recognition
> with WW1/WW2 technology ie all the ships make smoke and turn into their own
> smoke screens lol!
>
> DD
>
>
> > wrote in message
> oups.com...
> >
> > Keith W wrote:
> >> > If you are using video imaging (backed up by some other, e.g.
> >> > IR/passive EM sensors),
> >> > I suspect it is a graduate student's exercise in image recognition to
> >> > distinguish a warship (esp. aircraft carrier) from an oil
> >> > rig/tanker/finshing ship. Especially if you are flying slow.
> >>
> >> As a software engineer I'd suggest you are wrong. If such recognition
> >> is so easy how did an Argentine aircrew drop bombs on an
> >> American tanker in 1982 believing it was a RN Carrier ?
> > Scared ****less of being shot down?
> > Wishful thinking?
> > Orgasmic about being able to release their weapons and claim kills?
> > Darkness/lousy weather/bad visibility?
> > Flying fast and having only few short seconds to make decision?
> > Releasing their weapons from way too far range for positive
> > identification (perhaps because being scared ****less)?
> >
> > Can be any of these or their combination.
> >
> >> A UAV with realtime video image recognition and IR sensors is unlikely
> >> to be especially cheap
> > Realtime video image recognition needs a source of video (probably a
> > wide-angle search camera + narrow angle scope with some decent
> > magnification for examining the suspicios contacts), a decent CPU to do
> > the number crunching and a software to do the analysis. The first two
> > items are not particularly expensive. The software might take real
> > pains to develop, but afterwards the copies are free. Perhaps the
> > costliest part of the development would be sea trials (to see how is
> > the real-time identification working and debug it), but then who knows
> > what they use their small UAVs for now (see the first message of this
> > thread).
> >
> > <snip>
> >> >> 200 km/hr UAV's are going to be rather vulnerable to all forms
> >> >> of active defence including point defence missiles like RAM
> >> >> and to CIWS.
> >> > Yes. That's why you want them to be really cheap and use swarming.
> >>
> >> With real time image recognition systens cheap will be quite a trick.
> > The cost might be high for initial development, but there is not reason
> > the cost should be high on per-unit base. Cameras/CPUs and copying
> > software is cheap. Cooled IR sensors and other fancy sensor stuff might
> > rise the cost - the question is how much of it is needed, especially
> > if you don't ask for all-weather capability.
> >
> >> > On
> >> > the other hand RAM is IR homing and the IR signature of a 100hp piston
> >> > engine is negligible compared to the IR signature of a rocket/jet
> >> > engine of the current antiship missiles.
> >> But not small enough to be invisible
> > Nothing is invisible. But if its signature is there with seagulls and
> > sun reflections off waves, the locking/homing task is so much harder.
> >
> >> > Phalanx (or other gun-based CIWS) should be effective, but has rather
> >> > short range (and not THAT much reloads, if you are dealing with a huge
> >> > swarm). I suspect it is also looking at targets with much higher radar
> >> > signature and very different characteristics.
> >>
> >> Thats just software and rather easier to do than deciding if
> >> that 1000 ft long ship is a carrier or VLCC
> > An attacking UAV can make its decision to attack close enough - when it
> > can actually see the island/aircrafts on deck of the carrier. And has a
> > lots of frames to base its decision on. It might even send some info to
> > the controller and ask whether to attack or not (again, tradeoff
> > between how much you send and how reliable you want your communication
> > channel to be).
> >
> >> > The CIWS mounts look rather distinctly and will obviously be among the
> >> > targeted areas of the ship. You don't need that much of a warhead to
> >> > put CIWS radar ot of commission - so perhaps an UAV with 200kg warhead
> >> > can actually carry 8-12 short range missiles designed for homing on
> >> > CIWS radar and launch them while being out of range of CIWS.
> >> >
> >>
> >> Earth Calling Planet Esteban - a UAV with 200kg warhead and
> >> 8-12 sub missiles will be neither small nor cheap.
> > Such an UAV will not be small: it will be Predator size, powered by a
> > Rotax, Jabiru or more likely cheap copy of them. But it can be cheap,
> > especially if mass produced and intended for one-way cruise-missile
> > type missions. Ultralight aircraft kits are essentially hand-made and
> > sell for 10-20k. Replace the cabin with the warhead(s), give it faster
> > wing (no need for low stall speed, this is on one way mission) and the
> > sensors/brains/communication kit and mass produce it. Be smart
> > designing it (ease of mass production) and try to reduce the IR/radar
> > signature, but don't go overboard with that - keep the costs down. The
> > only potentially expensive parts on the aircraft are sensors and
> > warheads. The 200kg is the total useful load, some UAVs will have it
> > divided as sub missiles for massed attack on air defense radars, other
> > UAVs will simply have a big explosive load (hoping that the radars have
> > already been damaged, so they can get in close to do BAM).
> >
> > ...
> >> > simple systems are easier to debug/design correctly). However, a
> >> > country like China/India or even Iran should be able to mass produce
> >> > good enough UAVs for peanuts (i.e be able to field thousands of them).
> >> > The key term being 'good enough', not 'super duper, all weather, high
> >> > reliability and long service life'.
> >>
> >> But with real time image recognition, organic SEAD and large warheads
> > Yeah, you need real time image recognition. That is the enabling
> > technology. I think we can agree to disagree whether that is possible
> > in the next 5-10 years, for operation in good visibility.
> >
> > The quoted 200kg was just quoted as an example - about what an
> > ultralight aircraft can carry. You need your aircraft big enough to
> > have enough range to engage the carrier group operating off your
> > shores, so a 200kg payload will not significantly increase it anyway.
> > A modified ultralight can't fly that fast, leaving it rather
> > vulnerable. That's why you are better of launching submunitions from
> > out of range of the gun CIWS. Those subminitions need to be reasonably
> > smart (once qued by the sensors of the main craft, they need to be able
> > to lock on their target and hit it), but not necessarily pack a lot of
> > punch (hitting radars, aircraft on deck and so on). Once the radars
> > have been damaged, the second wave can then just press on with large
> > warhead bringing general destruction. (Or, to keep it simple, they all
> > go together. If the radars are switched off, the large warheads will
> > arrive and do the damage, if the radars are on (likely), the
> > submunitions will home on them.)
> >
> >
> >> DUH !
> >>
> >> Keith
> >

Counter with the finest image recognition equipment every made,
closely tied into a high-capacity combined memory and processing unit.
And still the Japanese and American pilots thought they had sunk
aircraft carriers and battleships when they actually missed tankers and
destroyers.

In article >,
says...
> Mark Borgerson <mborgerson.at.comcast.net> wrote:
>
> :In article >,
> says...
> :> wrote:
> :>
> :> :
> :> :Fred J. McCall wrote:
> :> :> wrote:
> :> :>
> :> :> :> Hint #3: A fighter with a 20mm Vulcan will flat mess up a "small,
> :> :> :> slow UAV" and actually has a radar on board so that he can see it and
> :> :> :> some actual training on how to do an air intercept, neither of which a
> :> :> :> helicopter has.
> :> :> :
> :> :> :Always assuming that the radar is capable of getting a lock on the UAV.
> :> :>
> :> :> No such assumption is necessary. It's not like in the movies.
> :> :
> :> :What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
> :> :UAV?
> :>
> :> What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?
> :>
> :> :The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
> :> :radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
> :> :radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
> :> :proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
> :> :foolish complacency.
> :>
> :> Which means nothing, since a fighter attacking with a gun uses
> :> EYEBALLS to get the target and they're way up close.
> :>
> :> :> :If not, his chance of scoring a hit is remote - the speed differential
> :> :> :is so huge that he could do no more than 'spray and pray'.
> :> :>
> :> :> Hint #1: What do you think the landing speed of a jet fighter is?
> :> :>
> :> :> Hint #2: Guns work off the pilot's eyeballs.
> :> :
> :> :And exactly how will the pilot aim his guns, if the radar gunsight
> :> :won't lock on and the sights he's got are no better than WW2 standards?
> :>
> :> He'll aim them the same way he aims them against anything else. Times
> :> have changed since WW2 and no 'radar gunsight' is required.
> :>
> :> :Hint #1: in WW2 the Luftwaffe found that only between 2% and 5% of the
> :> :shots they fired hit the target - and they were shooting at B-17s! Now
> :> :scale down the target size to a UAV with a wingspan of a couple of
> :> :metres, and work out how much ammo would have to be fired to nail one.
> :>
> :> About 5 rounds.
> :
> :Hmmm, coming up behind a UAV with a 6-foot wingspan, the cross-sectional
> :area of the target might be only 1 or 2 square feet. How close does
> :the fighter pilot have to be to hit a 2 square foot target with 5
> :rounds?
>
> He doesn't have to hit it with 5 rounds. He has to hit it with 1
> round out of 5.

This source: http://www.simhq.com/_air/air_028a.html

Says that 80% of round will fall inside a 5-foot diameter circle
at 1000 feet. That's pretty good for a high-speed cannon in
an aircraft mount.

Now let's look at the math: out of 5 rounds fired, 4 will be inside
a 5-foot diameter circle. That's 4 rounds in an area of 78.5 square
feet, or about one round for each 19 square feet. I think that
means that there is a significant probability that all five rounds
will miss a 2-square foot target at 1000 feet range. At
much closer ranges, there will be a higher projectile density,
but tracking the target may become more difficult---particularly
if the small UAV is turning with a radius that the fighter cannot
match.

In any case, I doubt that only 5 round will be fired---more likely
something on the order of 50 to 60 rounds. That makes a kill
much more likely.


I also think that a high-speed pass with a miss distance of 50 to 75
feet would probably generate enough turbulence to disturb the
flight control system and probably overstress the airframe. Most
of the UAVs I've come across have fairly high aspect ratio wings
and cost concerns probably exclude titanium main wing spars! ;-)
>
> This is probably not that difficult from hundreds of yards away. The
> HUD shows him what the bullet path is going to be. Initially they'll
> probably get FAR too close until they realize how small the targets
> are.
>

That's true. And if you get too close, you will run into parallax
problems between the sight and the gun, if the gun is boresighted
for 1000 feet.

50 round at 500 feet ought to do the trick if the UAV is
flying in a straight line.


Mark Borgerson

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
wrote:
:>:What makes you so certain that gunnery radar WILL lock on to a stealthy
:>:UAV?
:>
:>What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?
:
:The pilots say so.

<snip>

:Sounds like the gunsight uses radar, Fred.

Yes, I know, Paul. I work with pilots all the time. But it doesn't
HAVE to, the way the respondent was trying to insist that you HAD to
get a lock or you couldn't shoot.

<snip>

:>:The UAVs are designed, after all, to avoid being picked up by
:>:radar. For defence planning purposes the assumption has to be that
:>:radar will not probably work against them, unless and until it is
:>:proved to be capable of doing so. To take any other attitude would be
:>:foolish complacency.
:>
:>Which means nothing, since a fighter attacking with a gun uses
:>EYEBALLS to get the target and they're way up close.
:
:And then the gunnery system uses RADAR to get the range input, and after
:a few seconds adds velocity, and after that accelerations, to take the
:gunsight from Level III (locked on, range available) to Level IV (full
:system functionality)

But you can still do it better than the "WWII" accuracy claimed, even
if you're pure visual. There are tics on the HUD that you can stick
the guy between if you have a rough idea of his size and you can get
the approximate range that way.

:The range becomes particularly significant when you're shooting at a
:target only a foot in diameter (like a ScanEagle seen from behind) - but
:your ammunition drops more than twenty feet over a thousand yards.

With something that small you'd be a lot closer. If you didn't
realize what it was you'd probably miss on the first pass (you'd be a
lot closer than you thought you were and would shoot over him).

:>:Hint #2: unlike the Luftwaffe's ammo, the current standard US 20mm
:>:aircraft SAPHEI shell, the PGU-28/B, does not have a tracer - so the
:>:pilot will have no idea where his shots are going.
:>
:>Nor does he need to. It's NICE to have radar, but it's hardly
:>necessary in order to score a lot of hits with a modern gun and HUD.
:
:Depends on the size of the target and how long you have to shoot at it,
:doesn't it?

It's a slow UAV. Where's it going to go other than down, Paul? You
have all the time in the world to shoot it.

:>:How, exactly? Ordinary MGs with eyeball sights stand hardly any chance
:>:of connecting with a small plane at an unknown distance and travelling
:>:at an unknown speed, unless it comes very low and close. Radar FCS
:>:would probably not even pick it up.
:>
:>And none of that applies to most modern aircraft, or even most modern
:>air defense weapons in general.
:
:Unfortunately we're not talking "most modern aircraft" when discussing
:such small targets.

Really? What do you think a CVBG is going to send out after them?
Butterfly nets?

:Assume the radar locks on, or that Dick Dastardly in the fighter is such
:an expert marksman he can hit by eye every time. A ScanEagle UAV is
:about a foot in diameter, seen from astern: a F-16's gun puts 80% of its
:rounds in a six-mil circle. At 1,500 feet, the target occupies only 1%
:of that circle.

And you'd probably check fire until you got closer. It's not like it
can run away.

:Mathematically, if you fired an 86-round burst you would have a 50%
:chance of hitting it. To get the chance of a hit up to 95% takes you to
:a burst of 372 rounds, still assuming that the target remains in the
:six-mil circle throughout...

You're leaving out a factor. The rounds are not evenly distributed
through that six mil circle. They're still concentrated toward the
center. You need to work it as a Gaussian rather than a random spray
throughout the circle.

:This is the best case, assuming the burst is perfectly aimed throughout.
:Any errors - such as misjudging range because of a lack of radar lock -
:will make things worse.

Actually, it would probably make things better after the first pass,
since you'd be a lot closer. Probably miss with the first pass (shoot
over it judging by the visual range cues in the HUD because you'd
overestimate the range due to the small size) and get it with the
second pass.

Hell, fly close enough to it and it'd probably crash on its own just
from the turbulence.

--
"May God have mercy upon my enemies; they will need it."
-- General George S Patton, Jr.

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
:>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
:>:Sorry you can't think of a reason, but that doesn't mean there isn't
:>:one.
:>:
:>:A hint - destroyers max out around thirty knots, a Lynx can wind up to
:>:~170 knots. Which is more suitable to investigate something like a
:>:Cessna or a Robin that cruises at ~70kt and stalls at forty?
:>
:>An F/A-18. But you need a carrier for those.
:
:See? There *is* a reason after all!

Hence my mentioning NAVIES (and how forces with only destroyers don't
really qualify as same). :-)

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
.. .
:> "Arved Sandstrom" > wrote:
:>
:> :"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
:> .. .
:> :[ SNIP ]
:> :> I learned it the simple way: If you can see it, you can kill it.
:> :
:> :Well, not if "it" is capering about merrily in a No Fire Area.
:>
:> I can't say I believe in No Fire Areas.
:
:NFA's make sense if people remember what they are for. And if the target in
:the NFA is truly juicy, provoke them into firing on you; you are allowed to
:engage the enemy in an NFA for self-defense.

That's why it's "Hand of God" time when you get such targets.

One bullet - one kill.

[Of course, that assumes you have one of those guys around....]

--
"I know Slayers. No matter how many people there are around
them, they fight alone."
-- Spike, the vampire

In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>:>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>:>:Sorry you can't think of a reason, but that doesn't mean there isn't
>:>:one.
>:>:
>:>:A hint - destroyers max out around thirty knots, a Lynx can wind up to
>:>:~170 knots. Which is more suitable to investigate something like a
>:>:Cessna or a Robin that cruises at ~70kt and stalls at forty?
>:>
>:>An F/A-18. But you need a carrier for those.
>:
>:See? There *is* a reason after all!
>
>Hence my mentioning NAVIES (and how forces with only destroyers don't
>really qualify as same). :-)

Out of interest, what are the USN SH-60 detachment doing at Neptune
Warrior 063 this month? They've come to work with our Lynxes on
Objective 6.2.2... "low slow fliers".

Did they not get your memo that there was no reason for them to get
involved?



--
Paul J. Adam

"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote in
news:hmUfg.1658$A8.716@clgrps12:

> "Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
> ...
>> "Arved Sandstrom" > wrote:
>>
>> :"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
>> .. .
>> :[ SNIP ]
>> :> I learned it the simple way: If you can see it, you can kill it.
>> :
>> :Well, not if "it" is capering about merrily in a No Fire Area.
>>
>> I can't say I believe in No Fire Areas.
>
> NFA's make sense if people remember what they are for. And if the
> target in the NFA is truly juicy, provoke them into firing on you; you
> are allowed to engage the enemy in an NFA for self-defense.
>
> AHS
>
>

A UAV illuminating a carrier with a laser designator would be cause for
firing,IMO.

--
Jim Yanik
jyanik
at
kua.net

Fred J. McCall wrote:

> Hell, fly close enough to it and it'd probably crash on its own just
> from the turbulence.

Might even be able to drag your wingtip through the thing and cut it in
half with no noticeable degradation to your own airframe. :)

In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
wrote:
>:>What makes you think that fighter aircraft use gunnery radar?
>:
>:The pilots say so.
>
><snip>
>
>:Sounds like the gunsight uses radar, Fred.
>
>Yes, I know, Paul. I work with pilots all the time.

Then why did you doubt that fighters use radar?

Strange.

>But it doesn't
>HAVE to, the way the respondent was trying to insist that you HAD to
>get a lock or you couldn't shoot.

You don't HAVE to hit, either.

>:And then the gunnery system uses RADAR to get the range input, and after
>:a few seconds adds velocity, and after that accelerations, to take the
>:gunsight from Level III (locked on, range available) to Level IV (full
>:system functionality)
>
>But you can still do it better than the "WWII" accuracy claimed, even
>if you're pure visual. There are tics on the HUD that you can stick
>the guy between if you have a rough idea of his size and you can get
>the approximate range that way.

This gets tricky with a ten-foot wingspan. Can you even dial the input
down that low?

>:The range becomes particularly significant when you're shooting at a
>:target only a foot in diameter (like a ScanEagle seen from behind) - but
>:your ammunition drops more than twenty feet over a thousand yards.
>
>With something that small you'd be a lot closer.

If you're a lot closer, you're risking FOD when you hit him, he breaks
up and you suck some debris down your intake.

Or you don't pull up in time and risk wearing the UAV as a decorative
nose ornament - effective as a kill but not good in the
cost-effectiveness stakes. (Repair bill for the fighter is going to be
significant after hitting a 40lb drone)

>If you didn't
>realize what it was you'd probably miss on the first pass (you'd be a
>lot closer than you thought you were and would shoot over him).

Or into him - again, that's a pretty hefty birdstrike.

>:Depends on the size of the target and how long you have to shoot at it,
>:doesn't it?
>
>It's a slow UAV. Where's it going to go other than down, Paul? You
>have all the time in the world to shoot it.

What's your overtake speed, Fred? How long do you have on each pass,
considering you've got to get a lot closer than normal and still not hit
the thing? The actual firing time available is not large.

>:Unfortunately we're not talking "most modern aircraft" when discussing
>:such small targets.
>
>Really?

Yes, really, the targets are a fraction of the size of "most modern
aircraft" which seriously complicates things.

>:Assume the radar locks on, or that Dick Dastardly in the fighter is such
>:an expert marksman he can hit by eye every time. A ScanEagle UAV is
>:about a foot in diameter, seen from astern: a F-16's gun puts 80% of its
>:rounds in a six-mil circle. At 1,500 feet, the target occupies only 1%
>:of that circle.
>
>And you'd probably check fire until you got closer. It's not like it
>can run away.

Fighter doing 200kt, drone doing ~50kt, that gives you a 250fps overtake
- six seconds from 1,500 feet to the target coming through the
windscreen.

>:Mathematically, if you fired an 86-round burst you would have a 50%
>:chance of hitting it. To get the chance of a hit up to 95% takes you to
>:a burst of 372 rounds, still assuming that the target remains in the
>:six-mil circle throughout...
>
>You're leaving out a factor. The rounds are not evenly distributed
>through that six mil circle. They're still concentrated toward the
>center. You need to work it as a Gaussian rather than a random spray
>throughout the circle.

You assume, then, that the MPI will start - and remain - precisely
centred on the target throughout, despite a lack of any reliable range
input other than "best guess" and, up close, a significant parallax
error between the HUD cross and the gun bore?

That's one hell of a pilot you're assuming.



--
Paul J. Adam

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
:>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
:>:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
:>:>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
:>:>:Sorry you can't think of a reason, but that doesn't mean there isn't
:>:>:one.
:>:>:
:>:>:A hint - destroyers max out around thirty knots, a Lynx can wind up to
:>:>:~170 knots. Which is more suitable to investigate something like a
:>:>:Cessna or a Robin that cruises at ~70kt and stalls at forty?
:>:>
:>:>An F/A-18. But you need a carrier for those.
:>:
:>:See? There *is* a reason after all!
:>
:>Hence my mentioning NAVIES (and how forces with only destroyers don't
:>really qualify as same). :-)
:
:Out of interest, what are the USN SH-60 detachment doing at Neptune
:Warrior 063 this month? They've come to work with our Lynxes on
:Objective 6.2.2... "low slow fliers".

Why, they're making you look bad, of course.

:Did they not get your memo that there was no reason for them to get
:involved?

No need to get shirty, Paul. This sort of remark is what gets your
feelings bruised when I bat it back at you in return.

What air-to-air weapons do you think a USN SH-60 carries?

[They've actually modified the radars to allow air intercept
operations, but I still don't think they have anything much to shoot
with. They're strictly recce in that regard.]

--
"Before you embark on a journey of revenge dig two graves."

-- Confucius

In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>:
>:Out of interest, what are the USN SH-60 detachment doing at Neptune
>:Warrior 063 this month? They've come to work with our Lynxes on
>:Objective 6.2.2... "low slow fliers".
>
>Why, they're making you look bad, of course.

>:Did they not get your memo that there was no reason for them to get
>:involved?
>
>No need to get shirty, Paul. This sort of remark is what gets your
>feelings bruised when I bat it back at you in return.

No need to get defensive, Fred - it's not the first time you've made
statements that proved to be bold, sweeping and wrong.

"Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors." - unless the contact
is low and slow, like many types of UAV, in which case helicopters *are*
used as interceptors.

>What air-to-air weapons do you think a USN SH-60 carries?

For this, the optional door gun should suffice nicely (that's what the
Lynx would be using, after all).


--
Paul J. Adam

"Jim Yanik" > wrote in message
.. .
> "Arved Sandstrom" > wrote in
> news:hmUfg.1658$A8.716@clgrps12:
>
>> "Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>> "Arved Sandstrom" > wrote:
>>>
>>> :"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
>>> .. .
>>> :[ SNIP ]
>>> :> I learned it the simple way: If you can see it, you can kill it.
>>> :
>>> :Well, not if "it" is capering about merrily in a No Fire Area.
>>>
>>> I can't say I believe in No Fire Areas.
>>
>> NFA's make sense if people remember what they are for. And if the
>> target in the NFA is truly juicy, provoke them into firing on you; you
>> are allowed to engage the enemy in an NFA for self-defense.
>
> A UAV illuminating a carrier with a laser designator would be cause for
> firing,IMO.

Surely yes; the key word being "designator". In any case, I have no idea how
the USN manages its battlespace, or what restrictive and permissive fire
support coordination measures it uses at sea (on land for NSFS it's just the
same measures that the land forces use). In principle I guess a navy could
have at-sea no fire areas, or the equivalent thereof - something like "don't
blast oil rigs", for example, or less restrictive coordination areas, like
"get permission before engaging targets in the Strait of Gibraltar".

AHS

The USN has refuted claims that an Iranian UAV buzzed a U.S. Aircraft
Carrier. See:


http://navytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1843922.php

On Fri, 2 Jun 2006 18:11:12 +0100, "Paul J. Adam" >
wrote:

>Or you don't pull up in time and risk wearing the UAV as a decorative
>nose ornament - effective as a kill but not good in the
>cost-effectiveness stakes. (Repair bill for the fighter is going to be
>significant after hitting a 40lb drone)

The occasional new nose job on a fighter, or a new 4.5 billion dollar aircraft
carrier. Damn, that's a tough call, guess we should issue a 50 cent piece to
the CV captains so they can flip for it.

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Fred J. McCall
> writes
:>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
:>:
:>:Out of interest, what are the USN SH-60 detachment doing at Neptune
:>:Warrior 063 this month? They've come to work with our Lynxes on
:>:Objective 6.2.2... "low slow fliers".
:>
:>Why, they're making you look bad, of course.
:
:>:Did they not get your memo that there was no reason for them to get
:>:involved?
:>
:>No need to get shirty, Paul. This sort of remark is what gets your
:>feelings bruised when I bat it back at you in return.
:
:No need to get defensive, Fred -

It's not defensive to note you making one of your usual ****ty little
comments, Paul. It's merely an attempt to maintain comity.

You see, I suspect that like most arrogant ******s, you simply don't
realize quite what an absolute ass you frequently are.

:it's not the first time you've made
:statements that proved to be bold, sweeping and wrong.

Talk about irony....

Just don't get your nose out of joint when I slap you back, boyo.

:"Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors." - unless the contact
:is low and slow, like many types of UAV, in which case helicopters *are*
:used as interceptors.

No, they aren't. Interceptors carry WEAPONS, Paul.

Gee, not so wrong after all, I guess.

Now go read the story about the ostensible Iranian UAV. The claim is
that after 25 minutes the carrier 'scrambled' 2 helicopters and 4
fighter jets.

That may sound reasonable to you, but I live on planet Earth.

:>What air-to-air weapons do you think a USN SH-60 carries?
:
:For this, the optional door gun should suffice nicely (that's what the
:Lynx would be using, after all).

So you think a guy standing in a doorway over iron sights using a
weapon never intended to fire at anything but the ground is going to
hit one of these things but a purpose built machine designed to take
on air targets is going to be unable to?

Yeah, that could happen!

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

wrote:

> rb wrote:
>
>>The US navy in particular seems to have seen the writing on the wall for
>>some time now, hence (I would assume) part of the reason for their
>>interest in developing the 'Millenium' gun and expressed interest in the
>>naval 57mm cannon.
>>http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=13559&rsbci=13158&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400&jsi=false
>>http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/dec_04_46.php
>
>
> The 35mm Millennium gun would qualify - that's designed to fire the
> AHEAD ammo I mentioned - but I'm not so sure about the Bofors 57mm. In
> the AA mode that uses radar aiming and proximity fuzes, and I'm not
> sure if either would be sensitive enough to respond to a small stealthy
> UAV.
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>

How about cannister from a five incher?

Pull!

:-)

John Mullen

Mark Borgerson wrote:

> In article . com>,
> says...
>
>>Andrew Swallow wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Many UAVs are flown under remote control. Radio direction finding may
>>>permit the location of its headquarters to be found.
>>
>>Good point, few countries have enough satellite bandwidth to manage
>>UAVs the way the US does, so unless Iran is buying bandwidth from
>>someone else, they'd have to be RC controlled UAVs.
>>
>
> Fully autonomous UAVs are not common today---but they probably will
> be in another few years. They would be particularly good
> for surveillance of large targets like a CVBG. The UAV could
> send out data and wait for very generic microburst commands
> like "circle left, 20mile radius". That would make it hard
> to attack the controller. While it may be possible get a DF
> location on a randomly-timed, 10millisecond, spread spectrum signal
> from a mobile command post, it might also be very expensive.
>
>
>

And, you'd have to be looking for it. There is a lot of spectrum to
monitor.

John Mullen

wrote:

:The USN has refuted claims that an Iranian UAV buzzed a U.S. Aircraft
:Carrier. See:
:
:http://navytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1843922.php

Someone needs to explain to the author just what the word "refuted"
means.

They didn't refute the claims at all. They merely denied them.

Personally I think the claims are preposterous bull****, but nothing I
saw 'refuted' them.

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

Mark Borgerson wrote:
> In article <%AMfg.1638$I61.24@clgrps13>,
> says...
>
wrote:
>>
>>>Ken Chaddock wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Block 1B CIWS has an infrared and optical tracker that would do nicely
>>>>against any UAV within it's range...the question is finding the UAV in
>>>>the first place. An Infrared search system with the ability to designate
>>>>to a B1B Phalanx would work quite well I think...
>>>
>>>
>>>But a prop-driven UAV with a small engine and some attention to exhaust
>>>masking would not be an easy IR target.
>>>
>>>If all you want to do is locate and identify a ship, and beam an
>>>illuminating laser at it to guide the incoming ordnance, then the UAV
>>>can be very small and very hard to detect.
>>>
>>>Tony Williams
>>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>
>> Have you ever seen the radar return from a prop ? Looks like a bloody
>>747...a prop-job wouldn't be a particular problem and contrary to
>>popular misconception, most modern IR trackers don't rely on a hugh heat
>>gradient but rather on the difference in emissivity between the target
>>and the background, IOW it's tracking the delta, not the absolute IR
>>output of the target...
>
>
> So what IS the radar return from a wooden or fiberglass propellor like?

Not as strong as from metal but still there and the main feature of the
return is the doppler...which is unique and quite distinctive since it
varies from hub (near zero doppler) to quite high since the prop tip is
almost certainly supersonic. Remember Mark, you do get a radar return
from wood and fiberglass

Fundamentals of Stealth Design

The following article was written by Alan Brown, who retired as Director
of Engineering at Lockheed Corporate Headquarters in 1991. He is
generally regarded as one of the 'founding fathers' of stealth, or low
observable technology. He served for several years as director of low
observables technology at Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co. in Marietta,
Ga. From 1978 to 1982, he was the program manager and chief engineer for
the F-117 stealth fighter and had been active in stealth programs since
1975. This article first appeared in 1992. Design for low observability,
and specifically for low radar cross section (RCS), began almost as soon
as radar was invented. The predominantly wooden deHavilland Mosquito was
one of the first aircraft to be designed with this capability in mind.
Against World War II radar systems, that approach was fairly successful,
but it would not be appropriate today. First, wood and, by extension,
composite materials, are not transparent to radar, although they may be
less reflective than metal; and second, the degree to which they are
transparent merely amplifies the components that are normally hidden by
the outer skin. These include engines, fuel, avionics packages,
electrical and hydraulic circuits, and people.

> The UAVs that I've seen and the powered paragliders don't have metal
> propellors. I suspect the reason is economics, rather than stealth,
> though.

I'm absolutely positive...

....Ken

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> In message >, Fred J. McCall
> > writes
>> What air-to-air weapons do you think a USN SH-60 carries?
>
> For this, the optional door gun should suffice nicely (that's what the
> Lynx would be using, after all).

M-16 with Mk-I eyeball targetting.

-HJC

wrote:
> The USN has refuted claims that an Iranian UAV buzzed a U.S. Aircraft
> Carrier. See:
>
> http://navytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1843922.php

“No planes were scrambled at all. That did not happen.”

So they didn't detect it? ;-)

-HJC

"Fred J. McCall" wrote:

> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

<snip>

> :"Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors." - unless the contact
> :is low and slow, like many types of UAV, in which case helicopters *are*
> :used as interceptors.
>
> No, they aren't. Interceptors carry WEAPONS, Paul.
>
> Gee, not so wrong after all, I guess.
>
> Now go read the story about the ostensible Iranian UAV. The claim is
> that after 25 minutes the carrier 'scrambled' 2 helicopters and 4
> fighter jets.
>
> That may sound reasonable to you, but I live on planet Earth.
>
> :>What air-to-air weapons do you think a USN SH-60 carries?
> :
> :For this, the optional door gun should suffice nicely (that's what the
> :Lynx would be using, after all).
>
> So you think a guy standing in a doorway over iron sights using a
> weapon never intended to fire at anything but the ground is going to
> hit one of these things but a purpose built machine designed to take
> on air targets is going to be unable to?
>
> Yeah, that could happen!

Gven that the flight engineer on an Air America Huey was able to shoot down
an AN-2 using a hand-held AK-47, using a door gun while flying co-speed and
parallel to a UAV should be doable, given that they can get a lot closer than
any fighter without needing to take avoiding action (owing to much lower --
zero under ideal conditions -- closure rates. A UAV is a smaller target, but
likely able to take less violent avoiding action. Put a lead-computing
sight on the MG and it's easier, or just load it with lots of tracer.
Depending on how close they're willing to get (mainly a question of how
violently the UAV is or might be maneuvering), instead of an LCOSS they might
be able to get away with a simple laser sight. Alternatively, forward-firing
rockets with prox. fuses may do the trick, at relatively low cost.

Guy

Guy Alcala > wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" wrote:
:
:> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
:
:<snip>
:
:> :"Hint: Helicopters aren't used as interceptors." - unless the contact
:> :is low and slow, like many types of UAV, in which case helicopters *are*
:> :used as interceptors.
:>
:> No, they aren't. Interceptors carry WEAPONS, Paul.
:>
:> Gee, not so wrong after all, I guess.
:>
:> Now go read the story about the ostensible Iranian UAV. The claim is
:> that after 25 minutes the carrier 'scrambled' 2 helicopters and 4
:> fighter jets.
:>
:> That may sound reasonable to you, but I live on planet Earth.
:>
:> :>What air-to-air weapons do you think a USN SH-60 carries?
:> :
:> :For this, the optional door gun should suffice nicely (that's what the
:> :Lynx would be using, after all).
:>
:> So you think a guy standing in a doorway over iron sights using a
:> weapon never intended to fire at anything but the ground is going to
:> hit one of these things but a purpose built machine designed to take
:> on air targets is going to be unable to?
:>
:> Yeah, that could happen!
:
:Gven that the flight engineer on an Air America Huey was able to shoot down
:an AN-2 using a hand-held AK-47,

Yes, and someone knocked down a stealth fighter with a handgun.

:using a door gun while flying co-speed and
:parallel to a UAV should be doable, given that they can get a lot closer than
:any fighter without needing to take avoiding action (owing to much lower --
:zero under ideal conditions -- closure rates. A UAV is a smaller target, but
:likely able to take less violent avoiding action. Put a lead-computing
:sight on the MG and it's easier, or just load it with lots of tracer.
:Depending on how close they're willing to get (mainly a question of how
:violently the UAV is or might be maneuvering), instead of an LCOSS they might
:be able to get away with a simple laser sight. Alternatively, forward-firing
:rockets with prox. fuses may do the trick, at relatively low cost.

Why go to all this trouble? Use the bloody system that is already
designed to deal with air vehicles.

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

Greg Hennessy wrote:
> On 31 May 2006 01:51:29 -0700, wrote:
>
> >
> >rb wrote:
> >>
> >> The US navy in particular seems to have seen the writing on the wall for
> >> some time now, hence (I would assume) part of the reason for their
> >> interest in developing the 'Millenium' gun and expressed interest in the
> >> naval 57mm cannon.
> >> http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=13559&rsbci=13158&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400&jsi=false
> >> http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/dec_04_46.php
> >
> >The 35mm Millennium gun would qualify - that's designed to fire the
> >AHEAD ammo I mentioned - but I'm not so sure about the Bofors 57mm. In
> >the AA mode that uses radar aiming and proximity fuzes, and I'm not
> >sure if either would be sensitive enough to respond to a small stealthy
> >UAV.
>
> I would have thought that the 3Ps range gate fusing would be ideal for that
> ?
>
> A UAV with a spinning propellor is not going to be overly stealthy, hard to
> see yes, invisible to radar ?
>
What makes you think UAVs are restricted to props for propulsion?
Pain

"Fred J. McCall" wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote:
>
> :"Fred J. McCall" wrote:

<snip>

> :> So you think a guy standing in a doorway over iron sights using a
> :> weapon never intended to fire at anything but the ground is going to
> :> hit one of these things but a purpose built machine designed to take
> :> on air targets is going to be unable to?
> :>
> :> Yeah, that could happen!
> :
> :Gven that the flight engineer on an Air America Huey was able to shoot down
> :an AN-2 using a hand-held AK-47,
>
> Yes, and someone knocked down a stealth fighter with a handgun.

I'm sure you'll give a cite for that, Fred, but since I know about the Huey kill
of the AN-2, I'll share first:

"It Happened To Me

by Walt Darran as told to M.L. Jones

SOF Contributing Aviation Editor Walt Darran. who flew Navy fighter planes
from 1961-67 and piloted Air America and Continental Air Services cargo
planes from 1967-69, was present in Laos when (for the only time in aviation
history) a helicopter shot down a fixed- wing aircraft - indeed, two of them.

The victims were two Polish-built PZL Mielex Antonov AN-2 biplanes, known
as Colts, of the North Vietnamese Air Force. The victor was an Air America
Huey whose only armament was an AK-47 assault rifle. As Darran tells it:

On 12 January 1968, an Air America Huey was delivering 105mm ammo
from a U.S. TACAN (navigational aids) station perched on a high
pinnacle deep in northern Laos to some artillery positions down below.
I was flying a Continental Air Services Pilatus Porter (a single-engine
turboprop transport capable of short landings and takeoffs) making some
rice drops in the area at the time. I had just headed back for LS36 (a
Royal Laotian Army base) to refuel when the choppcr pilot, Ted Moore,
screamed over the radio that two Colts were strafing and bombing the
artillery positions.
We were the only ones in VHF radio contact with one another at the
time and since I was higher, I transmitted the message to CROWN (an
orbiting C-130 with powerful radio equipment capable of relaying
messages from Laos and Vietnam to U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft carriers) for
fighters, all the while ****ed as hell that I was almost out of fuel.
I was familiar with the Colt. When I was in the Navy, they'd send us
out on "Dawn Patrols," looking for the. rascals. They were used for aerial
drops to isolated outposts, usually right at dawn in order to avoid visual
sightings. To the best of my knowledge, the military never got one.
Nor did they this time, despite the fact that all kinds of fighters were

scrambled and sent to the area. By the time they got there, it was all over.
I heard Ted say, "****, I'm faster and can outmaneuver them." So off
the Huey went in pursuit. Glen Wood, the flight mechanic, had an AK-47
and shot the *******s down while the Huey made a few passes.
One went down near the scene and the other pancaked into a hill it
couldn't outclimb, about 13 miles away.
I had to go to Vientiane the next day, so I missed getting any of the
real goodies like Russian pistols, watches and so forth that were
distributed when a Chinook brought one of the wrecks into LS36. One of
the guys did manage to save me some of the canvas from the only
fixed-wing aircraft ever shot down by a chopper."

Cited from:

http://limasite85.us/ann_holland_page_2.htm

If you consider "Soldier of Fortune" to be a somewhat untrustworthy source, there
are plenty of others describing the events. Here's another, slightly differing in
the details:

http://home.hiwaay.net/~jlwebs/misc.html

and a third, ditto:

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/Linder.html

Okay, your turn to tell us all about the the stealth fighter that was shot down
with a handgun;-)

> :using a door gun while flying co-speed and
> :parallel to a UAV should be doable, given that they can get a lot closer than
> :any fighter without needing to take avoiding action (owing to much lower --
> :zero under ideal conditions -- closure rates. A UAV is a smaller target, but
> :likely able to take less violent avoiding action. Put a lead-computing
> :sight on the MG and it's easier, or just load it with lots of tracer.
> :Depending on how close they're willing to get (mainly a question of how
> :violently the UAV is or might be maneuvering), instead of an LCOSS they might
> :be able to get away with a simple laser sight. Alternatively, forward-firing
> :rockets with prox. fuses may do the trick, at relatively low cost.
>
> Why go to all this trouble? Use the bloody system that is already
> designed to deal with air vehicles.

Because, as Paul has pointed out, it's fairly poorly suited to dealing with this
particular type of target. Doesn't mean it could never do the job, but it's an
inefficient use of resources. Larger UAVs are a different matter.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:
> "Fred J. McCall" wrote:
>
> > Guy Alcala > wrote:
> >
> > :"Fred J. McCall" wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > :> So you think a guy standing in a doorway over iron sights using a
> > :> weapon never intended to fire at anything but the ground is going to
> > :> hit one of these things but a purpose built machine designed to take
> > :> on air targets is going to be unable to?
> > :>
> > :> Yeah, that could happen!
> > :
> > :Gven that the flight engineer on an Air America Huey was able to shoot down
> > :an AN-2 using a hand-held AK-47,
> >
> > Yes, and someone knocked down a stealth fighter with a handgun.
>
> I'm sure you'll give a cite for that, Fred, but since I know about the Huey kill
> of the AN-2, I'll share first:
>
> "It Happened To Me
>
> by Walt Darran as told to M.L. Jones
>
> SOF Contributing Aviation Editor Walt Darran. who flew Navy fighter planes
> from 1961-67 and piloted Air America and Continental Air Services cargo
> planes from 1967-69, was present in Laos when (for the only time in aviation
> history) a helicopter shot down a fixed- wing aircraft - indeed, two of them.
>
> The victims were two Polish-built PZL Mielex Antonov AN-2 biplanes, known
> as Colts, of the North Vietnamese Air Force. The victor was an Air America
> Huey whose only armament was an AK-47 assault rifle. As Darran tells it:
>
> On 12 January 1968, an Air America Huey was delivering 105mm ammo
> from a U.S. TACAN (navigational aids) station perched on a high
> pinnacle deep in northern Laos to some artillery positions down below.
> I was flying a Continental Air Services Pilatus Porter (a single-engine
> turboprop transport capable of short landings and takeoffs) making some
> rice drops in the area at the time. I had just headed back for LS36 (a
> Royal Laotian Army base) to refuel when the choppcr pilot, Ted Moore,
> screamed over the radio that two Colts were strafing and bombing the
> artillery positions.
> We were the only ones in VHF radio contact with one another at the
> time and since I was higher, I transmitted the message to CROWN (an
> orbiting C-130 with powerful radio equipment capable of relaying
> messages from Laos and Vietnam to U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft carriers) for
> fighters, all the while ****ed as hell that I was almost out of fuel.
> I was familiar with the Colt. When I was in the Navy, they'd send us
> out on "Dawn Patrols," looking for the. rascals. They were used for aerial
> drops to isolated outposts, usually right at dawn in order to avoid visual
> sightings. To the best of my knowledge, the military never got one.
> Nor did they this time, despite the fact that all kinds of fighters were
>
> scrambled and sent to the area. By the time they got there, it was all over.
> I heard Ted say, "****, I'm faster and can outmaneuver them." So off
> the Huey went in pursuit. Glen Wood, the flight mechanic, had an AK-47
> and shot the *******s down while the Huey made a few passes.
> One went down near the scene and the other pancaked into a hill it
> couldn't outclimb, about 13 miles away.
> I had to go to Vientiane the next day, so I missed getting any of the
> real goodies like Russian pistols, watches and so forth that were
> distributed when a Chinook brought one of the wrecks into LS36. One of
> the guys did manage to save me some of the canvas from the only
> fixed-wing aircraft ever shot down by a chopper."
>
> Cited from:
>
> http://limasite85.us/ann_holland_page_2.htm
>
> If you consider "Soldier of Fortune" to be a somewhat untrustworthy source, there
> are plenty of others describing the events. Here's another, slightly differing in
> the details:
>
> http://home.hiwaay.net/~jlwebs/misc.html
>
> and a third, ditto:
>
> http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/Linder.html
>
> Okay, your turn to tell us all about the the stealth fighter that was shot down
> with a handgun;-)
>
> > :using a door gun while flying co-speed and
> > :parallel to a UAV should be doable, given that they can get a lot closer than
> > :any fighter without needing to take avoiding action (owing to much lower --
> > :zero under ideal conditions -- closure rates. A UAV is a smaller target, but
> > :likely able to take less violent avoiding action. Put a lead-computing
> > :sight on the MG and it's easier, or just load it with lots of tracer.
> > :Depending on how close they're willing to get (mainly a question of how
> > :violently the UAV is or might be maneuvering), instead of an LCOSS they might
> > :be able to get away with a simple laser sight. Alternatively, forward-firing
> > :rockets with prox. fuses may do the trick, at relatively low cost.
> >
> > Why go to all this trouble? Use the bloody system that is already
> > designed to deal with air vehicles.
>
> Because, as Paul has pointed out, it's fairly poorly suited to dealing with this
> particular type of target. Doesn't mean it could never do the job, but it's an
> inefficient use of resources. Larger UAVs are a different matter.
>
> Guy

SAAF also claims a door gunner kill against a Zimbabwe? Defender.
There are likely to be other accounts as well. Of course the ratio of
fixed vs rotary in not in the Helo's favor :)
Pain